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ABSTRACT
Proliferation of mobile devices and sensors in common use is anticipated to have a
key role in building a smarter planet. The future Internet will be dominated by vast
amount of sensing data. This thesis attacks a grand challenge in this vision: how to
extract human-consumable information from such data? The prime contribution
of this work is a framework called FusionSuite that facilitates the development
of future applications and services based on mobile sensing data. The data in
this type of “wide-area” sensing applications are not obtained from a controlled
sensing system, rather collected from a dynamic and uncoordinated set of users
and autonomous systems.
This thesis focuses on studying research challenges that are revealed when
building a general-purpose data distillation framework. Four research problems
are identified and addressed: i) how to model non-linear cyber-physical systems
using sparsely collected data with guarantees on the accuracy, ii) how to clean the
unreliable, irrelevant, and noisy data collected by unscreened users to achieve the
best performance in modeling, iii) how to share users information without breach-
ing their personal privacy, and iv) how to collect data from autonomous sensing
systems to optimize the modeling accuracy. FusionSuite tackles all issues in an
application-independent manner to simplify wide-area sensing application devel-
opment.
The first challenge is addressed by combining techniques from data mining
and estimation theory where the advantages in error-bounded modeling meet the
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complex high dimensional data analysis. We overcome the second challenge by
creating a general abstraction of sensing data that can be handed to a machine
learning and data mining construct called FactFinder. The privacy concerns are
addressed by allowing users to share features unusable in inferring the private in-
formation, but yet useful for the purpose of data modeling. Finally, an optimized
data collection protocol enables prioritizing communication in a resource con-
strained multi-hop collection network such that the desirable modeling accuracy
is reached with the minimal cost.
We demonstrate the features of FusionSuite by developing a participatory sens-
ing application for green transportation, called GreenGPS. The service helps users
save fuel by calculating the most fuel efficient route between any given origin and
destination. In order to predict how fuel consumption varies from road to road
and vehicle to vehicle, the engine performance data are collected from users. The
fuel consumption models enable accurate prediction and routing. FusionSuite re-
solves major challenges in this application that are common to many wide-area
sensing services and hence prove to be a necessary tool in building such systems.
As an experimental testbed, 100 vehicles are equipped with cellphones to collect
fuel efficiency data enabling the GreenGPS service and the FusionSuite libraries
to run in a small scale.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Thanks to the proliferation of sensors in common use (e.g., GPS, camera phones,
smart meters, etc), the rate of growth of generated sensory data far outstrips human
capacity to consume it. An increasingly important category of applications in
the future “smart planet” will be information distillation applications that convert
myriads of available raw data to high-level actionable information. This thesis
studies such emerging applications and the challenges they pose and builds a set
of generic tools to address those. The key novelty lies in merging techniques from
data mining, machine learning and estimation theory to build reliably accurate
yet complex distillation tools. The end-product of this thesis is FusionSuite, a
framework that facilitates development of future wide-area sensing applications
by overcoming challenges in cyber-physical data distillation.
Our work is motivated by cyber-physical data distillation applications that col-
lect data samples from the physical world to generalize and understand the be-
havior of the underlying system, and to predict its behavior. Many prospective
applications are expected to fall into this category. Examples include a service
that models household energy consumption based on appliance usage in order to
help users save on energy costs, or an application that generates a model relating
exercise and diet to the amount of weight loss. We try to answer questions such
as: what are fundamentally different characteristics of cyber-physical data that
have not been considered to their full extent before? What properties of common
sensing applications can be exploited to build a common framework? What re-
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strictions are introduced in this new category of applications and how they can be
satisfied?
The main contribution of this thesis is a new software suite, called FusionSuite,
that embodies the services developed in this work to enable participatory sensing
applications that follow the information distillation model. We address major re-
search challenges involved with designing such software suite: i) how to model
non-linear cyber-physical systems using sparsely collected data with guarantees
on the accuracy, ii) how to clean the unreliable, irrelevant, and noisy data col-
lected by unscreened users to achieve the best performance in modeling, iii) how
to share users information without breaching their personal privacy, and iv) how to
collect data from autonomous sensing systems to optimize the modeling accuracy.
We focus on a green navigation service, called GreenGPS, as an example of
emerging cyber-physical data distillation applications. GreenGPS helps drivers to
save on fuel by finding fuel-efficient routes for their vehicles [Ganti et al., 2010].
The key observation for this system is that the fuel-efficient route does not always
coincide with the shortest or fastest routes, and may be a function of vehicle and
road type. In this participatory sensing application, users share their commute
information to allow the system to learn models of fuel-consumption. Model-
ing fuel-consumption is a data distillation task that forms the principal challenge
in developing GreenGPS. By building the service, we uncover data distillation
challenges and evaluate how FusionSuite tools and features can be used in devel-
opment of a real application. We describe the details of the application and the
instances of the data distillation challenges throughout the thesis.
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4, Data 
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Service Clients
Embedded 
Devices
Figure 1.1: Architecture of the FusionSuite software suite.
1.1 Thesis Statement
We summarize the thesis statement as follows: Information distillation requires
a strenuous effort when developing wide-area sensing applications. Four major
challenges are often raised: First, how to accurately and reliably model sparsely
collected high-dimensional sensing data. Second, how to eliminate noisy and
unreliable data in a general fashion and therefore support contribution from a
large population of uncoordinated users. Third, how to alleviate users privacy
concerns when sharing data traces that can potentially reveal private informa-
tion. Finally, how to optimize the data dissemination in multi-hop networks that
collect data to be modeled. All such challenges can be addressed in a single
application-independent framework to facilitate the information distillation task
in development of future wide-area sensing applications.
1.2 Thesis Contributions
The following are the main contributions of this thesis:
1. FusionSuite Architecture: Wide-area sensing applications often need to
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provide service based on models of the physical world that are constructed
using sensing data. In the FusionSuite architecture, an application-specific
Application Server uses the modeling information delivered by application-
independent data processing units to provide service. Sensing applications
may use FusionSuite by configuring different components through config-
uration files or small application-specific plug-ins. The system architecture
design is illustrated in Figure 1.1.
FusionSuite architecture embodies a set of data collection and sharing com-
ponents on the client side (frontend) and a set of data processing, aggrega-
tion, and modeling tools on the backend servers. The backend is responsi-
ble for collecting the data shared by a pool of users, and performing data
cleaning and modeling. The frontend efficiently collects and shares data
with the backend. The applications which use FusionSuite may use dif-
ferent combinations of the components depending on their objectives. The
data modeling and cleaning components assume that the application relies
an off line analysis of sensing data. The data sharing component assumes
participation-based and non real-time data collection that can be used for of-
fline analysis while the data collection component can be used for real-time
online data analysis as well as offline data sharing. Table 1.1 depicts how
different components are suitable for various types of sensing applications.
The key mechanisms and the theory behind each component in this archi-
tecture are presented first and the implementation details of FusionSuite are
later discussed in Chapter 6.
2. Reliable Modeling of Sparse High-dimensional Data : In most cases,
cyber-physical data are high-dimensional and correspond to complex non-
linear behavior. Such complexities need a hierarchy of models to capture the
4
Online Monitoring Participatory Sensing Offline Modeling
Data Modeling X X X
Data Cleaning X X
Data Sharing X
Data Collection X X
Table 1.1: Sample applications of the FusionSuite components.
system behavior at different levels of abstraction. Yet, the curse of dimen-
sionality prevents reliable modeling at sparsely sampled input subspaces.
There are various machine learning and data mining methods that can be
used to capture the high complexity or high dimensionality of the system.
What is missing is a framework that is able to reliably model the system with
arbitrary levels of generalization. Questions such as “how to ensure reliabil-
ity of modeling with arbitrary levels of generalization?” or “How to choose
a cost-efficient model for prediction?” remain unharnessed. We marry tech-
niques from estimation theory with data mining and machine learning to
model such non-linear systems while still providing reliability bounds. We
propose Sparse Regression Cubes, a data mining construct to address this
challenge. Chapter 2 discusses the details of our proposed data modeling
framework.
3. Application-independent Data Cleaning: The data in a wide-area sensing
application are often collected in an uncoordinated manner. Without coor-
dination, the data are prone to various sources of errors, including incorrect
setup and usage, wrong calibration, faulty sensors, and malicious behavior.
Most participatory sensing applications demand a significant effort in under-
standing and removing outliers and errors. However, it becomes a research
challenge to study how to remove unreliable data in a general way without
any application specific knowledge. FusionSuite provides generic means of
achieving this goal with no dependence on application specific knowledge.
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We adopt a common tool in machine learning and data mining communities
called FactFinder. FactFinders deal with extracting true or relevant claims
and are used as the core data cleaning module. In Chapter 3, we describe
the data cleaning engine in more details and present the methodology used
for fact-finding.
4. Privacy-aware Data Sharing: In many cases, sharing individual data traces
may breach personal privacy. For example, time and location attributes in-
volved in sampling may be sufficient to identify the users even if the data
are anonymized. This concern can hugely impact the user participation and
the amount of data that are being collected. Our data sharing approach is
to alleviate some of the concerns by altering the data that are being shared.
The question remains how to perform modeling using altered data. Our
approach to user privacy and data sharing are presented in Chapter 4.
5. Modeling-aware Data Collection: Spatio-temporal data streams constitute
a large portion of sensing data that are often collected in a multi-hop fash-
ion through wireless nodes. Given the set of components that are used to
model and distill the data, it becomes important to optimize network oper-
ation and data distillation process as a single system. To that end, we pro-
pose data collection protocols that control data flow and aggregation such
that the collection costs are minimized while modeling remains as accurate
as desired. The main observation for such optimization is that sensor data
are only valuable when they affect the accuracy of modeling. The major
challenge becomes how to use the modeling information in data collection
to optimize network operation. We propose a transport layer protocol that
probabilistically prioritizes data flows to ensure quality of modeling while
minimizing the resource consumption. The data collection challenge is dis-
6
cussed in Chapter 5.
6. Data Distillation in the GreenGPS Navigation Service: Vehicular fuel
consumption is a complex function of various road and vehicle parame-
ters. Therefore, a single nominal MPG value of the car does not accurately
represent what will be the actual fuel consumption. Finding a fuel-efficient
route calls for accurate fuel consumption modeling. GreenGPS takes a data-
driven approach to construct such models. The service exploits measure-
ments of vehicular fuel consumption sensors, available via the On-Board
Diagnostics (OBD-II) interface standardized in all vehicles sold in the US
since 1996. The interface allows access to several engine sensors and ve-
hicle gauges. OBDII system is designed for monitoring the vehicle health
through several sensors such as engine RPM, manifold pressure, air flow,
and oxygen. Using FusionSuite framework, we implement the data distilla-
tion backend for the GreenGPS service.
1.3 Thesis Impact
The work in this thesis has led to publication of several research papers in refereed
conferences in the area of sensor networks and cyber-physical systems. As a soft-
ware tool, FusionSuite source code is available to be used in various participatory
sensing applications.
• Data Modeling (ICCPS’11 [Ahmadi et al., 2011], DCOSS’11 [Wang et al.,
2011b])
• Data Cleaning (FUSION’11 [Wang et al., 2011a])
• Data Sharing (Sensys’10 [Ahmadi et al., 2010b])
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• Data Collection (RTSS’09 [Ahmadi and Abdelzaher, 2009], ICCPS’11 [Ah-
madi et al., 2010a])
• The GreenGPS Project [Ganti et al., 2010].
As a direct result, FusionSuite will be used in a testbed deployment of the
GreenGPS application on 100 vehicles of the Facilities and Services of University
of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. This project in particular helps the facilities and
services to optimize their fleet operation by rerouting through more fuel efficient
paths, to better schedule maintenance, and to monitor how the fleet is operating
for various tasks.
1.4 Thesis Organization
This thesis is organized as follows: In Chapter 2, we address the data modeling
challenge and present our proposed modeling tool. The data cleaning challenges
are discussed in Chapter 3 and a fact-finder based solution is proposed and eval-
uated. Chapter 4 describes the data privacy issue and proposes and evaluates a
solution. Optimized data collection in multi-hop scenarios is discussed in Chap-
ter 5. Chapter 6 presents the implementation details of FusionSuite. We present
the related work in Chapter 7 and finally conclude the dissertation in Chapter 8.
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CHAPTER 2
MODELING SPARSE SENSING DATA
Cyber-physical data-distillation applications need to understand the end-to-end
behavior of complex systems where computing interacts with physical world.
This becomes significantly important in applications where some components,
interactions, processes, or constraints are not well-understood or not measured.
In GreenGPS, for example, predicting the fuel consumption of a vehicle depends
not only on fixed factors such as weight, frontal area, and engine type, but also on
variables such as vehicle speed, acceleration, congestion patterns, and idle time,
which are hard to predict accurately in advance. A single MPG rating (miles per
gallon in highway and city) is quite inadequate. For instance, it cannot help decid-
ing which of two alternative city routes will consume less fuel. The data modeling
component in FusionSuite tackles this in an application-independent manner.
Building first principle models from scratch is not always practical, as too many
parameters are involved. In contrast, using regression to estimate model coeffi-
cients is challenging because reliable estimation suffers the curse of dimension-
ality. The state space grows exponentially in the number of parameters, making
sampling of that space sparse. As the number of parameters increases, estimated
models become less reliable. We use the term reliable to denote a model that
remains sufficiently accurate over the whole input range and can predict future
queries accurately. We need to answer questions such as how to ensure reliability
of modeling with arbitrary levels of generalization? How to choose a cost-efficient
model for prediction? Regression modeling of cyber-physical data has several
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challenges which have been addressed in different communities in isolation:
• Huge amount of high-dimensional data are available due to proliferation of
sensors. To this end, data mining tools efficiently tackle high-dimensionality.
• Physical phenomena and cyber-physical systems are complex and non-linear.
Many data mining or machine learning tools have been proposed to capture
the complexity.
• Quality of modeling should be guaranteed even when given sparse data.
Numerous estimation theory methods handle such cases.
In this space, a framework to address all three issues above is missing. We pro-
pose a new hierarchical modeling technique that is a result of an interdisciplinary
effort to combine the best of estimation-theory and data mining techniques to en-
able modeling such systems reliably at multiple degrees of abstraction. Our new
modeling construct, called the Sparse Regression Cube, simultaneously (i) par-
titions sparse, high-dimensional measurements into subspaces within which reli-
able models apply and (ii) determines the best reliable model for each partition,
quantifying uncertainty in output prediction.
Importantly, sparse regression cubes uncover the inherent generalization hier-
archy across such subspaces. For instance, in GreenGPS sparse regression cubes
will tell how best to categorize cars for purposes of building fuel prediction mod-
els in each category. Categorization could be by car class, make, model, manufac-
turer, year, or other attributes. These categories have a hierarchical structure. One
may build prediction models for cars by make, model and year (e.g., Ford Taurus
2005, Toyota Celica 2000). One may also aggregate these over years or over car
models to generate prediction models for larger categories (e.g., all Ford Taurus
cars, or all Toyotas of 2000). Such generalizations help when there is not enough
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data on each type of car to build a reliable model for that type alone. They are also
good for predicting performance of a car from performance of others (in the same
generalized category). Hence, finding accurate generalizations is an interesting
problem in cyber-physical systems where sampling is sparse and the number of
parameters is large.
We first motivate the problem in more details then formulate the problem and
present the overall structure of sparse regression cubes. The mechanisms proposed
to reliably model from sparse data are presented next. In the next section, we
discuss the scenarios where data collection cost can be incorporated into modeling
such that accurate predictions can be made with lower cost. We evaluate Sparse
Regression Cubes by modeling GreenGPS data and finally discuss the limitation
of sparse regression cubes.
2.1 Motivation
Sparse regression cubes are motivated by common use of regression modeling in
wide-area sensing applications. GreenGPS is an example where fuel-efficiency
measurements obtained from users are used to construct accurate predictive mod-
els of fuel consumption for a larger community. Particularly, users submit data
traces such as fuel consumption rate and vehicle speed. Data traces are cleaned
and segmented into tuples (as discussed later in Chapter 6) representing attributes
such as fuel consumption of the vehicles on a road segment. Each tuple consists
of the amount of fuel consumed per mile, vehicle make, model, year, and other car
and trip parameters such as the average velocity and the number of traffic lights
encountered (e.g., see Table 2.1). When a driver needs to find the most fuel effi-
cient route to a destination, this service predicts the amount of fuel consumed on
different route options using the constructed models.
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Street Attributes Vehicle Attributes
Fuel cons. Speed Lim. (vl) Lights (LT ) Stops (ST ) Weight (m) Avg. Speed (va) Make Model Year
0.030 gal/m 40.0 mph 0 1 3.086 klbs 34.3 mph Toyota Camry 2002
0.037 gal/m 25.0 mph 1 1 3.285 klbs 15.2 mph Ford Taurus 1999
0.048 gal/m 65.0 mph 0 0 4.506 klbs 59.0 mph Honda Pilot 2004
0.036 gal/m 45.0 mph 1 1 3.555 klbs 37.7 mph Chevy Impala 2003
0.027 gal/m 40.0 mph 1 0 2.723 klbs 32.9 mph Toyota Corolla 2009
0.031 gal/m 30.0 mph 0 2 2.467 klbs 25.3 mph Toyota Celica 2000
0.067 gal/m 45.0 mph 0 1 5.390 klbs 38.3 mph Toyota Highlander 2003
0.033 gal/m 40.0 mph 1 2 3.490 klbs 31.5 mph Toyota Avalon 2007
0.030 gal/m 35.0 mph 0 1 3.086 klbs 11.4 mph Toyota Camry 2000
Table 2.1: GreenGPS application samples.
GreenGPS is a complex cyber-physical system with many components (cars)
and sparse measurements (not all cars contribute data on their fuel efficiency).
Different types of cars behave differently on different roads and traffic condi-
tions when it comes to the fuel consumption. To represent the behavior of system
components, we build a hierarchy of models that could describe the system in
different input subspaces. For example, one linear regression model can predict
the fuel consumption for all Honda cars while another one predicts Toyota cars.
Some may model a more general class of cars such as all sedans or all SUVs. A
challenge is to find generalizations that lead to accurate prediction models for the
corresponding categories.
In estimation theory and statistical learning, numerous regression modeling
techniques are well-known, from least squares error estimators to singular value
decomposition and support vector regression techniques [Kutner et al., 2005].
While regression modeling is concerned with accurate estimation of regression
parameters, it does so by trying to fit the model, as best it can, to all data. In-
stead, we are concerned with dividing the multi-dimensional data into subspaces
and determining which data points and attributes to use for regression in each sub-
space such that models are reliable. Therefore, the sparse regression cube can be
thought of as a high-dimensional equivalent of linearization techniques. It com-
putes the set of “linearized” models directly from sparse observations, and derives
estimates of accuracy of these models.
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To decide how to break down the multi-dimensional data space into appro-
priate subspaces, we borrow tools from Online Analytical Processing (OLAP),
called data cubes [Gray and others, 1997]. Data cubes have been widely used for
modeling and analysis of multi-dimensional data. Conceptually speaking, they
efficiently try to group the data by all possible combinations of parameters, called
cuboids, and determine properties of data in each cuboid. Those cuboids where
data are particularly “homogeneous” are then used as the basis for data partition-
ing.
Previous techniques have not addressed reliable modeling of sparse data. For
example, regression cubes [Chen et al., 2006] and prediction cubes [Chen et al.,
2005] simply assume that a sufficient number of data points is always present. In
contrast, sampling cubes [Li et al., 2008] focus on grouping sparse data appropri-
ately into larger homogeneous categories to overcome sparseness problems, but
compute only primitive measures such as sum and average within each category.
In GreenGPS and similar sparsely-sampled cyber-physical systems, the measure-
ments provided by the users may be limited and cover only a small fraction of
input space (i.e. roads and car models in GreenGPS). When the samples used to
build a regression model are sparse, the model overfits the samples and performs
poor predictions. In the face of sparse data, traditional methods such as regression
cubes and regression trees build unreliable models that fail to predict accurately.
There are other techniques proposed in data mining and machine learning com-
munities that build generalization hierarchies suffering from the same disadvan-
tage. Most notably, regression trees [Breima et al., 1984] use a tree of regres-
sion models where the root node is the most general model that applies to all of
the input space, while children nodes are specialized to subspaces separated by
hyper-planes. Sparse regression cubes are novel in that they combine the ideas of
sampling and regression cubes to enable, for the first time, reliable and efficient
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modeling of sparse data using linear regression in each resulting data subspace.
Achieving this needs a new capability: a framework to efficiently construct sta-
tistically reliable models at different levels of generalization over the data space.
Different levels of abstraction or generalization can be compared using the mod-
eling error and appropriate data subspaces can be identified. Sparse regression
cubes also provide reliability guarantees and model confidence in each subspace.
To achieve this capability, our framework employs a set of mechanisms:
• Algebraic Representation of Regression Models and Error: Hierarchi-
cal structures such as regression trees or regression cubes tend to construct
a large (even exponential) number of models to represent all different ways
of dividing the input space into subspaces. To perform modeling efficiently,
it is desirable to be able to use the regression models of smaller subspaces to
derive regression models of larger subspaces instead of recalculating each
model from scratch. For example, when a regression model has already
been built for each car make, it is desirable to derive a model that fits all
cars just by using those constructed models. A function that allows such
recursive construction is called an Algebraic Measure. We propose a novel
representation of data that enables efficient computation of regression mod-
els and regression errors as algebraic measures.
• Reliability Measure: A measure of reliability for a particular regression
model over an input subspace indicates how well the regression model can
predict the output. We compute this measure in our framework to always
ensure that the constructed models are reliable. The measure also provides
an indication of quality of prediction by reporting a confidence interval.
• Reliable Modeling: Using the efficient representation of regression models
and measures of reliability, the framework needs to make sure that the hier-
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archy of regression models used for prediction is indeed reliable. This is an
extension to widely used forward selection techniques [Weisberg, 1980].
2.2 Problem Formulation
Sparse regression cubes consider systems where a hierarchy of regression models
is needed to capture the behavior at different levels of abstraction. This section
formulates our modeling problem, introduces data cubes, and describes how re-
gression models are organized as a data cube. Next section presents the main
contributions of our framework (i.e., the mechanisms that enable reliable hierar-
chical modeling).
Consider a set of n samples, where each sample is a tuple of d + 1 values: one
output and d inputs, or predictors, x1, . . . , xd. In the GreenGPS system, the output
is the fuel consumption of a vehicle on a specific road segment at a given time.
xjs are predictors such as average velocity, the square of the average velocity, and
the number of stop signs on the road segment. Note that xjs may be constants or
functions of the actual sensing data attributes. For example the sqaure of velocity
is a function of the actual sensing data stream which is velocity. To dissambugate,
we use sj to refer to sensing attribute j. We use yi to denote the value of the
output and xij to denote the value of input xj in the i-th sample. The modeling
framework aims to represent a complex function that relates yi to xijs using a set
of linear regression models.
We assume that a subset of input variables, namely, x1, . . . , xk, k ≤ d is used
for regression modeling. Those are called regression attributes and k is called the
number of regression dimensions. Also, we assume that another subset of inputs,
xd−l+1, . . . , xd, is used to group data together in the data cube. These attributes are
called group by attributes and l is the number of group by dimensions. Using this
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Make, Year
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Figure 2.1: A sample data cube for GreenGPS.
notation, we emphasize that an input can be a regression attribute and a group by
attribute at the same time.
As an example, suppose that we are given the samples in Table 2.1 where there
are 8 input variables in total (d = 8). A reasonable choice is to pick x1 = vl,
x2 = LT , x3 = ST , x4 = m, and x5 = va as regression attributes (k = 5) and use
x6 = make, x7 = model, and x8 = year as group by attributes (l = 3).
A data cube characterizes each group of data by a Data Cell. A data cell c
is defined by a particular assignment of values to some of group by attributes.
For example, {make=Honda} is a data cell that represents all Honda cars while
{(make,year) = (Honda, 2000)} identifies all Honda cars built in year 2000. In the
latter case, make (x6) and year (x8) are the set of group by attributes. A cuboid
is defined as the collection of all data cells which share the same set of group by
attributes. For instance, {make=Honda} and {make=Toyota} belong to the same
cuboid (make) while the data cell {(make,year) = (Honda, 2000)} belongs to the
cuboid (make,year).
Cuboids are arranged in a hyper-cube formation. Let A1 and A2 be the set of
group by attributes of two cells c1 and c2. c1 is an ancestor of c2 if A1 ⊂ A2 and
is parent of c2 if A1 ⊂ A2 and |A2| = |A1| − 1 [Li et al., 2008]. Based on our
choice of group by attributes, cuboids in the sparse regression cube are arranged
as in Figure 2.1.
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Employing continuous variables like velocity to group data may not result in
meaningful cells, because each sample may have its own unique value of that
variable. In this case, the variable can be discretized. For example, velocity can
be divided into 10mph bins (i.e., 10–20mph, 20–30mph, and so on). We assume
that appropriate discretization intervals are provided by the user.
Let vector Y = {yi : 1 ≤ i ≤ n} and matrix X = {xij|1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ j ≤ k}
be outputs and inputs to our modeling framework. Let Xc be the matrix formed
by gathering rows of matrix X which match the attribute list of data cell c (e.g. all
Honda Accords). Yc can be defined similarly by gathering corresponding values
from vector Y . Assuming a local linear behavior (i.e., linear behavior at each cell)
yields:
Yc = Xcηc + c
where c is a zero mean noise with variance σ2 that is not correlated with X .
The regression model at cell c can be estimated using the ordinary least-squares
method:
Yˆc = Xcηˆc
ηˆc = (X
T
c Xc)
−1XTc Yc (2.1)
where ηˆc is the vector of estimated regression coefficients for cell c. Let c1, . . . , cm
be children of cell c. Based on the group by nature of data cube dimensions, we
can write:
Xc = [Xc1 99
9 · · · 99
9Xcm ]T , Yc = [Yc1 99
9 · · · 99
9Ycm ]T
Similar to traditional regression methods, we use the mean square error of a
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regression model as the measure of accuracy of the model [Hastie et al., 2003;
Kutner et al., 2005]. However, we propose a particular reliability or confidence
measure for the calculated mean square error later in Section 2.3. Formally, we
use the residual sum of squared errors for a cell c, defined as follows:
Errc =
∑
i∈c
(yi − yˆi)2 = (Yc −Xcηˆc)T (Yc −Xcηˆc) (2.2)
The following example illustrates regression coefficients and error of a data
cell.
Example 1 (Regression Coefficients and Error) Given the data in Table 2.1 and
cell c : {make = Toyota}, we have:
Yc =

0.030
0.027
0.031
0.067
0.033
0.03

Xc =

40 0 1 3.086 34.3
40 1 0 2.723 32.9
30 0 2 2.467 25.3
45 0 1 5.390 38.3
40 1 2 3.490 31.5
35 0 1 3.086 11.4

According to (2.1) and (2.2), the estimated regression parameters and residual
sum of squares for cell c are given by:
ηˆc =
[
−0.0005 −0.0034 −0.0002 0.0149 0.0003
]T
Errc = (Yc −Xcηˆc)T (Yc −Xcηˆc) = 3.9342× 10−5
The values of regression coefficients should be calculated for each data cell.
This calls for an efficient computation method using an algebraic representation
of a regression model. This mechanism is described in the next section.
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2.3 Reliability Mechanisms
This section presents the mechanisms that are used in sparse regression cubes to
construct a reliable hierarchy of regression models for different levels of abstrac-
tion over the input space. We first present an algebraic representation of regres-
sion models that enables efficient calculation of regression coefficients and error
at each data cell. Next, we describe the mechanism used to determine if a cell
is reliable or not and to provide a confidence interval with every prediction. We
propose our reliable modeling technique that uses the algebraic representation and
the reliability measure to select appropriate predictors for each data cell. Finally,
we summarize how the cube is constructed and predictions are performed.
2.3.1 Algebraic Representation of Regression Models and Error
The size of the data cube described in Section 2.2 can be exponential with respect
to the number of group by attributes, d. Although later in this section we discuss
how to avoid building the exponentially large structure, it is essential to compute
regression model coefficients and error (ηˆc and Errc) for each cell efficiently and
without accessing the raw data. It was shown previously that regression coeffi-
cients, ηˆc, could in fact be efficiently computed in a hierarchical manner [Chen et
al., 2006]. Here, we show that regression error can be computed in a hierarchical
manner as well.
We propose a set of matrices to be stored in each cell that can be used to derive
regression models while supporting distributive aggregation:
• ρc = Y Tc Yc : A scalar value
• νc = XTc Yc : Vector of size k
• Θc = XTc Xc : A k × k matrix
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• nc = Number of tuples in cell c
This is called the Algebraic Representation of the cell regression model. Note
that, none of the matrices used in this representation depend on n. Therefore, their
sizes are constant with respect to the number of data tuples. An example of such
algebraic representation is presented next.
Example 2 (Algebraic Representation) Consider data cell c : {make = Toyota}
and matrices Xc and Yc from the previous example. One can derive the algebraic
representation matrices as follows:
ρc = 0.0091
νc =
[
8.595 0.06 0.255 0.8115 6.6492
]T
Θc =

8950 80 260 796.53 6829.5
80 2 2 6.21 64.4
260 2 11 23.48 197.6
796.53 6.21 23.48 73.78 609.4
6829.5 64.4 197.6 609.4 5488.09

nc = 6
In order to calculate the regression model from the algebraic representation, we
reformulate the derivation of regression coefficients and error for cell c as follows:
ηˆc = (X
T
c Xc)
−1XTc Yc = Θ
−1
c νc (2.3)
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Errc = (Yc −Xcηˆc)T (Yc −Xcηˆc) =
Y Tc Yc − (Xcηˆc)TYc − Y Tc Xcηˆc + (Xcηˆc)TXcηˆc =
ρc − ηˆTc νc − νTc ηˆc + ηˆTc Θcηˆc (2.4)
So far, we have shown how to derive the regression coefficients and error from
the algebraic representation. Next, we show how they can be hierarchically ag-
gregated. Let i = 1, . . . ,m be the m cells used to obtain aggregate values for a
cell c. It can easily be verified that ρc, νc,Θc, and nc are distributive measures and
can be accurately aggregated as follows:
ρc = Y
T
c Yc = [Yc1 99
9 · · · 99
9Ycm ]

Yc1
999
...
999
Ycm

=
m∑
i=1
Y Tci Yci =
m∑
i=1
ρci
νc = X
T
c Yc = [Xc1 99
9 · · · 99
9Xcm ]

Yc1
999
...
999
Ycm

=
m∑
i=1
XTciYci =
m∑
i=1
νci
nc =
m∑
i=1
nci
The result for Θc is obtained similarly in previous work [Chen et al., 2006]:
Θc =
m∑
i=1
Θci
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We conclude that the regression error can be derived hierarchically alongside
with the regression parameters from the algebraic representation. The space com-
plexity of the algebraic representation is O(k2).
2.3.2 Reliability Measure
The second mechanism proposed in our framework is to determine whether or not
a specific model can be confidently used for prediction. There are several estab-
lished statistical tests [Kutner et al., 2005] to evaluate a regression model (e.g.,
Cross-validation). In all cases, access to the raw samples is required for the test to
work. We develop a reliability criterion which only uses the information stored in
the data cells (i.e., the algebraic representation). Not requiring further information
makes this criterion easy to evaluate and therefore usable in the context of a data
cube with a potentially large number of data cells.
The purpose of this criterion is to make sure that the sampled estimator remains
the least error estimator for the whole distribution of data corresponding to the
data cell. We use the term Reliable Cell to refer to a cell where the above is true
with a probability greater than a threshold, p:
Definition 1 (Reliable Cell) For a given probability threshold, p, a cell is reliable
if it satisfies Pr[||ηˆc − ηc|| > δ] < p.
Here, ηˆc and ηc are the estimated and actual regression parameters, δ is the
confidence interval, and ||x|| denotes the `2 norm of vector x. Intuitively, we
use Markov’s inequality to derive an upper bound on the difference between our
estimated coefficients and the actual values:
Theorem 1 Pr[||ηˆc − ηc|| > δ] < kσ2δ2λmin(XTc Xc)
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where λmin denotes the minimum eigenvalue and σ2 is the variance of the inher-
ent model error. To prove the theorem, we observe that ηˆc is the least squared
estimator of ηc, and hence is unbiased [Kutner et al., 2005]:
E[ηˆc] = ηc
Using Markov’s inequality, the probability at which the estimator deviates from
its mean is shown [Heij et al., 2007] to be:
Pr[||ηˆc − ηc|| > δ] ≤ Pr[|ηˆc(i)− ηc(i)| > δ√
k
for some i]
≤ kvar(ηˆc(i))
δ2
assuming that all sample errors, ei, are zero mean and have the same variance of
σ2. This is a common assumption for linear regression models. Consequently, the
variance of ηˆc equals σ2(XTc Xc)
−1. Hence:
var(ηˆc(i)) = σ
2λmax(X
T
c Xc)
−1
Pr[||ηˆc − ηc|| > δ] ≤ kσ
2
δ2λmin(XTc Xc)
where λmax and λmin are the maximum and minimum eigenvalues. Since eis have
zero mean, σ2 can be estimated from the mean square error of the regression. In
particular, σˆ2 is obtained by [Kutner et al., 2005]:
σˆ2 =
∑
i belongs to c e
2
i
nc − k =
Errc
nc − k
The reason behind using nc − k in the denominator is that |ηc| = k degrees
of freedom is lost by fixing the mean values in ηc. To illustrate this, consider
the case where nc = k. Since the regression model completely fits the data, the
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regression error is always zero. This overfitting leads to a wrong estimate for σ2
if the degrees of freedom are not adjusted.
In our algorithm, we use a probability threshold of p = 0.05 to identify whether
or not a cell is reliable. In other words, we want the regression coefficients to be
in the confidence interval of δ2 with at least 95% probability. To capture the effect
of scaling in ηc, we set δ to be `2 norm of ηˆc, δ = ||ηˆc||. Tivially, we cannot build
a model when the number of samples is less than the number of dimensions (i.e.,
nc < k). Therefore, a cell is reliable if it satisfies nc > k and kσˆ
2
δ2λmin(Θc)
< 0.05.
The benefit of employing this criterion instead of using traditional approaches
such as cross-validation is its minimal computational overhead. A cross-validation
is very time consuming due to the need to access the raw data. To illustrate this,
we compared the average execution time of our reliability condition against leave-
one-out cross-validation for an average data cell (which matches 5000 tuples) both
implemented in C++. On a Windows desktop computer with 4GB of memory, the
cross-validation is 5 × 104 times slower than evaluating the reliability criterion
largely because of access to the raw dataset.
For any given prediction task given to the data cell, the expected prediction
error can be derived using:
E[(y − xηˆc)2] = E[(xηc + − xηˆc)2] = E[(x(ηc − ηˆc) + )2] (2.5)
where y is the actual value of the attribute being predicted. In case that the
regression model in cell c is perfectly accurate (ηˆc = ηc), we expect the following
prediction error according to (2.5):
EPE = E[2] = σ2 =
Errc
nc − k (2.6)
We can derive a 95%-confidence bound on the prediction error using the reli-
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ability criterion. Since  and x are independent and  has a zero mean, expected
prediction error equals:
EPE = E[(xT (ηc − ηˆc))2] + E[2] ≤
E[xTx(ηc − ηˆc)T (ηc − ηˆc)] + σ2
Cauchy-Schwarz inequality is used here to conclude that (xT (ηc − ηˆc))2 ≤
xTx(ηc− ηˆc)T (ηc− ηˆc). We already know that with 95% probability, ||ηc− ηˆc|| ≤ δ
if the reliability condition is met. Therefore, with 95% probability the prediction
error is bounded by:
EPE ≤ E[xTx]δ2 + σ2 (2.7)
Example 3 (Data Cell Confidence) Consider the cell c : {make = Toyota}
from the previous example. We estimate σˆ2:
σˆ2 =
Errc
nc − k =
3.9342× 10−5
6− 5 = 3.9342× 10
−5
We have δ = ||ηˆc|| = 0.0153. So, the confidence probability is computed as
kσ2
δ2λmin(Θc)
=
1.9671× 10−4
(2.3387× 10−4)(0.8172) = 1.0337 (2.8)
This means that the probability at which the estimated parameters deviate more
than δ from the actual values is bounded by 1.0337 (i.e., not bounded at all). Since
this is more than the 5% limit in reliability condition, the cell is unreliable.
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2.3.3 Reliable Modeling
The third mechanism proposed in our framework is to choose the right subset of
predictors that ensures the reliability of the model hierarchy by employing the al-
gebraic representation and evaluating the reliability criterion. A smaller model
requires fewer samples to achieve the same confidence level. However, for a
given sample set, reducing model size theoretically increases the regression er-
ror. Hence, our goal is to find a subset of attributes which minimizes the error
while the data cell is kept reliable.
The problems of feature selection and model shrinkage have been widely stud-
ied [Hastie et al., 2003]. Mechanisms such as forward selection or backward
elimination [Weisberg, 1980] are widely used to reduce the number of predictors
used in the regression models and can prevent the over-fitting of a model. Our re-
liable modeling mechanism differs from traditional feature selection in the sense
that it is based on our reliability measure. Hence, it can build models with quan-
tifiable confidence values. Furthermore, it only uses the algebraic representation
matrices to permit efficient modeling. We first define the reduced model, a model
that only uses a subset of predictors for prediction and then propose a simple ap-
proach based on the forward selection method to derive the reduced model from
the original model without accessing raw data.
Let L = {ar1 , . . . , arj} be the set of j attributes used for regression. We define
XL to be sub-matrix of X given by column indices in L. The following equation
represents a regression carried out only on the attributes included in L:
Yˆc = X
L
c ηˆ
L
c
ηˆLc is the Reduced Regression Parameters based on attribute list L. Err
L
c is the
corresponding regression error.
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Computing ηˆLc and Err
L
c for every L should be fast and efficient. To this end,
we propose a method based on transforming the algebraic representation matri-
ces. The transformed matrices are then used as before to derive ηˆLc and Err
L
c .
Formally, the reduced model based on L on cell c is described by the following
algebraic representation:
• ρLc = Y TY = ρc
• νLc : a sub-vector of νc obtained by selecting dimensions in L.
νLc = (X
L
c )
TYc = rowsL(X
T
c )Yc = rowsL(νc)
• ΘLc : a sub-matrix of Θc obtained by choosing row and column indices in L
ΘLc = (X
L
c )
TXLc = rowsL(X
T
c )colsL(X
T
c ) =
rowsL(colsL(X
T
c Xc)) = rowsL(colsL(Θc))
• nLc = nc
It is clear that the elements in algebraic representation matrices are not modified
at all. In fact, a reduced model is obtained just by excluding some of the rows and
columns of the original measures from matrix operations. This means that no extra
storage or computation is required on top of the original algebraic representation.
Given such an approach for reducing model dimensions, the naive model re-
duction technique is to search over all possible subsets of regression attributes
and find the one which conforms to the reliability condition and has the minimum
regression error. This search space is indeed exponential in terms of k which
causes this method to become impractical.
Our solution is based on a simple greedy approximation. The idea is to start
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Algorithm 1 Model Reduction
1: L← {}
2: while |L| < k do
3: Candidates← {}
4: for every 1 ≤ a ≤ k, a /∈ L do
5: Compute the transformed matrices for L ∪ {a}
6: if corresponding model is reliable then
7: Candidates← Candidates ∪ {a}
8: end if
9: end for
10: if Candidates = {} then
11: return L
12: end if
13: a∗ = argmina∈CandidatesErr
L∪{a}
c
14: L← L ∪ {a∗}
15: end while
Table 2.2: An example of model reduction procedure.
L Errc Reliable? L Errc Reliable?
{vl} 8.1× 10−4 yes {m, vl} 6.51× 10−5 yes
{LT} 7.3× 10−3 no {m,LT} 9.63× 10−5 no
{ST} 3.2× 10−3 no {m,ST} 1.40× 10−4 no
{m} 1.4× 10−4 yes {m, va} 1.37× 10−4 yes
{va} 1.0× 10−3 yes
with an empty model, L = {}, defined to always output zero. At each step, for
every attribute a that is not already included in L, we create a larger model that
includes L and a. We find the attribute, a∗, which minimizes the regression error
of the resulting model among all of the alternatives and set L = L ∪ {a∗}. In
this process, we only consider reliable extensions. We continue this process until
either there is no attribute that can be added to L in a reliable fashion or L includes
all of the attributes.
The pseudo-code for model reduction is presented in Algorithm 1. The run-
ning time of this method is O(k2). The following gives an example of the model
reduction algorithm:
Example 4 (Model Reduction) Considering cell c in Example 2, we run the model
28
reduction algorithm to find the appropriate set of predictors. We choose L = {}
at the beginning and add all potential attributes to L. The left section of Table 2.2
shows 5 different sets of single attributes. Then, the error is computed for each
set according to (2.2). After the first step, only the models based on L = {vl},
L = {m} and L = {va} are reliable while L = {m} has the least mean square er-
ror. Therefore, we fix m as one of the predictors and try all attribute combinations
involving m in the next step (right section of Table 2.2).
After the second step, L = {vl,m} and L = {m, va} both generate reliable
models while {vl,m} has the minimum error. Trying combinations of size three
while fixing m and vl as two of the predictors yields one reliable sub-model:
L = {vl, ST,m}. At this point adding any more attributes to the list leads to
an unreliable model. The model reduction algorithm outputs L = {vl, ST,m} as
the final set of predictors. The final regression error is 1.3486× 10−4
2.3.4 Summary
A complete data cube has an exponential number of cuboids (and data cells) in
terms of the number of group by dimensions, d. Calculating even simple measures
over all data cells can be intractable when facing such an exponential explosion.
Hence, data cubes are often partially constructed or materialized [Li et al., 2008;
Chen et al., 2006; Harinarayan et al., 1996]. In other words, only measures for
a small subset of cuboids, called Cube Shell, are calculated to improve the effi-
ciency. We aim to limit the number of cells that are being materialized to the ones
which provide the most useful predictive information similar to the Cube Shell
Construction algorithm [Li et al., 2008].
Given the pieces that enable reliable hierarchical modeling, we summarize the
cube construction procedure as follows: We start by the apex cuboid (which
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groups all data together and builds a single model) and compute the reliable re-
gression model for all of the cells in that cuboid and its children cuboids. We then
find the cuboid with the lowest prediction error compared to its parent. In this pro-
cess, cuboids that contain an unreliable cell are discarded. At each step, we add
the cuboid with the maximum reduction in average error and consider its children
as the next-step candidates. This is done until the there is no error reduction above
some threshold or all new cells are unreliable.
The intuition behind this algorithm is that drilling down to child cuboids should
reasonably improve the prediction accuracy. If the child cuboid does not have
a significantly lower regression error than the parent, it is unlikely to be more
accurate since it is more sparse comparing to the parent.
When it is desired to predict an output (e.g., fuel consumption of a Ford Taurus
2005 on a given route), we start from the bottom of the cube. If the matching base
cell is materialized (i.e., we have a cell for a Ford Taurus 2005), the regression
model from that cell is used to derive the output value. Otherwise, ancestor cells
are considered (e.g., “Ford Taurus”, “Ford” or “All cars”). To this end, we perform
a tree search from the base cell until we find a materialized parent cell and use it
for prediction. We emphasize that any data cell that is materialized is reliable
according to our criterion.
2.4 Cost-sensitive Modeling
Predictions in a sensing application are often performed with a limited amount
of resources that are available to collect data. In this section, we optimize the
configuration of data used for modeling such that the modeling is done with the
maximum utility subject to resource constraints. Rather than optimizing generic
network-level metrics such as latency or throughput, we directly optimize the
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quality of regression modeling given the constraints. Towards this end, we ex-
tend sparse regression cubes to accommodate cost constraints imposed by the data
collection system. This section formulates the cost-sensitive modeling problem
and proposes solutions for single-dimensional and multi-dimensional cost bud-
gets. Next, we describe how to use the multi-dimensional cost budgets with sparse
regression cubes.
2.4.1 Problem Formulation
In a prediction model, several sensing data streams and processes can be used as
a predictor. Observe that different data attributes have different qualities in terms
of accuracy, reliability, and relevance depending on the information source(s) and
fusion algorithms applied to compute the attribute. At the same time, different
amounts of resources are involved in acquiring or computing the different data
attributes. For example, real-time video monitoring of the target provides much
more accurate information for trajectory prediction than acoustic intensity. How-
ever, video monitoring consumes significantly higher bandwidth. In GreenGPS,
variables such as street congestion or vehicle acceleration may be good candi-
dates as fuel consumption predictors. However, data from each source have dif-
ferent costs. Extracting the number of stop signs and stop lights on a given street
segment is a certain process that has a particular monetary cost (to access the
appropriate database).
An interesting problem is to optimize the prediction accuracy of the target track-
ing system while keeping cost within budget. More formally, the system is repre-
sented by the following parameters:
• An output variable y, and d input variables (attributes) x1, x2, ...xd as defined
in Section 2.2.
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• The cost cj (per unit time) associated with measuring or computing each
data attribute xj .
• The cost budget CB (per unit time). The prediction cost should be kept
within budget:
∑
j∈used cj ≤ CB.
Note that, in the above formulation, the costs cj and the budgetCB can be scalar
values or a vector of multiple costs. In the systems that one single resource is
critical or is the bottleneck resource, the budget can be represented only in terms
of that resource and hence a scalar value is used. However, in heterogeneous
systems that have multiple resources that can be a bottleneck, a vector of values
represents costs and the budget for each resource. We first present our solution to
address the scalar cost and then discuss multiple dimensions of cost.
To evaluate the accuracy of the prediction model for y, we use the sum of
squared prediction errors, defined by (2.9), where yˆi is the predicted value of the
output variable y:
Errc =
∑
i
(yi − yˆi)2 (2.9)
The problem becomes how to select the data attributes to use in prediction mod-
eling such that the above prediction error is minimized subject to cost budget con-
straints. In other words, in the space of models M , find:
M∗ = argmin
M
Errc(M) (2.10)
Subject to: ∑
j∈M
cj ≤ CB
where M∗ is the desirable modeling scheme that minimizes the prediction error
subject to the cost budget constraint. M can be a single regression model or a
hierarchy.
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2.4.2 Approximation Algorithm
The simplest way of incorporating prediction costs into regression modeling is
to add a stop condition to the predictor selection algorithm. The stop condi-
tion checks whether adding any predictors to the regression model violates the
resource budget. For example, our reliable modeling algorithm presented in Sec-
tion 2.3 can stop when either of the reliability stop condition or resource budget
stop conditions are met. Such approach is generally used in other domains to
make regression modeling cost-sensitive [Goetschalckx et al., 2008].
The optimization problem formulated in (2.10) is NP-hard even with scalar re-
sources (proof by reduction from Knapsack problem). Since the objective function
is not linear in terms of the attributes that are being used in the model, there is no
hope of finding an optimal answer. However, we propose an approach in selecting
the predictors that achieves a better performance than blindly choosing predictors
until the budget is reached.
We first describe our approach for the case of single-dimensional cost. Our
solution is based on dynamic programming approximation of Knapsack problem.
Let b be an arbitrary budget less than CB that can take some discrete values, δ.
We sort all input attributes based on the correlation with the output in descend-
ing order. Our algorithm finds E(b, i) and M(b, i), the best error and the model
coefficients for budget b and considering the first i input attributes.
The model for combination (b, i) can be inferred from previously calculated
combinations: it either contains the i-th attribute or not. In the former case, the
model is calculated by considering attributes from combination (b− ci, i−1) plus
the i-th attribute where ci is the cost of the i-th attribute. On the other hand, it
can be simply the model used for (b, i − 1) meaning to drop i-th attribute. The
algorithm comparesE(b, i−1) with the model calculated by merging i-th attribute
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to M(b − c, i − 1) and chooses the one with the lower error. E(b, i) and M(b, i)
are updated accordingly. Finally, the M(CB, d) is the solution to our problem.
Multi-dimensional cost can be done by extending the Knapsack approxima-
tion algorithm to the multi-dimensional Knapsack. In this case, each cost dimen-
sion represents a dimension in the multi-dimensional error matrix. Formally, we
use E(b1, . . . , bp, i) to denote the optimal modeling error given the budget vec-
tor b1, . . . , bp. M(b1, . . . , bp, i) represents the optimal regression model given that
budget. Again, we sort the attributes based on their correlation with the output,
highest correlation first.
Given a solution to the single-model case, the next challenge is how to extend
the cost-sensitivity to a hierarchy of regression models and in particular, sparse
regression cubes. In addition to the cost imposed by regression models, a hierar-
chy of models needs evaluating input variables to determine which model to use
(group by attributes in case of sparse regression cubes). The cost of prediction
can be thought of as the cost of regression added to the cost of space partitioning.
Cost-sensitive sparse regression cubes use the same partitions as cost-insensitive
modeling case. Cost budget is only enforced when each individual regression
model is constructed. In other words, we use the cost-sensitive regression mod-
eling instead of reliable modeling at each cell. The reliability condition is indeed
verified similarly to preserve prediction reliability.
2.5 Evaluation
In this section, we report the performance evaluation of sparse regression cubes
when used to predict fuel consumption in GreenGPS. In addition to the data col-
lected from the testbed, we generate larger synthetic data sets based on the col-
lected distribution of values to evaluate the scalability of our approach. We im-
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Figure 2.2: Average prediction accuracy for all trips.
plemented the sparse regression cube in C++. The experiments are performed on
a Windows desktop computer with 2.4 GHz Intel Core 2 processor and 4GB of
RAM using a 80GB Hitachi (7200RPM) hard disk drive. In this section, we first
evaluate the prediction accuracy of our approach. Next, we evaluate the reliabil-
ity provided by our sparse regression cube and verify that the prediction error is
indeed within the confidence interval. Our proposed cost-sensitive modeling ap-
proach is evaluated and compared against the naive approach. Finally, we evaluate
the scalability and efficiency of sparse regression cubes.
2.5.1 Prediction Accuracy
We compare the prediction accuracy of the sparse regression cube against three
other approaches: i) a single multi-dimensional regression model obtained by us-
ing support vector regression (SVR) [Hastie et al., 2003]. ii) regression cubes [Chen
et al., 2006], and iii) sampling cubes [Li et al., 2008]. The sampling cube only
uses the average value of a data cell as the model. It is analogous to using the
MPG rating of the car. We choose SVR since it is one of the most accurate single-
model regression tools [Hastie et al., 2003] while regression and sampling cubes
are the most relevant hierarchical modeling methods. Other hierarchical model-
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Figure 2.3: Prediction accuracy for 6 different trips.
ing techniques such as prediction cubes and logistic regression cubes are more
appropriate for classification problems.
Figure 2.2 presents the prediction accuracy of various techniques. The accuracy
is computed using leave-one-out cross validation (i.e., the fuel consumption is
predicted for each road segment from model learned from the other segments).
The average error over all evaluated samples is then reported. First, we observe
that the sampling cube performs a poor prediction. This simply emphasizes on
the need for multi-dimensional regression in these cases instead of merely using
the average values such as MPG ratings. It is also interesting that using regression
cubes for predictive regression without appropriate techniques for sparse data cells
(such as model reduction) does worse than a one-size-fits-all model. The reason is
that previous regression cubes (that do not consider reliability), build models for
individual cells that end up unreliable when data is sparse. The sparse regression
cube on the other hand shows a significant reduction in prediction error.
We repeat the comparison for 6 fixed trips in the GreenGPS data set, where the
total fuel consumption for each trip is estimated. The percentage of prediction
error with respect to the actual fuel consumption is reported in Figure 2.3. Again,
our new technique significantly improves prediction accuracy.
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Figure 2.4: The prediction confidence measured by our framework.
2.5.2 Reliability Measure
As discussed before, our sparse regression cube provides a 95% confidence bound
on the prediction error of each prediction query. The confidence bound is the
error value that is guaranteed to be larger than the actual prediction error 95%
of the time. In the next experiment, we verify that the estimated prediction error
and the 95% confidence bound match the actual prediction error. To this end,
we randomly select a road segment driven by a given car and predict its fuel
consumption using a model trained from data on other cars and segments. We
change the size of training set and measure the mean squared prediction error
observed, then compare it against the analytically estimated prediction error from
our Equation 2.6 as well as the 95% confidence bound given by Equation 2.7. The
results, depicted in Figure 2.4, show that the estimated error is very close to the
actual observed prediction error and is indeed less than the confidence bound. To
make error values meaningful, we have normalized fuel consumption values to be
zero mean and between −1 and 1.
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2.5.3 Cost-sensitive Modeling
We evaluate our proposed approximation algorithm for cost-sensitive modeling by
comparing against the insensitive modeling (baseline) and the greedy approach
(naive). In the greedy approach, attributes are ordered according to their corre-
lation with the output and are selected as predictors until the budget runs out.
We assign estimated retrieval latency costs to each of the attributes used for fuel-
consumption modeling and normalize. Two types of attributes are considered: i)
The vehicle specification attributes including make, model, year, frontal area and
weight. These are the inexpensive attributes as they can be retrieved from a small
and local database of car models. ii) The road parameters such as the number
of stop signs, the number of traffic lights, and the average speed on the street.
We assume the latter attributes are twice as costly as the former. We change the
total budget and compare the mean squared error in prediction in Figure 2.5. As
budget increases, more regression attributes or group by attributes can be incorpo-
rated and hence the prediction error drops. Our proposed approximation algorithm
performs better than the greedy algorithm since it explores more combinations of
attributes when building models.
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2.5.4 Efficiency and Scalability
We use 500K synthetic samples to evaluate the scalability of our framework. Each
tuple consists of a fuel consumption value as well as 14 attributes. The data used
for this evaluation are synthesized using the following method: We first identify a
subset of the attributes to be independently generated. These attributes are similar
to the real data set and include the attributes of the road. Each of these attributes
are generated using a discrete uniform distribution. We also uniformly generate
make, model, and year values as well as other vehicle parameters such as weight
and frontal area. Finally, vehicle speed is derived from a normal distribution where
its mean and variance are determined by the road parameters. Our data generation
scheme assigns about 1000 samples to each vehicle type (make, model, and year).
Until otherwise specified, the number of regression dimensions, k, for synthetic
data is 14.
Our scalability and efficiency evaluation is based on two performance met-
rics: i) materialization time, and ii) memory usage. The materialization time is
the interval between the time the first access to disk is performed until the cube
shell construction algorithm is complete. Memory usage is derived both using a
probe subprogram to evaluate run-time C++ structure sizes and the total amount
of memory used by the program. We compare the sparse regression cube with full
functionalities against two other approaches. The first approach completely mate-
rializes the cube using bottom-up computation (BUC) [Beyer and Ramakrishnan,
1999] while still using the algebraic representation for cell measure aggregation.
The second approach employs the cube shell construction algorithm but instead
of algebraic representation, reprocesses raw data when materializing each cell.
In the first experiment, we evaluate the effect of data cube dimensions on the
materialization time. We change the number of group by dimensions, l, from 5
39
4 6 8 10 12 14
0
50
100
150
200
Number of group by dimesions, l
M
a
te
ri
al
iz
at
io
n
T
im
e
(s
ec
o
n
d
s)
 
 
Sparse Regr. Cube
BUC + CR
Shell w/o CR
(a)
4 6 8 10 12 14
0
20
40
60
80
Number of regression attributes, k
M
a
te
ri
al
iz
at
io
n
ti
m
e
(s
ec
o
n
d
s)
 
 
Sparse Regr. Cube
BUC + CR
Shell w/o CR
(b)
0 100 200 300 400 500
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
Number of tuples (thousands)
M
a
te
ri
al
iz
at
io
n
ti
m
e
(s
ec
o
n
d
s)
 
 
Sparse Regr. Cube
BUC+CR
Shell w/o CR
(c)
Figure 2.6: Effect of number of a) group by dimensions, b) regression dimensions,
and c) tuples on materialization time.
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Figure 2.7: Effect of number of a) group by dimensions, b) regression dimensions,
and c) tuples on storage requirement.
to 14 and calculate the running time for each approach (Figure 2.6(a)). Since full
materialization and raw reprocessing approaches cannot scale with the number
of tuples, we use only 50K tuples in this experiment to illustrate the difference.
Full materialization exposes an exponential increase in running time in the same
trend as with the cube size. The raw reprocessing approach maintains the same
gap against the sparse regression cube since the number of data tuples are not
changing. Memory usage of different approaches is compared in Figure 2.7(a).
Bottom-up computation reveals the same exponential explosion.
Next, we study the effect of regression dimensions, k, on the performance met-
rics. Again we use 50K tuples but fix the group by dimension to 10. Figure 2.6(b)
depicts the materialization time for the three approaches. The number of regres-
sion dimensions does change the cube size and hence does not result in an expo-
nential explosion of the full materialization approach. This uniformly increases
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the computation time for all approaches as the number of data cells in high dimen-
sional cuboids (i.e. close to the base cuboid) increases. We also plot the memory
usage in Figure 2.7(b). The number of regression dimensions have a more signif-
icant impact on the memory usage since it increases the algebraic representation
matrix sizes accordingly. The size of the cube shell is approximately 30 cuboids
and independent of k.
In the final scalability experiment, we change the number of tuples used for
modeling between 10K and 500K while fixing l = 10 and k = 14. The material-
ization time and storage requirement of the cube is presented in Figures 2.6(c) and
2.7(c). Since the number of cuboids that shell construction methods materialize is
constant, the running time and memory time increases linearly with respect to the
number of tuples. BUC on the other hand shows an exponential relation.
2.6 Discussion
The proposed sparse regression cube framework is designed to tackle sparseness
of the input data. Although the model construction algorithm adapts to the sparse-
ness of data, there are certain extreme conditions where even our proposed ap-
proach cannot model the system reliably. If the data is too sparse to create a single
linear regression model using common subset selection and shrinkage methods,
sparse regression cubes will most likely fail to even model at the most course-
grained generalizations. On the other hand, if the data are so dense that all data
cells in a regression cube [Chen et al., 2006] are populated with many diverse
samples, the accuracy of sparse regression cubes becomes similar to the regres-
sion cube. In that case, a regression cube may become computationally less costly
and hence a slightly better choice to use.
Identifying the extreme conditions remains an open issue. One approach can
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be to detect extreme sparseness using standard tests [Kutner et al., 2005] or our
reliability measure computed over the whole data set. Identifying densely cov-
ered scenarios maybe more challenging. Running the sparseness tests over all
fine-grained data cells in the data cube is one way. However, this is almost as
computationally expensive as building a sparse regression cube.
In many applications, domain knowledge about the predictors and input at-
tributes has a significant effect on both prediction accuracy and efficiency. Using
non-linear correlations between attributes can improve prediction accuracy when
choosing a subset of predictors for modeling. It can also reduce the size of the
hierarchy and the models which consequently improves performance. The depen-
dence can be exploited both in the context of regression predictors or grouping
attributes. For example in the GreenGPS application, make and model of the car,
two of the grouping attributes, are dependent such that the model of the car deter-
mines the make. Therefore, many combinations of attributes to group the data are
redundant and can be avoided. Exploiting such knowledge is another future work
direction to extend sparse regression cubes.
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CHAPTER 3
GENERAL-PURPOSE DATA CLEANING
Most of the wide-area sensing data are gathered from a community where the
participants are not screened a priori. They may vary widely in their degree of
reliability. Moreover, their reliability may not be a priori known. For example in
GreenGPS, some vehicle may use faulty engine or GPS sensors reporting invalid
data. Some cars produced outside the US may provide data in a slightly different
format (e.g. metric units). The lack of explicit participant vetting and the corre-
sponding data reliability and uncertainty problems pose difficulties in computing
accurate conclusions from data. Extracting the “truth” from multitudes of possi-
bly unreliable data sources, who may be unknown to the application in advance,
emerges as a major challenge. This challenge is known as fact-finding.
Since fact-finding functionality is needed in a broad category of sensing ap-
plications, it is good to delegate it to a general service that many different ap-
plications can use. To this end, we propose a data cleaning component aimed at
uncovering most likely truth in noisy sensing data. This is an exercise in solving
the fact-finding challenge in a generalized application-independent manner, such
that the solution can be easily adopted by different applications without significant
effort, despite differences in each application’s data cleaning needs. Such needs
might differ, for example, depending on data types. Applications that work with
time-series data (e.g., data from sensors reporting periodic measurements) might
need different data cleaning solutions than those that share images. Providing a
general data cleaning solution is therefore challenging.
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The core part of this component is an iterative algorithm that has roots in
Google’s PageRank [Brin and Page, 1998]. PageRank computes the most credi-
ble sources of information for a given query, with no a priori knowledge of the
authority of each source. It does so simply by observing a network of linkages
from which it iteratively computes both source and claim credibility. Similarly,
our system groups the data collected from the sources into claims. It then uses an
iterative algorithm to assess source and claim credibility. This process ultimately
leads to a ranking of described claims by their likelihood of occurrence, as well as
a ranking of sources by credibility. While the idea of fact-finding algorithms has
been explored in machine-learning literature [Galland et al., 2010; Pasternack and
Roth, 2010], our approach is the first general service for fact-finding in human-
centric sensing data that is designed specifically as an application-independent
component to facilitate development of participatory and social sensing applica-
tions. We develop a general fact-finding service that isolates application-specific
details from the general algorithmic core, to allow easy customization of the fact-
finding algorithm to a diverse set of applications. The fact-finding and clustering
engines used here and the theory behind them are parts of a fact-finding system
called Apollo [Wang et al., 2011a]. The main contribution of our data cleaning
components is to create a data cleaning usable by wide-area sensing applications
in the context of FusionSuite.
We evaluate our system in a wide-area sensing application similar to GreenGPS.
A set of participants simply allow GPS sensors in their possession to automatically
report traffic speed data. Without direct human supervision, we show that the
data reported is noisy enough that computing average traffic statistics from it is
not always accurate. However, when data are clustered and ranked by the data
cleaning component, the quality of reported observations increases considerably.
In all cases, we show that the cleaned data are more accurate than simple voting or
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averaging and are close to the data cleaned by application-specific methods. The
intuitive reason is that voting and averaging does not take source credibility into
account.
Our data cleaning system is not meant to outperform clever application-specific
data cleaning schemes. There is little that can beat large amounts of careful
application-specific knowledge. Adding a general-purpose data cleaning com-
ponent to FusionSuite allows application developers do a good enough job of data
cleaning without developing their own specialized solutions. Our system will not
remove all data biases and there will always be scenarios where it fails. It should
not be used for applications where values need to be computed with scientific ac-
curacy. However, it is appropriate for less sensitive application scenarios such as
deciding which of many alleged sightings of invasive species in a park are true, or
which of several images of reported problems in a neighborhood are frivolous.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.1 introduces the
goals, challenges, and main principles of fact-finding. Section 3.2 presents the
design and implementation of the data cleaning component. Section 3.3 presents
its evaluation using several application case studies and Section 3.4 discusses the
limitations of our approach and possible considerations.
3.1 Goals, Challenges, and Approach
Our aim in developing a data cleaning component in FusionSuite is to facilitate
developing various human-centric sensing applications by minimizing the efforts
application developers need to spend on collecting and cleaning unreliable data.
This raises a number of questions: First, how to convert the data collected in
the FusionSuite backend, which may consist of a range of data types, into an
application-independent form suitable for fact-finding? Second, how to formulate
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and perform the fact-finding task?
In the rest of this section, we discuss our approach to addressing these ques-
tions. At a high-level, to offer data collection and fact-finding as a service, we
create a system with two classes of components: application-independent and
application-specific. The aim is to maximize the number and functionality of
application-independent components, while minimizing and simplifying the ones
that are application-specific. This has to be achieved in such a way that the quality
of the results is not compromised. In particular, the quality of results should be
comparable to (or at least not much worse than) that of custom-built solutions. In
the next two sections, we briefly overview our approach for addressing the above
two questions, respectively.
3.1.1 Data Conversion
To address the first question (data conversion to application-independent types),
we represent the reported observations by a graph of sources and claims that we
call the source-claim network. Sources simply refer to the IDs of devices that re-
port the corresponding data. Claims can be thought of as abstract objects reported
by the sources. In the source-claim network, a link between a source and a claim
indicates that the source asserted that claim. The structure and semantics of the
claim objects need not be known to our system. All that is needed is a measure
of distance between claims. A distance function is defined by the application de-
veloper to return an application-specific notion of distance between claims. For
example, if claims refer to sensory data (such as temperature values), the distance
function is simply the difference in temperature. If claims refer to pieces of text,
the distance function could be the Jaccard distance [Tan et al., 2005], a commonly
used metric for deciding how similar two pieces of text are. Finally, if claims
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refer to images taken, a distance metric might be the color correlogram [Huang,
1998] or other visual similarity metric in vision literature. Note that, claims can
also be multi-dimensional. For example, if temperature is sensed at different lo-
cations and different times of day, one can think of these measurements as points
in a space whose dimensions are sensor value (temperature), location, and time
of day. A distance metric such as the (appropriately weighted) L2 norm can be
defined between points in that space.
The source-claim network is a general representation of reported sensory data
that enables cleaning based on two important criteria. First, corroboration: if
more sensors make the same claim, the claim is more credible. Second, outlier
detection: claims that are different from the rest must be considered separately
(as shown later, however, they should not be automatically discarded). It also
allows a third criterion to be used. Namely, sources that originate more of the
credible claims (by the above criteria) must be more credible. This weighting of
the sources, in turn, allows better estimation of credibility of claims. For example,
a value reported by a credible source may not need corroboration.
It may be noticed from the above that the common requirement to enable cor-
roboration and outlier detection (and subsequently, source credibility estimation)
is the existence of a distance metric between claims. This metric determines which
claims corroborate each other and which are outliers (and hence, which sources
make more corroborated claims).
Indeed, in our system, the function that computes the distance metric between
claim objects is the main way the entire system is specialized to an application’s
needs. When the abstract graph is formed, the rest of fact-finding components will
not interact with any application specific data types or measurements. All of the
data is converted to the set of source identifiers with links to claim identifiers, as
well as distances between claims computed using the defined distance metric.
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In order to further prepare large amounts of data for fact-finding, we perform
clustering of claims. Clustering is an important step that significantly improves the
scalability and quality of the fact-finding process. In a real-world human-centric
sensing application, sources will typically report slightly different observations,
even when they measure the same variable or observe the same event. In a fact-
finding context, this results in a large number of individual claims and a large,
poorly-connected, source-claim network, which has at least two negative conse-
quences. First, it impairs scalability of the fact-finding algorithm (and increases its
convergence time). Second, it lowers the quality of fact-finding outputs because
similar claims that represent are treated separately and cannot get the credibility
boost they would have enjoyed had they been considered together. Clustering of
similar claims alleviates the above problems. It results in smaller well-connected
source-claim networks in which fact-finding converges rapidly and the outcome
is more accurate.
As detailed in Section 3.2, we design and implement a fast and practical general-
purpose clustering algorithm that is able to create meaningful clusters suitable for
fact-finding. The output of this algorithm is a graph of individual sources and
claim clusters that is input to the generic fact-finding algorithm.
3.1.2 Fact-finding
The above leads us to the next question: how to perform the fact-finding task?
The answer to this question comes from existing machine learning literature. We
do not claim a contribution in developing the theory of fact-finding. We adapt
this theory, for the first time, to a general service of use in practical wide-area
sensing, and evaluate the performance of such a service. With that in mind, we
review in this section the key theoretical results that underly Apollo fact-finder
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operation [Wang et al., 2011a; ] that are burrowed in our framework.
Consider a source-claim network of m sources, S1, ..., Sm who collectively
make claims that fall into n clusters,C1, ..., Cn. Each cluster therefore represents a
fact, real or alleged. The sources and clusters form an information network graph,
where sources and clusters represent nodes, and where a claim Ci,j represents
the link between source Si and cluster Cj into which the claim falls. We define
Cred(Si) as the credibility of source Si, and Cred(Cj) as the credibility of (the
fact represented by the) cluster Cj . Furthermore, we define a n×1 vector Ccred to
be the cluster credibility vector[Cred(C1)...Cred(Cn)] and them×1 vector, Scred,
to be the source credibility vector [Cred(S1)...Cred(Sm)]. The claims made by
sources are represented by an n ×m array CS such that element CS(j, i) = 1 if
source Si makes a claim that belongs to cluster Cj , and is zero otherwise.
In the basic fact-finder, the credibility of different claim clusters is proportional
to the number of sources who make the claims, each source weighted by its credi-
bility. Similarly, source credibilities are proportional to the number of claims they
make, each weighted by its credibility. Let us define C
est
cred as a vector of estimated
claim cluster credibility, defined as α[CS]Scred. This basic fact-finding problem
can be considered as finding a least squares estimator (that minimizes that sum of
squares of errors in source credibility estimates) for the following system:
C
est
cred = α[CS]Scred
Scred = β[CS]
TC
est
cred + e (3.1)
where the notation XT denotes the transpose of matrix X . It can be easily shown
that the the error is minimized when α and β are chosen such that their product is
the reciprocal of an Eigenvalue of [CS]T [CS]. Source and claim cluster credibility
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values can be obtained when the above iteration process converges. Therefore,
these credibility values are used to find trustful sources and facts (claim clusters)
from the information network.
As pointed out in recent literature [Wang et al., 2011a], the above fact-finder
design has a Bayesian interpretation. Let Sti denote the proposition that “Source
Si speaks the truth”. Let Ctj denote the proposition that “Fact Cj is true”. Let
us also assume that claims of individual sources do not change much our state of
belief in different facts. In other words:
P (SikCj|Ctj)
P (SikCj)
= 1 + δtikj (3.2)
where δtikj << 1. In this case, it was shown using Bayesian analysis that the
following relations hold true regarding the credibility rank of sources, Rank(Si),
and the credibility rank of claim clusters Rank(Cj):
Rank(Cj) =
∑
k∈Sourcesj
Rank(Sk)
Rank(Si) =
∑
k∈Claimsi
Rank(Ck) (3.3)
where:
Rank(Cj) =
P (Ctj|evidence)− P (Ctj)
P (Ctj)
(3.4)
Rank(Si) =
P (Sti |evidence)− P (Sti )
P (Sti )
(3.5)
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In other words,Rank(Cj) is interpreted as the increase in the posterior probability
that a claim is true, normalized by the prior. Similarly, Rank(Si) is interpreted
as the increase in the posterior probability that a source is truthful, normalized by
the prior. From the above, we get:
P (Ctj|evidence) = pta(Rank(Cj) + 1) (3.6)
and:
P (Sti |evidence) = pts(Rank(Si) + 1) (3.7)
Where pta and p
t
a are initialization constants. The above gives a theoretical foun-
dation for estimating the credibility of sources and assertions. Figure 3.1, provides
an illustration for the functional architecture of the data cleaning component.
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Assertion 
Clusters
Figure 3.1: The architecture of the data cleaning component.
3.2 Component Design
The data cleaning component in FusionSuite constitutes an application-independent
core and a set of application-specific plug-ins (see Figure 3.2). A Data Processor
component continuously receives and processes cleaning requests from the distil-
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lation manager component, reads the raw collected data from the database, have
them processed, and prepare the results for use by the application.
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Data 
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Source Credibility List
Cluster Credibility List
Cluster Member List
Source/Cluster Graph
Source/Cluster Graph
distance(…)
process(…)
Cleaned 
Data 
Samples
Figure 3.2: Software components of our data cleaning component.
The distillation manager component collects sensing data through a variety of
sharing mechanisms, parses them, and stores the results in a raw data stream
database as discribed in more details in Chapter 6. The sources of interest can
be selected by their account names, or optionally a set of hashtags. For example,
in GreenGPS, phone ids can be used as the source idenfier.
With the source identifier defined by a configuration file, the data processor
module reads data tuples in form of 〈source, claim〉 from the raw data stream
database. An application-specific plug-in called Distance Metric is provided to
calculate the distance between any two given claims. This plug-in is used to cre-
ate a general network of sources, claims, and claim distances. This network is
passed to the application-independent Clustering Module and subsequently to the
application-independent Fact Finding Module. After deriving the source and as-
sertion credibility values, Data Processor passes the set of valid assertions to an
application-specific Post-Processing module to create the desired application out-
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put.
In the rest of this section, we describe each component individually. We also
describe the APIs for each application-specific component and discuss how they
need to be implemented in a human-centric sensing application.
3.2.1 Application-independent Core
The application-independent core contains three modules: i) the data processor,
ii) the clustering engine, and iiii) the factfinder.
Data Processor
Data processing starts with extracting (source, claim) tuples from the database.
The data processing module assigns application-independent identifiers to each
source and each assertion and creates a source/assertion graph which is repre-
sented by a text file containing a list of pairs <source id, assertion id>.
Note that, the data processor does not process or access the actual content of a
claim. Next, for each pair of claims, the data processor calls the distance met-
ric plug-in to obtain the distance value. The distance metric accesses the claim
contents and calculates a real and positive distance value. The assertion dis-
tance list is prepared by the data processor that contains elements in the form
of <assertion1 id, assertion2 id, distance>. As a convention, we
request that all distances be normalized between 0 and 1.0. Any distance value
larger than 1.0 is assumed to be infinity and hence is not included in the assertion
distance list. The choice of value 1.0 is an arbitrary threshold made for ease of
representation, without loss of generality. The total number of elements in the dis-
tance list is much smaller than the total number of assertion pairs in the network
because the great majority of assertions are not related to one another (i.e., are
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distance more than 1 apart).
The two data structures created by the data processor are passed to the clus-
tering engine through an execution pipe. The clustering engine returns the list
of clusters specifying new assertion IDs that correspond to each cluster in addi-
tion to a source/cluster claim graph. Again, the graph is a list of <source id,
cluster id> entries. The next step after clustering is to use the fact-finder al-
gorithm on the source/cluster claim graph to derive the credibility values of each
cluster and each source. The output of the fact-finder module is the list of source
IDs and corresponding credibility values. A similar list is created for cluster IDs.
Each cluster is represented by its centroid claim.
Note that, the algorithm described in Section 3.1 may return both positive and
negative credibility values. According to its Bayesian interpretation, negative val-
ues mean that the posterior probability of claim correctness is less than the prior
probability. In other words, evidence has shown that these are less likely to be
true. Starting with the same prior probability for all assertions, a good heuristic
is simply to discard assertions whose credibility values returned by the fact-finder
are negative. Hence, the data processor module computes the credibility values
and discards all claims that have the credibility value less than 0.0. Similarly
sources whose credibility is less than zero are discarded. This allows our appli-
cation to decide which assertions and sources to disregard as invalid or untruthful
in an application-independent manner. Finally, the list of qualified assertions are
extracted from the cluster list and are passed to the application’s post-processing
module.
Clustering Engine
The clustering engine takes a set of assertions and a sparse distance matrix of as-
sertions, and groups similar assertions (which are likely to refer to the same facts)
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into same clusters. The absence of a link between two assertions in the sparse
distance matrix means the distance is significant enough so that the pair should
not be in the same cluster. In our system, we designed and implemented a simple
assertion clustering algorithm. It starts with one cluster, which comprises all as-
sertions and spits it unit a given diameter or total number of clusters is reached. If
the terminating condition has not been met, the cluster with the largest diameter is
chosen and is split into two new clusters. If there are more than one clusters with
the same largest diameter, the one with more assertions is chosen. The algorithm
pseudo-code is shown in Algorithm 2.
To split a cluster, the two furthest assertions are selected as first members of
two new clusters. The other assertions are then consecutively assigned to one of
the two new clusters. Each assertions is assigned to the cluster having the smallest
average distance from it.
Upon termination, the clustering module records the set of computed (source,
cluster) tuples. A source is linked to a cluster if the sources contributed a claim
in that cluster. Like claims, each cluster is represented by a cluster ID. Note
that, in this representation, all clusters are independent. No distance links connect
different clusters.
Algorithm 2 Claim Clustering
to be split cluster ← {all claims}
clusters← {to be split cluster}
while ‖clusters‖ < max cluster and diameter(to be split cluster) <
max diameter do
new cluster 1, new cluster 2← split to two(to be split cluster)
clusters← clusters ∪ {new cluster 1, new cluster 2}
to be split cluster ← get largest diameter cluster(clusters)
end while
return clusters
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Fact-finder
The fact-finding module reads the results from the Clustering engine and outputs
both source and cluster credibility rankings to be used by the post-processing mod-
ule of the application. More specifically, the fact-finder first takes the source and
cluster information network topology as input and forms the CS matrix defined
in Section 3.1. Meanwhile, if the source initial credibility values are available, the
fact-finder will initialize source credibility vector Scred accordingly, otherwise it
assumes equal initial credibility values among sources.
The algorithm then simply iterates based on Equation 3.1 until credibility values
of sources and clusters converge. To prevent Scred and Ccred in Equation 3.1 from
growing unbounded, we normalize the source credibility values to be within in the
range of -1 and 1 after each iteration. After the iteration finishes, the fact-finder
ranks both sources and clusters based on their credibility values. Such rankings
will be output to application specific post-processing modules to figure out the
true claims to be used for each application.
3.2.2 Application-specific Components
There are two application-specific components that need to provide certain APIs
to corresponding modules in the core that call them.
The Distance Metric
In order to establish the application independent distance value between every pair
of assertions, the distance metric plug-in is used. The application-specific distance
metric assigns a positive real value to any pair of assertions given by the data
processor module. For example, the distance function may range from a simple
Euclidean distance in case of numerical assertions to complex feature distances
56
in case of visual assertions. The distance 0 means that two claims are exactly the
same. For the sake of uniformity, it is required that distances be normalized. All
distances larger than 1 are considered to be infinity by the application-independent
part. That is to say, the are viewed as large enough to be ignored. The API to the
distance metrics library is a single distance function that takes two assertion
objects and returns the distance value.
The Post-processing Module
After the fact finding process is completed, true assertions and credible sources
are given to the application-specific post-processing module to be actually used
by the application. This part is where the real application logic lies. It can now
work on clean data instead of the original raw data feed. Application-specific logic
can be as simple as storing all reported (i.e., clean) assertions in a database to be
shown to users or to be processed by other application-specific components. For
example, applications that compute statistics (e.g., average traffic speed) might
average the stored assertions (speed sensor values) by location or to derive other
statistics, then show them to users.
3.3 Evaluation
This section evaluates our data cleaning component and shows how wide-area
sensing applications can be easily implemented using our fact-finding service. We
implement an example traffic monitoring application. The goal of this application
is to create a speed map of different streets that shows the average speed of cars
on different segments of the road. People carry phones that share GPS and speed
using FusionSuite frontend and the backend collects and cleans the noisy data and
uses the rest to calculate the average driving speed on roads. Our tool is used to
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distinguish between invalid and accurate driving speed data.
There are two observations to remember at this point. First, the purpose of
this evaluation is to understand how well FusionSuite can clean data. Hence, we
are concerned with knowing ground truth. For this reason, we do not rely on
actual deployment data from real users. Rather, we run controlled experiments,
where we “emulate” both reliable and unreliable participants ourselves, and hence
know ground truth by design. Therefore, this evaluation is not a statement of how
FusionSuite will perform in a real deployment. Such an investigation is a subject
of future work. Instead, this evaluation presents controlled tests that offer a proof
of concept that our data cleaning component indeed removes a significant portion
of bad data from noisy data sets involving different sources in different scenarios
such as GPS locations, text, images and time-series data.
Second, it is not the purpose of this evaluation to show that our system out-
performs cleaning solutions tailored to the respective applications. We simply
optimistically assume that such solutions will find ground truth. Instead, we com-
pare our approach to both ground truth (as a proxy for highly-tailored application-
specific cleaning solutions) and to simple heuristics (e.g., voting and averaging).
We show that our method approaches the former and outperforms the latter.
We first present the implementation of the application-specific component in
the backend. We also describe the front-end implementation and data collection
details. Next, we discuss the experimental setup and how the data are collected.
We study the data cleaning performance of this implementation in three common
causes of sharing incorrect data: i) inconsistent context, ii) faulty sensors, and iii)
incorrect calibration.
By inconsistent context we refer to the cases where the people need to perform
the measurements in a particular manner. Specifically in the speed mapping appli-
cation, we look at the cases where pedestrians share speed data instead of drivers.
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(a) Averaging (b) FusionSuite (c) GroundTruth
Figure 3.3: Output of the speed mapping application.
This inconsistency can potentially alter the average speed values computed for
vehicular traffic. Several application specific methods are proposed to detect such
cases in speed mapping applications [Thiagarajan et al., 2010]. For example, ac-
celerometer signatures can be used to distinguish pedestrians from drivers. We
show how our application-independent framework can achieve similar data clean-
ing performance.
Faulty sensors are another common issue to all sensing applications where sen-
sors report noisy values. Noise removal often requires a prior application specific
knowledge such as a noise model or distribution of different variables. Finally,
incorrect calibration of sensors can lead to reports that are in different units (e.g.
speed values in km/h instead of mph). We use our FusionSuite-based implemen-
tation to remove such noise and wrongly calibrated data.
3.3.1 Implementation
In this application, streets are segmented into 500-feet segments identified by a
segment id. Each assertion (or claim) consists of a segment id, an average
speed value and the number of samples used for averaging. The following are the
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implementation of each application-specific components:
• Parser: The parser module parses a sample string and extracts attribute val-
ues. The MySQL database that stores the sample consists of a single table
with columns including NodeID, SampleID, GPS longitude and latitude,
GPS time, speed, and bearing.
• Distance Metrics: Given two assertions, they are deemed infinitely far apart
if the segment ids differ. Otherwise, it is the absolute difference in the
speed value divided by 40. This means that two assertions with more than
40mph speed difference are considered to be irreconcilable since most of
the street that we are experimenting with have a speed limit of 40.
• Post-processing: Given the list of credible clusters, the post-processing
module creates the speed map by averaging the speed value in the assertions
which belong to the same cluster and assign it to the appropriate segment.
An output text file contains the list of <segment id, speed value>
pairs. A color coded map of the area is also produced using Google Map
static API. Figure 3.3 is a map of area that highlights the speed value at par-
ticular location using color coded marks. The deep blue color means zero
speed and a complete red represents the maximum speed (50mph in these
figure for better illustration).
The data collection is done using GPS-equipped Android smart-phones and in
particular Nexus One and Nexus S phones. An android application is developed
to sample GPS location, time, speed, and bearing every 5 seconds. Two identifiers
are added to each sample: a NodeID (the cellphone unique IMEI identifier), and
a SampleID (cellphone local timestamp value). In order to be able to distinguish
between different context where the sample is collected (e.g. while walking or
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Figure 3.4: The average speed on Main street in the inconsistent context scenario.
driving) a tag is added to each sample. To this end, the application provides a
simple interface to the user to specify which tag should be used. Each sample is
then formated as a string of key-values with 8 attributes.
The android data collection frontend application is installed on 4 Nexus S and
3 Nexus One smart-phones. Cars that carry the phones drive 6 different routes
(approximately 5 miles each) multiple times. We then consider each trip on one
of the routes to be the report from a different source. This way, we end up with 15
hours of driving data that covers 10 streets and around 180 miles.
3.3.2 Inconsistent Context
In the first experiment with the speed mapping application, we investigate the
ability of our framework for removing data that are shared from an inconsistent
context. Here, 7 of the sources share GPS speed traces when walking instead
of driving. When looking at the average speed value at each road segment for a
particular street1, we observe in Figure 3.4 that a lower pedestrian speed reports
significantly reduces the average speed values for the segments. However, our Fu-
sionSuite implementation of speed mapping removes all of the pedestrians from
1Street names have been modified to preserve anonymity.
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Average Error (%) Simple Averaging FusionSuite
Main Street 41.89 9.23
Oak Street 7.71 6.17
First Street 6.89 6.38
Lake Street 0.0 0.53
All Streets 15.0 6.2
Table 3.1: Average error in the inconsistent context scenario.
Driver Pedestrian
Identified as Driver 15 0
Identified as Pedestrian 3 7
Table 3.2: Source confusion matrix in the inconsistent context scenario.
averaging and results in a curve much closer to the ground truth. In this scenario,
we assume that a state-of-art technique to distinguish between drivers and pedes-
trians (e.g. [Thiagarajan et al., 2010]) will be able to match the ground truth.
Therefore, the ground truth can represent the performance of a well-designed
application-specific scheme.
Table 3.1 shows the average error percentage over four different streets as well
as all segments in the experiment. To this end, we find the absolute relative er-
ror between the average speed value from the ground truth with the speed value
derived from the particular scheme. We then average this relative error across
all street segments. As the results suggest, using our framework can significantly
resolve the incorrect context issue by producing results quite close to the ground
truth.
To better evaluate the performance, we look at the source credibility values pro-
duced by the fact finder and whether the source is classified as driver or pedestrian.
The confusion matrix in Table 3.2 shows that all of pedestrian traces have been
correctly identified while only a few drivers are misclassified as false negative.
There are no false positives in this example.
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Figure 3.5: The average speed on Oak street in the faulty sensor scenario.
Average Error (%) Simple Averaging Noise Removal FusionSuite
Main Street 21.76 8.95 14.04
Oak Street 13.36 5.56 5.29
First Street 25.25 5.32 16.18
Lake Street 29.55 1.54 2.4
All Streets 25.31 6.87 9.48
Table 3.3: Average error in the faulty sensor scenario.
3.3.3 Faulty Sensor
In the second speed mapping experiment, we investigate the performance of our
framework in the presence of faulty sensors. This example is motivated by our
testbed where we observed that some of the phones (particularly Nexus Ones)
report noisy speed values (in ranges from 0 to 150 miles per hour). Application-
specific knowledge can be used here to remove the outliers from the data set. By
doing this experiment we aim to show how we can achieve a similar performance
without using any application-specific knowledge. Again, we plot the speed curve
for the First street in Figure 3.5 based on the ground truth and results from simple
averaging and our data cleaning system.
The application-specific noise removal scheme uses speed limit values and re-
moves samples that are larger than 30% plus the street speed limit. We compare
the average error over all street segments and report the results in Table 3.3. Note
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Accurate Noisy
Identified as Accurate 14 2
Identified as Noisy 4 5
Table 3.4: Source confusion matrix for the faulty sensor scenario.
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Figure 3.6: The average speed on First street in the calibration error scenario.
that the result from our FusionSuite implementation is quite comparable with the
application-specific noise removal scheme. Finally, we show the source confusion
matrix for the faulty sensor scenario in Table 3.4 and conclude that our fact-finding
framework still has a low false positive to true positive ratio.
3.3.4 Incorrect Calibration
The final experiment for the speed mapping application focuses on the case where
the sensors are incorrectly calibrated. We simulate 7 incorrectly calibrated device
traces that report the speed in km/h instead of mph. To this end, we simply
Average Error (%) Simple Averaging FusionSuite
Main Street 21.22 5.4
Oak Street 14.85 3.97
First Street 21.02 12.08
Lake Street 17.47 5.74
All Streets 19.02 6.63
Table 3.5: Average error in the incorrect calibration scenario.
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Correctly Incorrectly
Calibrated Calibrated
Identified as Correct 14 1
Identified as Incorrect 4 6
Table 3.6: Source confusion matrix for the incorrect calibration scenario.
multiply correct driving traces from one of the sources by 1.61 and use the values
for the experiment. Again, we use simple averaging and our approach to conclude
average speed values in each street segment. Figure 3.6 compares the color coded
maps generated by each method. The higher speed values caused by converting
mph to km/h are visible in the middle map. We show the average error over all
segments in Table 3.5. The results shows a significant improvement when using
our method. Finally, we derive the source confusion matrix for and present it in
Table 3.6. As the table suggests, most of the incorrectly calibrated sources are
filtered out (low false positive) while a few of the correctly calibrated sources are
filtered out as well.
3.4 Discussion
This section discusses the shortcomings of our data cleaning component and the
alternatives and extensions that can be considered. There are certain limitations to
our data cleaning approach that are inherent in most of fact-finding frameworks.
Firstly, it is assumed that there exist some reliable sources that consistently re-
port measurements that are close to the true value. For example, if all devices
in our traffic monitoring application are noisy, none of them would get a cred-
ibility advantage to distinguish the true claims. However, this requirement still
allows our approach to work in many cases that traditional approaches fail. For
example, voting ignores the pieces of information that do not get enough votes to
be considered top claims. FusionSuite on the other hand can report information
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claimed by very few sources if it determines those sources to be reliable. This is
because our approach is a weighted voting scheme where weights are determined
based on perceived source reliability. Therefore, true events with few, but reliable,
witnesses will also get reported.
Secondly, the proposed approach fails to remove certain type of colluding or
malicious sources. Colluding sources can make sure that the false reports are
consistent such that the formed clusters of claims are deemed credible by the
fact finder. The success of the attack depends on the fraction of sources that are
colluding. When it is more than half of the users, almost all of the results can be
altered.
Malicious users who have access to the reports from other users are able to
unilaterally boost their credibility. Our data cleaning method will not be able to
filter those out. This creates an opportunity for the attacker to tamper the results
in a limited scale. To illustrate, suppose a source is aware of other claims. Such
information can be used to boost source’s own credibility simply if the source
intentionally makes claims that are consistent with the others and hence perceived
as true. The malicious user then takes advantage of the credibility to change the
results as desired.
Lastly, some systematic errors where a source behaves slightly differently may
slip through the fact-finding filter. In the GreenGPS example, a custom-tuned
car engine may perform differently from others, yet the individually shared data
points are reasonable enough not to be removed. Next in this section, we describe
alternative approaches to data cleaning and present possible extensions that can
alleviate these limitations.
In many systems, the data cleaning process takes advantage of the models or
assumptions describing the system. In a variety of different areas from target
tracking, to stock market modeling, assumptions regarding system models allow
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techniques such as Hidden Markov models or Kalman filters to jointly model the
measurements and noise and hence perform cleaning and modeling tasks simul-
taneously. Knowing the system model greatly improves the data cleaning perfor-
mance. For instance, it allows distinguishing between outliers and market spikes
in stock data.
Assuming that the noise follows an uncorrelated Gaussian model or the state
of the system is a linear function of its previous state enables techniques such as
Kalman filters to perform data cleaning and modeling efficiently. Our framework,
in contrast, first models data and noise with the minimum assumptions regarding
the system (credibility values) then uses a more specialized modeling tool (sparse
regression cubes) to refine the models.
Our approach enables isolating complex modeling that is used for prediction
from the way the noisy data is cleaned at the cost of losing some data cleaning ca-
pabilities, since the FusionSuite data cleaning component is more general-purpose
than the modeling framework. However, the specialized models can still be in-
corporated into the cleaning process to improve the performance. A multi-stage
cleaning solution is to first clean data using fact-finders, then use the regression
models created by the sparse regression cubes (Chapter 2) and remove data points
that are not justifiable by the model. This allows removing unreliable data that a
fact-finding framework has failed to remove. In particular, systematic errors can
be easily identified when the computed model of the system is compared with
each individual user.
Using data-driven models when cleaning the data have potential drawbacks and
inefficiencies that should be considered. Most importantly, when the data are
sparse or when the modeling error (variance) is high, it becomes difficult to iden-
tify the data that do not conform to the model. Even with dense data and low
modeling error, the unreliable data that passes the fact-finding stage may cause
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the regression models perform poorly to clean the data. It is not possible to han-
dle the cases where the whole data set follows a “wrong” model or most of the
users are colluding with a consistent model, and no information about the true
model of the system is available. The appropriate mechanisms and conditions
to use a modeling based data cleaning is beyond the scope of this thesis and are
considered as future work.
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CHAPTER 4
DATA SHARING PRIVACY
Wide-area sensing applications use data collected by participants to construct a
public model. It is often desirable to keep such input and output data traces pri-
vate, while allowing accurate model construction. For example, GreenGPS par-
ticipants may not want to share their speed since it may reveal whether they are
speeding or not. Traditional perturbation-based techniques degrade the accuracy
of constructed model by adding noise. We show a certain data transformation
at the client side that helps keeping the client data private while not introducing
any additional error to model construction. We particularly focus on linear re-
gression models which are widely used in participatory sensing applications and
design our scheme to work with sparse regression cubes as the modeling back-
end. Our goal is to show that: i) an individual data trace is generally hard to re-
construct with any reasonable accuracy, and ii) the regression model constructed
using the transformed traces has a much smaller error than one based on additive
data-perturbation schemes.
In this chapter, we first formulate the privacy-aware data sharing problem. Next,
we describe our approach on how to alter data on the client side and the steps
needed to be taken on the server side. We then empirically study the privacy pre-
serving properties of our approach and apply it to the GreenGPS service. Finally,
we discuss the limitations of our approach.
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Figure 4.1: A privacy-aware participatory sensing model.
4.1 Problem Formulation
Many participatory sensing applications calculate community statistics using data
shared by the community [Burke and others, 2006]. Previous privacy-preserving
approaches mostly focused on deriving community statistics while keeping indi-
vidual data traces private [Ganti et al., 2008; Pham et al., 2010]. FusionSuite
modeling backend is focused on sensing applications where the application ex-
trapolates and predicts unavailable data using models of the system. Therefore, a
new privacy-aware data sharing scheme is needed.
Given the nature of applications we target, the following summarizes the as-
sumptions and requirements of our scheme:
• The model relating user inputs to the outputs is public.
• Each data sample collected by an individual is private and may not be re-
vealed.
• The models used in the service are linear in coefficients.
• The time-series data can be packed into uncorrelated data samples by ag-
gregation (over time for example).
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4.1.1 Modeling in Participatory Sensing Applications
Regression modeling is an essential part of many sensing applications as discussed
in Chapter 2. In the GreenGPS application, the fuel consumption is predicted
from various car and street parameters. Another sample participatory sensing
service may aim to reduce household energy consumption. Each user collects the
following data traces daily: i) the total time that various appliances are in use
(e.g., TV), ii) the temperature inside the house, and iii) the outside temperature.
By sharing the data, a regression model can be constructed and used to predict the
energy consumption for a given usage pattern and season. Eventually, the service
helps other residents to save on energy costs by adapting their appliance usage.
Figure 4.1 illustrates our model of privacy-aware participatory sensing applica-
tions that construct a model of user data. In our architecture, data traces collected
by participants are transformed on the client side to neutral features. The data can
typically be divided into a variable we are interested in (e.g., household energy
consumption) and other variables we believe are good predictors of the former.
The objective is to compute a model relating the predictors (model input) to the
variable of interest (model output). The neutral features computed from user data
do not easily reveal user data and can thus be made available to any entity that
needs them.
The process of attempting to compute the private data from the features is called
reconstruction. An important question is: given the information that each user
sends to the service, how accurately it is possible to reconstruct the values in
the original data traces? To measure privacy, we calculate the sum of squared
difference between each value in the original trace and the corresponding value in
the reconstructed trace. A lower value means that the reconstructed trace is more
similar to the original one and reveals more private information about the user.
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The participatory sensing service includes a server that collects the neutral fea-
tures of all participants to compute the regression model of the underlying mea-
sured phenomenon. The model has a predictive property and can thus be of in-
terest to a broad population besides the participants who contributed data to its
construction.
4.1.2 Design Goals and Metrics
There are two challenges in designing a system according to our model. First, we
need a scheme that converts the data traces to features that reduces reconstruction
accuracy of the data traces. Second, we need to perform the modeling using the
shared features instead of the data traces themselves. This immediately leads to
the two objectives for the system:
• Minimize the modeling error: It is desirable to reach the same level of
modeling accuracy as one attained in a system not employing any data al-
terations.
• Maximize the reconstruction (breach) error: The higher the error in re-
construction of individual user data, the more it is ensured that the privacy
of the user is not breached.
We define a perfect privacy-enabling data sharing scheme in participatory sens-
ing applications to be a scheme that satisfies two conditions:
• Perfect modeling: Model construction from shared data produces exactly
the same model as if the original private data traces were used.
• Perfect neutrality: Reconstruction of private user data from shared data
yields the same error as if no additional information was available to the
outside world (i.e., to an attacker) besides the computed public phenomenon
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model. Note, however, that the neutrality condition does not exclude infor-
mation leaks that result from computing the public model itself. For exam-
ple, if the model suggests that all adults in some population are between 5
and 6 feet high, then something is leaked about individual user data in that
population. A perfectly neutral scheme should not introduce any additional
leaks.
We present and empirically evaluate a privacy-aware scheme for data sharing in
sensing applications that aim to compute a linear regression model of some mea-
sured phenomenon. Our scheme satisfies the perfect modeling condition while
empirical evidence suggests that it is also neutral in many cases.
4.2 Privacy Filter
A participant in a participatory-sensing application uses various sensing devices
to collect data samples about a phenomenon (e.g., a thermometer to measure tem-
perature inside a house, a GPS device to measure location, or an OBD-II port to
measure vehicular fuel consumption). A privacy filter converts such data to fea-
tures to be used for phenomenon modeling. In order to attain the goals of a perfect
privacy-enabling scheme, our approach is first to convert the traces into a set of
uncorrelated samples, we call segments. This is to foil correlation-based attacks.
Clients then report neutral features computed over a set of segments. They are
used later for model construction.
This section details the various algorithmic steps involved on the client side and
presents the structure of the features which are sent to the server and describe how
our scheme achieves the perfect modeling property. In Section 4.3, we present
empirical evidence to support some level of neutrality for our scheme and describe
how it can be used to personalize the level of privacy provided.
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Month Elec. Cons. Avg. Appliance Usage Avg. Inside Temp. Avg. Outside Temp.
(MWh) (hours) (degrees F) (degrees F)
Jul. 1.230 2.5 74 79
Aug. 0.870 3.9 72 73
Sept. 1.00 1.5 72 70
Oct. 1.45 1.2 71 56
Nov. 2.1 3.4 70 44
Dec. 2.75 2.3 70 26
Table 4.1: A sample segmented data set.
The data collected by a user is usually in form of time-series. For example,
a sensing device might record the value of temperature every second. However,
the phenomenon model is typically concerned with predicting quantities at longer
time-scales. For example, how much gas a vehicle will spend on a given route?
How much energy a household will save if they installed motion-activated light
controls? How much weight a 300lb person might lose if engaged in a particular
diet and exercise routine? At those time-scales, fast system dynamics are averaged
out. The aggregate output of a system in a sufficiently large time-interval is more
correlated with the aggregate input in that interval and not what happens in other
intervals. For example, one’s weight loss in one month might be more correlated
with food intake in that month, rather than the month before. This is not neces-
sarily true of fluctuations at shorter timescales. This process of aggregation over
appropriate timescales is the first step in our client-side data alteration. It is called
data segmentation. The segment aggregate can be the sum (e.g. of consumed en-
ergy) or in some cases the average. The main reason to do the segmentation is to
eliminate correlations between samples taken at different times.
This section first describes how the segmentation is done and why the seg-
mented data cannot be shared without possibly violating privacy of the individual.
The next step in our scheme is to convert the segmented data into neutral features
that are less of a threat to users’ privacy.
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4.2.1 Data Segmentation
In order to perform segmentation on raw data traces, we first need to decide on the
time interval to use. This often requires application specific knowledge. There are
three criteria involved: i) a large enough time interval ensures that the system can
be described using a static model and hence remove correlations among samples,
ii) the time interval should result in an accurate prediction, and iii) the time interval
should be usable by the participatory-sensing service.
In our household energy consumption example, various time intervals such as
a day, a month, or a year ensure a static description of the system and so the first
property is achieved. Very small time intervals like daily energy consumption
usually highlight the effect of modeling noise and therefore fail to achieve the
second property. On the other hand, the energy consumption over a year may
not be as useful since laws of large numbers may make such averages converge,
resulting in ill-condition matrices. Hence, considering the data collected by each
user in a given application, as illustrated in the previous example, the data might
be segmented into one-month intervals before being shared with the community.
Table 4.1 presents sample values for such segmentation. The above discussion is
to present general guidelines. Actual segmentation period will vary substantially
from one application to the next.
The segmentation process on the client is the same as the backend segmenta-
tion process as briefly discussed in Section 2.2. The result of the segmentation is
a set of n data points. Each data point consists of d input values corresponding to
model inputs (input dimensions) and a single output value. Note that, by doing the
segmentation, we actually remove the time attribute from all of the data and make
each data point time-independent. In particular, there is no particular order main-
tained for the segmented data. We use the same notation as Section 2.2: yi denotes
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the value of the output attribute in the ith segment (e.g., energy consumption), xij
denotes the value of j-th predictor of segment i and sij is the value of j sensing
data attribute of segment i. Similarly, Y and X refer to the output and the input
matrices respectively. Formally, an appropriate time interval for the segmentation
ensures that yi can be estimated accurately using:
yˆi = f(xi1, . . . , xid)
Although the data segmentation performs aggregation on the original data trace,
sharing raw segments can result in a breach of privacy. For example, Table 4.1
shows appliance usage and temperature inside a house each month. Now, these
values can easily show whether a residence is occupied or not in a particular
month. Therefore, we need to take another step and only share some features
of the segmented data that are less likely to threaten privacy. This is presented
next.
4.2.2 Neutral Features
A multi-dimensional linear regression model relates an output variable to several
predictor variables or simply inputs. Consider the segmented data from above
and the notation used to represent input and output values in each data point.
We should note that a linear regression model is only linear with respect to the
regression coefficients. As mentioned before in Section 2.2, the predictor vari-
ables can be any arbitrary function of the input attributes. Several general purpose
regression techniques explore a range of feature spaces (e.g., quadratic features
where the predictors are product of two input attributes). To generalize, we use
xij = gj(si1, . . . , sid′) and denote X = {xij|1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ j ≤ d }. Sparse
regression cubes the system using a set of linear regression models:
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Yc = Xcηc + ε
where ε is assumed to be a zero-mean error term with a constant variance σ2.
In our household energy consumption example, gj is simply an identity function
(i.e. S = X). In many cases, sharing X instead of S does not resolve the issue
of privacy since gj’s are simple reversible functions making S discoverable from
any given X .
Since the goal of our system is to calculate η’s for the whole community, a
simple idea is that each user computes the η using its local information and only
shares the regression coefficients. There is no way of reconstructing the values
of X and Y only by knowing the function relating them. However, it is also
impossible to combine the partially-calculated models (η’s) and obtain the global
model without extra information.
What is needed are the features that represent correlations between different
attributes. Our idea is that a correlation matrix reveals very limited information
about the data trace but has enough information to be used for regression modeling
since we already have shown how well compressed representation matrices can
describe regression models while allowing merging multiple models. Let Xu and
Yu represent the data corresponding to each user u. LetXu be the predictor matrix
corresponding to user u. Similar to compressed representation of data in a sparse
regression cube cell defined in Section 2.2, we define the neutral feature matrices
of the data collected by user u as follows:
• ρu = Y Tu Yu
• νu = XTu Yu
• Θu = XTuXu
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We first observe that none of the matrices used in the above definition depends
on the number of samples collected by the user. In other words, regardless of
the number of samples the user has collected, the same amount of data is sent
to the server for modeling. As we see later in Section 4.3, this property helps
enabling users’ privacy. Moreover, this simple property enables users to achieve
a personalized level of privacy. A user who shares more data samples in a single
transaction achieves a higher level of privacy.
The computational cost associated with extracting the feature matrices is pro-
portional to the square of the number of samples and number of variables, n2 and
k2. Note that the number of samples shared by a user can be as large as n in
the worst-case computation analysis. Calculating Θu is the most computationally
expensive transformation requiring O(k2n2) operations. Calculating ρu and nu
requires O(n2) and O(kn2) operations respectively. The data segmentation is lin-
ear in terms of the number of segments (n) and therefore is dominated by feature
extraction process.
The following example illustrates how the feature matrices are obtained from
the data and shared.
Example 5 (Features) Given the segmented data in Table 4.1, the client calcu-
lates the following feature matrices:
ρu =
[
1.23 0.87 1.00 1.45 2.10 2.75
]
[
1.23 0.87 1.00 1.45 2.10 2.75
]T
= 17.3448
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νu =

2.5 74.0 79.0
3.9 72.0 73.0
1.5 72.0 70.0
1.2 71.0 56.0
3.4 70.0 44.0
2.3 70.0 26.0

T 
1.23
0.87
1.00
1.45
2.10
2.75

=

23.173
668.11
475.78

Θu =

2.5 74.0 79.0
3.9 72.0 73.0
1.5 72.0 70.0
1.2 71.0 56.0
3.4 70.0 44.0
2.3 70.0 26.0

T 
2.5 74.0 79.0
3.9 72.0 73.0
1.5 72.0 70.0
1.2 71.0 56.0
3.4 70.0 44.0
2.3 70.0 26.0

=

42 1058 863.8
1058 30685 25018
863.8 25018 22218

4.2.3 Modeling Server Interface
The neutral features that are sent to the FusionSuite backend are already in form
of the compressed representation matrices used in sparse regression cube cells. In
this case, the distillation manager skips the segmentation and cleaning phases and
sends an update request to the sparse regression cube with the values of ρu, νu,
and Θu. The sparse regression cube update all materialized cells c that match user
parameters (e.g. car make, model, and year in GreenGPS) by adding the neutral
features to the compressed representation:
ρ{u∪c} = Y T{u∪c}Y{u∪c} = [Y
T
c 99
9Y Tu ]
[
Yc999Yu
]
= Y Tc Yc + Y
T
u Yu = ρc + ρu
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ν{u∪c} = XT{u∪c}Y{u∪c} = [X
T
c 99
9XTu ]
[
Yc999Yu
]
= XTc Yc +X
T
u Yu = νc + νu
Θ{u∪c} = XT{u∪c}X{u∪c} = [[X
T
c 99
9XTu ]
[
Xc999Xu
]
= XTc Xc+X
T
uXu = Θc+ Θu
The rest of the regression modeling operation remains the same. The com-
pressed representation matrices are exactly the same as if the actual private data
traces were segmented on the server and provided to the sparse regression cube. In
other words, the above process derives the values of η and Err without requiring
access to the users’ data and by only using the shared features. Meanwhile, the
derivation produces exactly the same results as if having access to the raw data.
Therefore, our scheme successfully achieves the first design objective that is not
to impose any additional modeling error.
We can observe that the modeling process employed at the server is computa-
tionally efficient. Specifically, computing ρ, ν, and Θ for all n samples shared
by everyone need O(nk2) operations. The reason being that each matrix addition
takes at most O(k2) time (size of the largest matrix, Θ) and we can have at most
n users in the system hence n additions. Calculating the regression coefficients
needs matrix inversion of a k × k matrix leading to an O(k3) computation time.
Error calculation takesO(k3) to complete as well. Since n is much larger than k in
most cases, the total computation time is dominated by O(nk2). The server-side
computation is significantly more efficient than modeling the whole raw data set
where users do not use a privacy firewall (which is O(n3)).
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4.3 Privacy Analysis
Our approach to study how the method presented in Section 4.2 helps enabling pri-
vacy is to show that is not likely to reconstruct user data accurately and efficiently.
We first formulate our measure of privacy as the amount of error incurred while
the best reconstruction of the data is done. In particular, let yi and xi1, . . . , xik
be the segmented data that are transformed into the feature matrices. Let y˜i and
x˜i1, . . . , x˜ik be the values in the reconstructed set. We define the reconstruction
error for each attribute j to be
Definition 2 (Reconstruction Error) The reconstruction error of xj is the nor-
malized sum of squared difference between the data set and the reconstructed
trace:
RE(xj) =
∑n
i=1(x˜ij − xij)2
σ2j
where σ2j is the variance of the variable xj.
In order to measure the privacy, consider the case that no information is shared
by the user. The mean of the variables (i.e. y˜i = E[y], x˜i1 = E[x1], . . . , x˜ik =
E[xk]) are the best estimators when no observations are available. The resulting
reconstruction error is simply:
RE(xj) =
∑n
i=1(E[xj]− xij)2
σ2j
=
σ2j
σ2j
= 1 (4.1)
A reconstruction is effective if the reconstruction error for some variable is
less than the error resulted from using the mean value. In other words, if the
reconstruction error is greater than or equal to 1, it means that the transformed
matrices have almost no useful information:
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Definition 3 (Privacy-Enabling Transformation) A transformation is defined to
be privacy-enabling if the reconstruction error is always greater than or equal to 1.
In this section, we study the privacy-enabling properties of the scheme proposed
in Section 4.2. Our approach is to first discover how an attacker can infer informa-
tion about the private data traces based on the features. We formalize this problem
and call it optimal reconstruction. We discuss the accuracy and complexity of an
optimal reconstruction scheme. Next, we use empirical evidence to support our
heuristics about the conditions under which the privacy is most likely preserved.
4.3.1 Privacy-Enabling Properties
In order to study how our approach tries to preserve users’ privacy, we show that
it is hard to accurately reconstruct the private data for user u (i.e., Yu and Xu)
from ρu, νu, and θu. Given the transformed matrices and their relation to the
user data, there are a set of values (or a subspace) that satisfies the relation and
produces the same matrices. Since the only information available from the user are
the transformed matrices, an optimal reconstruction should pick the most likely
values among those which satisfy the transformation. For example, it is much
more probable for a user to drive a 3000lbs vehicle rather than a 500lbs vehicle.
Therefore, when both values satisfy the transformation, 3000lbs is more likely to
be the accurate reconstruction. We formally define the optimal reconstruction as
follows:
Definition 4 (Optimal Reconstruction) An Optimal Reconstruction is to find the
values Y˜u and X˜u that produce the given transformed matrices ρu, νu, Θu while
maximizing the joint probability of observing such values.
We assume that distribution information is available to the attacker. This usu-
ally comes from publicly available knowledge about the measured variable. For
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example, the weight distribution of vehicles sold in the US may be a public piece
of information available to the attacker. The optimal reconstruction can be formu-
lated as the solution to the following optimization problem:
max Πni=1p(yi, xi1, . . . , xik) (4.2)
n∑
i=1
y2i = ρu
n∑
i=1
yixji = νu(j) : ∀1 ≤ j ≤ k
n∑
i=1
xj1ixj2i = Θu(j1, j2) : ∀1 ≤ j1, j2 ≤ k
where p(y, x1, . . . , xk) is the probability of observing values y, x1, . . . , xk which
may be known to the attacker as prior knowledge. We emphasize that likelihood
maximization is a key to the reconstruction. Here, we assume that data from
any two segments shared by the user are independent. This is the case because
each segment can belong to an arbitrary time and location and is uncorrelated to
others due to segmentation. Note that the optimal reconstruction does not directly
calculate values of model inputs, X , but rather the values of matrix W . However,
in many applications the exact values of X can be derived from W . In Section
4.4, we discuss the details of such derivation when doing a case study.
Another important point here is that the value of n and consequently the number
of variables to be reconstructed is not available to the attacker in most of the cases.
To overcome this, one may try several guesses of n and choose the reconstruction
with the maximum likelihood. Perhaps, starting with a value of n that makes the
number of constraints and variables equal (i.e. n = k
2
+ 1) and increasing n until
the value of the objective function is minimized.
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Next in this section, we discuss why one cannot easily reconstruct the original
values from the transformed matrices. We first describe why given a large enough
n, the reconstruction accuracy is expected to be low. Then, we argue that finding
an accurate reconstruction becomes computationally expensive for large values of
n.
Inaccuracy of Reconstruction
We first discuss the following question: If someone succeeds at finding an optimal
reconstruction, how close are the reconstructed data points to the actual data trace?
Intuitions to answer this question are presented below. Later, we demonstrate an
example answer for a specific empirical study.
First observe that the number of constraints in the optimal reconstruction prob-
lem is k
2+3k
2
+1. When the number of data points n(k+1) is less than the number
of constraints, only a single feasible assignment exits. Hence, the reconstruction
may be performed with 100% accuracy and no privacy is preserved. On the other
hand, when n tends to infinity, the feasible solution space becomes more and more
relaxed as the number of constraints remain constant. In this case, the optimal so-
lution converges to (E[y], E[x1], . . . , E[xk]). The reconstruction error tends to 1,
using a derivation similar to (4.1). This means that for large enough n, it becomes
unlikely to reconstruct the private data.
Inefficiency of Reconstruction
Next, we give intuitions on why optimally reconstructing data as in (4.2) becomes
computationally expensive for large values of n and k. We emphasize that our
discussion is the worst-case complexity analysis for finding the optimal solution
and merely gives a hint regarding the complexity of reconstruction in general.
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The analysis does not hold for the cases where a non-optimal solution can still be a
threat to privacy, where the particular form of features allows for fast computation,
or where the values of n and k are always small.
It is obvious that the objective probability distribution should be approximated
by a well defined smooth function. Otherwise, the optimal solution cannot be
obtained in less than an exponential time even without any constraints. Let us
assume that the objective function has a very simple form (e.g., linear or con-
vex quadratic). Still, the constraint space is not convex since the equality con-
straints are not affine [Boyd and Vandenberghe, 2004]. This means that there is
no hope to solve such a problem through convex optimization methods. On the
other hand, any general non-convex quadratically constrained program is shown
to be NP-Hard [Sahni, 1974]. In fact, any integer linear program can be written as
a quadratically constrained optimization problem. Therefore, an optimal recon-
struction of the user data trace takes an exponential amount of time with respect
to the number of variables, n(k + 1), unless P = NP .
4.3.2 Conditions to Protect Privacy
It is important for the privacy firewall to identify the conditions where the privacy
of the user data is not protected at all. In particular, this happens when the number
of segments used to create features is small. Here, we experimentally study the
privacy-enabling properties of feature matrices to derive a heuristic lower bound
on the number of segments to be used in the client. The client application simply
warns the user if the number of samples used for the transformation is less than
the threshold.
Our first step in order to evaluate privacy is to approximate the reconstruction
process by using a heuristic model of the objective function. Our heuristic is to
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Figure 4.2: The number of iterations needed for the reconstruction.
assume that the maximum likelihood is obtained when the solution is close to the
expected value of each parameter’s marginal distribution. Therefore, we minimize
the distance of each variable from the expected value of its corresponding distri-
bution. Let y and xi be the random variables corresponding to the output attribute
and the predictor variables respectively.
min
n∑
i=1
[(yi − E[y])2 + (xi1 − E[x1])2 + . . .+ (xik − E[xk])2]
n∑
i=1
y2i = ρu
n∑
i=1
yixji = νu(j) : ∀1 ≤ j ≤ k
n∑
i=1
xj1ixj2i = Θu(j1, j2) : ∀1 ≤ j1, j2 ≤ k
There are two methods to approximate the above optimization problem. First,
the problem can be relaxed into a semi-definite program (SDP) and then the solu-
tion of the SDP converted to a feasible solution for our quadratically constrained
program. However, in most cases, SDP relaxations needs a specific form of con-
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straints. The second approach is to use a non-linear optimizer based on interior-
point barrier or sequential quadratic programming. We use KNITRO [KNITRO,
2010] non-linear solver package in our implementation. This package can be
linked to a MATLAB code.
Using our MATLAB implementation, we evaluate the time efficiency of this
non-linear solver with respect to the number of samples used for the transforma-
tion. Here, we simply assume that we know the value of n for the reconstruction.
We experiment with various number of predictors (model inputs), k, ranging be-
tween 3 to 5. For any given n and k, we divide the whole data set into groups of
n samples. For each group, we perform the transformation and reconstruction. At
the end, we report the average number of iterations over all of the groups.
As Figure 4.2 suggests, there is a peak in the reconstruction time for any given
value of k. This is the situation where the number of variables, n(k+1), is closest
to the number of constraints, k
2+3k
2
+ 1. For smaller values of n, the number of
constraints is more than the free variables. A single feasible solution in this case
may be the reconstruction result. On the other hand, for larger values of n, the
number of free variables is more than the constraints. It is easier then to find a
point closer to the mean to maximize the objective function. Based on this we
expect the reconstruction error to be very high after n = k.
We should note that since the rows of W and Y are not ordered, the order of the
reconstructed matrices Y˜ and X˜ may be different from the original data. In our
implementation, we try all permutations of the rows to find the best match. This,
of course, is only feasible for small values of n, and is just to show that even the
best possible reconstruction will not be accurate against the feature matrices.
To empirically demonstrate that accurate reconstruction is unlikely for when
n is larger than a threshold and to find that threshold, we generate random input
and output values with various correlations. In particular, when no correlation is
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Figure 4.3: The average reconstruction error of all parameters for different vertical
correlations.
present, we generate 1000 different data segments with k = 4 using independent
random values distributed with a normal distribution. We call this distribution the
case of no correlation. When correlations are present, they can be classified into
two classes: i) the vertical correlation is the correlation among different attributes,
and ii) the horizontal correlation is the correlation within a single attribute. To gen-
erate an input with some vertical correlation, we multiply our random matrix by a
matrix U such that UTU = C, where C is the correlation matrix. In particular, let
R be the independent random input:
X = RU
XTX = UTRTRU = UTU = C
The last equation comes from the fact that R is a matrix of independent vari-
ables and RTR = I . We simply use several correlation matrices and derive U
using a Cholesky decomposition. This is an established method of adding cor-
relation to independent random variables. Finally, we create the highest possible
vertical correlation by making each attribute xi to be x1 + c where c is a constant
offset.
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Figure 4.4: The average reconstruction error of all parameters for different hori-
zontal correlations.
In the first experiment, we change the value of n used to create the feature
matrices and derive the average reconstruction error for 10 different input matrices
with various correlations. As Figure 4.3 suggests, even in the extreme case of the
highest vertical correlation, the reconstruction error is close to 1 when n > 2k.
In the next experiment, we try various horizontal correlations while employing
a medium vertical correlation. Similarly the highest correlation is obtained when
the segments are just a shifted version of each other by a constant offset. We
should emphasize that our data segmentation is required to remove any signifi-
cant horizontal correlation. This experiment is to show what happens if residual
temporal correlations exist between segments. Results in Figure 4.4 show that for
n > 2k, the error approaches 1 indicating privacy protection against this particular
reconstruction.
Figures 4.3 and 4.4 suggest that the user can personalize the amount of privacy
that is guaranteed based on the number of segments shared. One simple way to
implement this is to have multiple threshold values on the number of samples
being shared. Each threshold guarantees a higher degree of privacy (a higher
minimum reconstruction error).
To derive the relation between a safe value of n and k, in the last experiment
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Figure 4.5: The number of samples required to minimize the change of a privacy
breach.
we change the value of k and create correlated input samples. Figure 4.5 plots
the minimum number of samples required to guarantee a reconstruction error of
at least 0.9. Observe that n = 2k is always a safe bet. The curve suggests that
the client-side software should compute neutral features based on a number of
segments that is at least twice the number of model inputs.
The author admits that this rule of thumb is not supported by rigorous theo-
retical analysis. A formal investigation is beyond the scope of this thesis. Here,
the conjecture is merely observed without formal proof. In general, however, the
client-side software, when asked to share data, can compute the neutral features
given the currently available segments then perform the reconstruction itself and
estimate reconstruction error. If the error is significantly less than 1, the software
may warn the user that privacy may be breached.
4.4 GreenGPS Case Study
In this section, we implement our proposed scheme and evaluate it on a prelimi-
nary GreenGPS data set [GreenGPS Data Set, 2010]. There are several privacy-
preserving techniques proposed for participatory sensing applications that can
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Figure 4.6: Distribution of various parameters in the green navigation data set.
are comparable in that they rely on data alteration. Mostly they propose spe-
cific noise models to overcome correlations in the data set [Huang et al., 2005b;
Evfimievski, 2002; Pham et al., 2010; Ganti et al., 2008]. Since we have already
removed the correlations between data points during segmentation, we compare
our technique to one that shares raw segments perturbed by white noise. This
simple technique in fact outperforms more complex correlated noise schemes in
terms of impact on the final model. We first present the experimental setup and
data set used for evaluation. Next, we compare the level of privacy achieved by
our approach to perturbation-based techniques. Finally, we compare the accuracy
of modeling of our approach and perturbation-based approaches.
4.4.1 Experimental Setup and Data Set
To evaluate our privacy-aware mechanism, we utilize data from the experimental
deployment of a green navigation system. This data consists of geo-tagged engine
sensor measurements for a range of vehicles and constitutes a total of over 1000
miles of driving. A total of sixteen users (with different cars) drive over the course
of three months [GreenGPS Data Set, 2010].
After segmentation, the total number of data segments in the data set are 650.
Each segment represents a approximately 2 miles of driving data, although shorter
segments are present when routes where shorter than 2 miles or were not a mul-
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tiple of that distance. There are 5 parameters for each segment, which are inputs
to (and output of) a model of vehicular fuel consumption. These are: i) fuel con-
sumption over the segment, y = f , ii) w1 = m(ST + vTL) where m and v are
the mass and the average velocity of the vehicle, ST and TL are the number of
stop signs and traffic lights encountered, iii) w2 = mv2, iv) w3 = m, and v)
w4 = Av
2 where A is the frontal area of the car. Using our notation, we can write
x1 = m, x2 = v, x3 = A, x4 = ST , x5 = TL. Therefore, we have k = 4 and
d = 5.
The values of m, v, A, can easily be obtained by knowing parameters w2, w3,
and w4. The values of ST and TL can also be determined since they are integers
and the number of their value combinations are less than 20. Using a brute force
approach the values of ST and TL are derived from w1. In our experiments,
we use all the five parameters by default. This makes 1 output attribute and 4
predictors, hence k = 4. In some experiments, we drop the last parameter from
the data set and denote it by k = 3. In this case, we only obtain the values for f
m, v, and A.
The attacker (reconstruction algorithm) is implemented as a MATLAB code
as presented in Section 4.3. Again, to eliminate differences in the order of re-
constructed segments, all permutations of the segments are compared against the
original set and the minimum is reported as the reconstruction error. In order to
derive the objective function in our non-linear reconstruction, we use the sample
mean and variance from the data set. Figure 4.6 shows the distribution of three
parameters collected by the users of the system. Until otherwise specified, we use
the same noise variance as the variance of each parameter.
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Figure 4.7: Comparing our approach against data perturbation in terms of the
average reconstruction error of all parameters for different values of k.
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Figure 4.8: The (a) average, and (b) minimum reconstruction error of various
attributes for k = 4. Fuel consumption, f , weight (m), speed (v), and frontal area
(A).
4.4.2 Privacy Evaluation
Our evaluation of privacy uses the definition of privacy presented in Section 4.3. In
the first experiment, we compare the reconstruction error resulting from using the
two approaches when the number of samples shared by each user, n, varies. The
total number of segments are the constant, 650. This divided by n is the number
of users who share the data. For every n, we average the resulting reconstruction
over all users data and report the results in Figure 4.7. We do this for both k = 3
and k = 4. The result from the perturbation scheme does neither change with k
nor with n. Therefore, we only present a single line.
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Figure 4.9: The (a) average, and (b) minimum reconstruction error of various
attributes for k = 3. Fuel consumption, f , weight (m), speed (v), and frontal area
(A).
Next, we repeat the same experiment while studying the reconstruction error
of each individual parameter xi. Using all of the predictor variables we report
the average reconstruction error of each parameter in Figure 4.8(a). The results
show that reconstruction errors of 0.8 and 1.0 are achieved for all parameters
when n = k = 4 and n ≥ 2k = 8 respectively. Figure 4.8(b) repeats the same
experiment and reports the error corresponding to the most accurate reconstruction
among different samples instead of the average. This is the worst case privacy
for in a particular set of data points. The results still show the complete privacy
protection for n ≥ 2k.
In order to evaluate the effect of the number of predictors on privacy, we also
evaluate individual parameter reconstruction errors for k = 3, by dropping the last
predictor variable from the data set. Figures 4.9(a) and 4.9(b) shows the average
and worst-case privacy obtained by using our approach. The result verifies that
a privacy-breach is unlikely if the number of samples is larger than the heuristic
threshold.
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4.4.3 Prediction Accuracy
In this set of experiments, we evaluate the prediction accuracy of the constructed
model at the server and compare it against a perturbation scheme. To this end, we
perform a cross validation by leaving out a single segment from the data set and
use the rest to construct the model which is then used to predict fuel consumption
of the segment in question. To emulate multiple users, we divide (the rest of)
the data set into groups of 10 segments and share them using our privacy-aware
client firewalls. The regression coefficients computed on the server are then used
to estimate the fuel consumption on the single segment that was left out. We add
the estimated fuel consumption values on all segments to obtain a total fuel esti-
mate. We calculate the relative error (in percents) between this estimated value
and the sum of actual fuel consumption values. This calculation is called cumu-
lative error. To calculate the prediction error of the perturbation scheme, we use
the same cross-validation and error calculation scheme, except that the model is
computed from individually shared segments perturbed with additive noise. Thus,
to estimate fuel consumption of a segment, we simply add white noise (of a given
energy) to the data set with one segment removed and calculate the regression
coefficients of the noisy data. The power consumption for that segment is then es-
timated from the obtained model and the process is repeated for all other segments
in turn.
Our first experiment here compares the prediction accuracy of the two schemes
when the amount of noise energy used for perturbation changes. Figure 4.10
shows the results where the prediction error is represented using the mean squared
error between the estimates and the actual fuel consumption values where all val-
ues in the dataset are normalized to [−1,+1] range. Note that, the prediction
accuracy of our approach is presented as a reference and remains constant since
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we do not use any noise. The x-axis shows the ratio of the noise variance to the
variance of data parameters.
Note that, prediction error linearly changes with noise energy. However, it is
clear from the figure that even with low noise energy values, the prediction error
of the perturbation scheme is much higher than ours. This is despite the fact that
our scheme is always providing privacy.
The next experiment studies the effect of the total number of segments that
are collected for modeling. We fix n = 10 and noise variance ratio to be 1 and
change the total number of available segments from 10 to 500. Figure 4.11 depicts
that the prediction error decreases as the number of samples increases. This is
simply because the constructed model becomes more accurate. However, when
the number of segments is very small, the perturbation scheme shows an additional
prediction error because the noise values do not cancel out when the number of
samples are small.
In the final experiment, we evaluate the prediction accuracy of the fuel con-
sumption for each individual car and report it in Table 4.2. For each car, only the
data set that corresponds to the car is used for the prediction. The segments are
similarly left out one by one for cross-validation. This result simply shows that the
prediction error increases at least by four times when using perturbation. In the
green navigation service which relies on accurate prediction of energy consumed
on various segments in order to compute the most fuel-efficient routes and where
different routes often differ in less than 5% to 6% of the total fuel consumption,
2% prediction error certainly affects the routing decisions made by the service.
Our scheme on the other hand, enables the application to have the same accuracy
as that achieved in the absence of privacy-enabling techniques.
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Figure 4.10: Comparing our approach against data perturbation with varying noise
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Figure 4.11: Comparing our approach against data perturbation with varying num-
ber of total segments collected.
4.5 Discussion
In the previous sections, we discussed how our technique matched the two de-
sign goals presented in the beginning. Although the perfect modeling criterion
is analytically shown to be satisfied in all situations, our work lacks a rigorous
validation of the perfect neutrality condition.
The privacy argument presented here has two major shortcomings: i) The quan-
tification of privacy does not capture all forms of privacy breaches, and ii) this
scheme has not been strictly shown to guarantee privacy, as defined by our mea-
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Car Car Car Our Appr. Perturb.
Make Model Year % error % error
Honda Accord 2003 0.46 7.86
Ford Contour 1999 0.58 2.12
Toyota Corolla 2009 0.36 6.52
Ford Focus 2009 0.11 2.25
Hyundai Santa Fe 2008 0.39 2.43
Ford Taurus 2001 0.18 1.75
Table 4.2: The modeling error induced by the perturbation comparing to our
scheme when using individual car models.
sure of privacy. This section discusses these limitations in detail and presents the
cases where the approach may perform poorly to satisfy the neutrality condition.
Our quantification of privacy captures a specific form of information about the
user, i.e. the exact data point values in users’ data traces. Sometimes, more high-
level information about the user can be deduced without reconstructing the exact
data point values. For example, the magnitude of values in the feature matrix
may reveal information about the range of values in the original trace. Changes in
the correlations can also be used to infer information about how and when a user
changes behavior (e.g. in energy consumption). To reflect those concerns, various
definitions including Bayes-Optimal and differential privacy have been studied in
the literature [Dwork, 2008; Chen et al., 2009]. Understanding the performance
of our scheme under such notions helps a more concrete analysis of the privacy
properties.
Based on our privacy-measure, we identify two major factors that can affect the
possibility of revealing data after applying the privacy firewall. First, the distribu-
tion of the original data: a discrete and narrow distribution leaves a fewer number
of choices for the reconstruction. Narrow distributions means that the value of
a variable is approximately known to the attacker even before sharing any data.
It can be the case that some data points are estimated rather accurately while the
total reconstruction error is still high.
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The second factor is the correlation values: For example, if the correlation val-
ues are all 1s, the whole data trace is a constant and therefore can be reconstructed
perfectly if the average value for the user is revealed. Generally, a higher corre-
lation makes the process of reconstructing the variables easier as the search space
shrinks.
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CHAPTER 5
DATA COLLECTION
So far, we have assumed arbitrary communication and data collection mecha-
nisms without considering the effect of dissemination on distillation. This section
studies data dissemination protocols in information distillation applications that
considers the importance of data packets in protocol decisions. To this end, two
mechanisms are employed by our cyber-physical data transport protocol. First
mechanism guarantees accurate modeling while minimizing resource consump-
tion while the second mechanism maximizes the modeling accuracy when re-
source constraints becomes a bottleneck. We propose schemes to adapt trans-
mission reliability based on the importance of transmitted spatio-temporal data to
the reconstruction of the phenomenon. Data whose omission generates a higher
estimation error are transmitted more reliably. The protocol aggregates data from
nodes to the base station and provides a constant expected estimation error while
significantly reducing the energy consumption and bandwidth usage compared
with other approaches to reliable communication. We redesign congestion con-
trol functions in sensor network transport protocols to account for importance of
physical data. We show that by accounting for the impact of communicated sensor
data on estimation accuracy in congestion control decisions, the error in estimat-
ing aggregate phenomena can be reduced by as much as one order of magnitude.
The rest of this section describes the data collection model that we use for multi-
hop information distillation. Next, we describe mechanisms to provide adaptive
reliability and congestion control. Finally, experimental results from a multi-hop
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wireless sensor network testbed are presented.
5.1 Data Collection in Multi-hop Distillation
Applications
In several data collection scenarios, every observation from any particular sen-
sor at a specific time is represented as a sampling point in space and time. We
propose our new features as parts of a transport layer protocol for such spatio-
temporal data. In the transport layer, we adapt transmission reliability based on
the amount of estimation error contributed if the wireless link drops update mes-
sages. We use the expected value of estimation error as the reliability metric. In
other words, a transport protocol is reliable if it can guarantee that the expected
error is bounded by a desired constant at any time. The purpose of data collection
here is to support accurate modeling of a physical phenomena or a cyber-physical
system. Our transport protocol supports linear auto-regressive moving average
(ARMA) models in the backend.
Several data distillation applications may run concurrently and share the net-
work for data collection. For each application, a node called base station is re-
sponsible for collecting the data. We assume that sensors perform reading and
send the measurements to the base station using our protocol for processing. Our
protocol is connection-oriented where each connection involves a subset of nodes
in the network and supports data collection from these nodes to the same base
station. Each connection uses a convergecast tree obtained from the underlying
routing protocol to collect data from the participating nodes. The tree is rooted
at the base station and spans over a connected subset of nodes including the ones
participating in monitoring as well as relay nodes. Port numbers are used to dis-
tinguish between different applications running on the network. Readings are
101
uv
wkw1 w2
Tv
r
Figure 5.1: Routing tree and notation.
aggregated at intermediate nodes and are forwarded to the parent node.
The transport layer provides a specialized send function for sensor data to send
spatio-temporal measurements to the base station. When using this function, a
slightly different version of the measurements may be returned at the base station.
However, the total difference is guaranteed not to exceed the value of the accept-
able estimation error. In order to send other arbitrary data (e.g., send control in-
formation), we also provide a regular send functionality. Its payload is transmitted
100% reliably. This is done through hop-by-hop selective acknowledgments.
Given this system model, congestion occurs when a node cannot transmit its
(aggregate) data values at the rate they are generated. This happens if the bot-
tleneck resource, such as communication bandwidth from a node to its parent,
cannot accommodate the sending rate. Our protocol is agnostic to the nature of
the bottleneck resource. For example, in energy-starved systems, congestion may
be defined by the condition when the average energy consumption constraint at a
node cannot accommodate the required sending rate.
We use the following notation in this chapter. For any given connection, we
denote the routing tree by T and the base station by r. Let Tv be the routing sub-
tree rooted at node v. Also, let u be the parent of v, and w1, . . . , wk be successors
of node v in T . We use Mv(t) = {mx(t)|x ∈ Tv} to denote the measured phe-
102
Table 5.1: Network Layer API
Method
function send(destination id, datagram)
callback receive(source id, datagram)
nomenon in the region covered by Tv at time t where mx(t) is the actual reading
of the sensor at node x. In our protocol, every node v has an estimation of space-
time data collected in Tz ⊆ Tv. We define M¯ vz (t) = {m¯vx(t)|x ∈ Tz}, to be the
estimated values of phenomenon in the region Tz and at time t which is present
to node v. m¯vx(t) is the value that node v locally thinks that x has measured.
This value can come from either the actual measurement of node w or the result
of a physical model estimation. Assuming that c1, . . . , cl denote the coefficients
of auto-regressive moving average physical model provided by the application,
m¯vw(ti) = c1m¯
v
w(ti−1) + · · · + clm¯vw(ti−l) estimates future data from w based on
the previous observations.
We formally define the estimation error as follows:
Definition 5 (Estimation Error) Estimation error at node v is defined as:
Ev =
∑
tj
∑
x∈Tv
(mx(tj)− m¯vx(tj))2
where tjs are sampling times.
5.2 API and Non-congested Operation
Like other connection-oriented transport protocols, our protocol provides listen
and connect functions to initiate the connection as depicted in Table 5.2. Listen
is called at the base station while connect is called at those sensors participating
in monitoring on the given port. Port numbers are used to distinguish between
different applications running on the network. When initializing a connection, the
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Table 5.2: Transport Layer API
Method
listen(port number, expected error, model parameters)
connect(port number, destination id)
send(port number, destination id, payload)
send data(port number, destination id, spatio temporal data)
receive(port number)
close(port number)
base node needs to provide expected error, the value of acceptable estimation error
that the protocol should guarantee. On top of that, the application can optionally
provide model parameters to express the physical model of the phenomenon. If
not provided with a model, the transport protocol assumes slow changing data.
Hence, an estimated value equals the latest observed value (i.e. x(ti+1) = x(ti)).
The transport layer provides a specialized send function for sensor data, called
send data, to send spatio-temporal measurements to the base station. The spa-
tio temporal data payload has a specific format: It contains an array of measure-
ments each preceded by a header involving a timestamp (of first sample), a data
type ID, and sampling rate. For example, payload can contain all the values read
from the temperature sensor of the node within some interval. When using this
function, a slightly different version of the measurements may be returned by the
receive function at the base station. However, the total difference is guaranteed
not to exceed the value of the acceptable estimation error specified in the listen
call. In order to send other arbitrary data (e.g., send control information), we
also provide a regular send function. Its payload is transmitted 100% reliably.
Finally, the close function is used by the base station to close the connection.
Every connection in our protocol is represented by a base station address and a
port number. To initiate the connection, the base station calls listen function
provided by the transport layer interface to listen to some specific port. Any node
willing to join the connection, calls connect with the base station address and
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corresponding port number (Figure 5.3). A connection table in each node keeps
track of the established connections that the node is aware of. We emphasize that
a node does not necessary participate in data collection for all connections stored
in its connection table. Some nodes may simply serve as relay nodes. For each
connection, the connection table keeps the corresponding basestation address, port
number, and a flag to show whether the node itself is collecting data for that con-
nection.
The connect message is sent towards the base station. It is processed at every
hop and forwarded to the next hop. If an intermediate node is not aware of this
connection, the base station address and port are added to the connection table
with the participation flag indicating that the node only forwards messages in this
connection. The connectmessage also contains the sender address and location,
in addition to the basestation address and port number. The location is cached at
every hop towards the base station. The reason behind forwarding the connect
all the way to the base station is to cache the location of the joining node at all
intermediate nodes. When received by the base station, an acknowledgment is
sent back to the source. The connection is closed when the basestation calls a
close function.
Sending is done using two different functions: send control sends control
messages, and send data is used for sending spatio-temporal data to the base
station. As illustrated in Figure 5.4, send control uses hop-by-hop acknowl-
edgments to reliably transfer control packets to the destination (similar to [Stann
and Heidemann, 2003; Wan et al., 2002]). The structure of a control packet is
depicted in Figure 5.2. A flag in the message header distinguishes this kind of
messages from spatio-temporal data messages. The header also stores source and
destination address and port number to distinguish between different flows. When
a packet is received from the network layer, a selective ACK message is sent back
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Figure 5.2: Control and data packet structure.
to the previous hop. The ACK message contains the port number and the sequence
number of the acknowledged packet. If the packet is destined to the receiver, it
is added to the receive buffer to be fetched by the receive function. Otherwise, it
is forwarded towards the destination. This traditional approach supports any end-
to-end communication (i.e. sensor-to-sink, sink-to-sensor, or sensor-to-sensor).
Control messages form a small portion of the total traffic and are often critical.
Therefore, we do not employ any congestion control mechanism for control pack-
ets.
The send data function is responsible for transmitting the majority of the
traffic and uses a specific format for its payload. The payload contains an ar-
ray of measurements (for example, temperature) and the associated node IDs. At
the source, the sending application simply specifies its local node ID. However,
as we explain later in detail, each measurement forwarded in the network may
be attributed to more than one source node because of aggregation at the trans-
port layer. Unlike the send control function, spatio-temporal data may not
be directly forwarded towards the base station depending on the next hop (Fig-
ure 5.4). If the next hop is participating in the same connection (i.e. running the
same application), the send data message is used to update the local array of
measurements at the next hop and the message itself is dropped. Otherwise, the
message is forwarded in the same way as the control packets until it reaches a
participating node.
Formally, every node v, maintains M¯ vv as an array of values of m¯
v
w for every
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node w in Tv (we drop the time variable to represent the latest value). Whenever
a data message is received by v, the corresponding data points in M¯ vv are updated
and the message is dropped. The measurements are propagated at the next call
to send data at v where M¯ vv is first updated using the local measurement at v
given by the application. Assuming no congestion, it then sends the whole array
of estimated data m¯vv to the parent and waits for an ACK message upon success-
ful receipt of the packet by u. When an ACK message is received, v knows that
the estimated values in u have been updated to M¯ vv and the send data func-
tion returns control to the application layer. The transport layer keeps the last l
successfully delivered estimated values to the parent, M¯ vv (ts1), . . . , M¯
v
v (tsl). The
receive function at the base station simply returns the M¯ rr . Later in this chapter
we describe the mechanisms employed in send data function to: i) ensure reli-
able and accurate data collection while minimizing resource consumption, and ii)
maximize the modeling accuracy when resource constraints becomes a bottleneck.
Each node keeps track of established connections by maintaining a table of
open ports, destination ids, and their corresponding  values. The connection is
established when the base station calls the listen function and other nodes call
connect. The base station broadcasts an INIT message to the nodes to let them
know of the new port listened to. This message maybe flooded for certain num-
ber of hops or to cover the whole network. The INIT message contains the port
number and . The connect function on a port succeeds if the transport layer is
already aware of this port via a past INIT. If the local node has not seen an INIT, a
CONNECT message is sent out towards the destination with a given time-to-live
(TTL), expressed in hops, to establish the connection. Forwarding of this message
stops at the first node that is aware of the original INIT. An acknowledgment is
sent back to the connecting node indicating the joining point to the connection
tree.
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After connection setup, the send function is used to reliably transmit general
payload to the base station. This is done through hop-by-hop acknowledgments.
In wireless data transport, hop-by-hop loss recovery is shown to achieve much
better performance compared with end-to-end recovery [Stann and Heidemann,
2003; Wan et al., 2002]. Our transport protocol uses a message buffer for in-
transit and received data packets. When receiving a packet from child nodes,
the packet is acknowledged using a selective ACK message. The ACK message
contains the port number and the sequence number of acknowledged packet. If
the packet is destined to the receiver, it is added to the receive buffer to be fetched
by the receive function. If not, it will be sent toward the base station.
5.3 Adaptive Reliability
The main challenge in optimizing the data collection for accurate modeling is to
quantify the importance of a packet and coordinate the transmissions in such a
way that the global estimation error is bounded. This should be done with almost
no communication overhead since conserving energy is our main objective. We
choose a probabilistic transmission approach using local decisions to guarantee
the resulting error in expected value sense.
For any given value of , our protocol guarantees that the expected estimation
error at root, E[Er(t)], does not exceed n at any time instance where n is the
number of connected nodes. We first give an overview of the protocol explaining
connection management and general-purpose API. Next, we present our approach
for spatio-temporal data transport and we analytically prove the correctness of our
approach in achieving the desired expected estimation error. Finally, we provide
details of the protocol in case of variable link quality.
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5.3.1 Spatio-Temporal Data Transport
At every call to send data function, the transport layer first updates m¯vv using
the sample given by the application. Then, it creates a packet consisting the port
number and the whole array representing M¯ vv . Based on the importance of that
information, we derive a probability, pv(t), and using that, we send M¯ vv to its
parent. Note that in contrast with general packet transport, data is packed together
at each hop and may be different from actual values sent from the sender.
We should use a value for pv such that the final expected estimation error at
the base station does not exceed n. We use a local derivation and we show that
this local decision will keep the final error bounded regardless of global state
of the network. The transport protocol first derives the estimated values in its
parent if no new measurement is received by the parent. Formally, we compute
M¯uv =
∑l
i=1 ciM¯
u
v (tsi) =
∑l
i=1 ciM¯
v
v (tsi) using the physical model provided by
the application. Then, the protocol computes Fv, the squared distance between
M¯ vv and M¯
u
v :
Fv =
∑
w∈Tv
(m¯vw − m¯uw)2 (5.1)
Fv is the amount by which the estimation error at u will be reduced if M¯ vv is
delivered. Using this, we obtain pv by:
pv =

1− 
Fv
Fv > 
0 Fv ≤ 
(5.2)
If the wireless link between v and u is fully reliable, then the protocol just needs
to send the packet one time with probability pv. However, we need to accommo-
date channel failures in a way that the probability of receiving the message by u
would be pv. We discuss the details next in this section. Like traditional send
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functionality, an ACK message will be sent back to v if the packet is success-
fully received by u. Upon receipt of an ACK message, v knows that the estimated
values in u has been updated to M¯ vv . The send function returns control to the ap-
plication layer. The parent node does not directly forward the received packet to
its parent. Rather, it uses the information to update values in M¯uu . The packets
would be collected in this fashion until the next call to the send function at node
u when the whole array of estimated data is probabilistically transmitted to the
parent of u. The receive function at the base station simply returns M¯ rr .
In order to show that the expected estimation error at the base station is indeed
bounded by n, we prove a stronger claim:
Theorem 2 The expected error that an intermediate node, v introduces to its par-
ent, u, is less than or equal to |Tv|.
Proof:
The proof is by induction on the height of v. Suppose v has the height of 0
which means that v is a leaf node and Tv = {v}. Hence, the estimated data at
v equals its own measurement, i.e. Mv = M¯ vv = {mv}. The estimation error
contributed to u is zero if the packet is received by u or it is Fv = (m¯uv − mv)2
otherwise. Therefore, the expected value of error introduced to the parent equals
(1− pv)Fv. From (5.2), this is no more than .
Now, consider a node v with height h + 1. According to the induction hypoth-
esis, each child node, yi (Figure 5.1), contributes |Tyi | to the estimation error at
v. So we have:
Ev =
∑
w∈Tv
E[(m¯vw−mw)2] =
∑
1≤i≤k
∑
j∈Tyi
(m¯vj −mj)2 ≤
∑
1≤i≤k
|Tyi | = (|Tv|−1)
(5.3)
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Using Bayes rule, we know that for every w ∈ Tv − {v}:
E[(m¯uw −mw)2] = E[(m¯uw −mw)2|Dv = 1]P (Dv = 1)+
E[(m¯uw −mw)2|Dv = 0]P (Dv = 0) (5.4)
where Dv is a random variable representing the delivery of packet from v to
u. Given a successful delivery from v to u, m¯uw is updated to m¯
v
w. So, E[(m¯
u
w −
mw)
2|Dv = 1] = E[(m¯vw −mw)2]. On the other hand, depending on whether m¯vw
has been updated to mw or not we can write:
E[(m¯uw −mw)2|Dv = 0] =
E[(m¯uw −mw)2|Dv = 0, Uv = 0]P (Uv = 0)+
E[(m¯uw −mw)2|Dv = 0, Uv = 1]P (Uv = 1) (5.5)
where Uv is one if m¯vw has been updated or zero otherwise. Again given Uv = 1,
m¯vw = mw and therefore E[(m¯
u
w − mw)2|Dv = 0, Uv = 1] = E[m¯uw − m¯vw].
Otherwise, neither m¯uw nor m¯
v
w are affected by the new measurement at w. This
means that (m¯uw − m¯vw)2 and (m¯vw −mw)2 are uncorrelated in this specific case.
Thus, we can writeE[(m¯uw−mw)2|Dv = 0, Uv = 0] = E[(m¯vw−mw)2]+E[(m¯uw−
m¯vw)
2]. From equations 5.4 and 5.5, we obtain:
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E[(m¯uw −mw)2] = E[(m¯vm −mw)2]P (Dv = 1)+
[E[(m¯vw −mw)2]P (Uv = 0) + E[(m¯uw − m¯vw)2]]P (Dv = 0)
≤ E[(m¯vw −mw)2] + E[(m¯uw − m¯vw)2]P (Dv = 0) (5.6)
Now, summing both sides for all nodes in Tv and using (5.3) and the fact that
P (Dv = 0) = 1− pv ≤ Fv , we conclude:
∑
w∈Tv
E[(m¯uw−mw)2] ≤
∑
w∈Tv
E[(m¯vw−mw)2]+
∑
w∈Tv
E[(m¯uw−m¯vw)2]P (Dv = 0) ≤
(|Tv| − 1)+ FvP (Dv = 0) ≤ (|Tv| − 1)+ Fv 
Fv
= |Tv| (5.7)

5.3.2 Channel Failures
As we discussed above, pv is the probability at which the message from v should
be delivered to u. When the link is 100% reliable, a node just needs to send
the packet with probability pv. Otherwise, we need to design a retransmission
mechanism to make sure that the packet is received by u with probability pv. We
denote the delivery ratio of channel between v and u by dv. We first assume
that dv is known to our protocol and later we explain how to estimate its value
dynamically.
Depending on the value of dv, we have two cases: First, if pv < dv, we derive
qv =
pv
dv
and send the packet with probability qv instead of pv. This packet is deliv-
ered to u with probability of qvdv = pv. In the second case, we have pv ≥ dv and
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therefore we need multiple transmissions to reach the required pv. If the protocol
initiates the transmission with probability qv and performs rv retransmissions, the
following condition must hold to ensure delivery probability of pv:
pv ≤ qv(1− (1− dv)rv) (5.8)
Ideally, we need to find the values of qv and rv such that rv is minimized while
(5.8) is satisfied. However, due to limited computational capacity of current motes
which are running this protocol and to avoid complex floating point operations, we
fix qv = 1 and find the minimum value for rv such that:
(1− dv)rv ≤ 1− pv (5.9)
In practice, the protocol multiplies (1− dv) by itself until the resulting value is
less than 1−pv. This would ensure delivery probability of at least pv. In summary,
the transport protocol starts the transmission with probability qv, and retries for rv
times until it receives an acknowledgment.
Until now, we assumed that our protocol knows the link delivery rate, dv. In
practice, we need to find dv adaptively based on channel conditions. The idea
is to use ACK messages for each transmission to update the value of dv using
an exponential moving average. In particular, let a(t) be 1 if the most recent
transmission has been acknowledged and 0 otherwise. We initialize dv with a
small value and update it at the end of the send function according to:
dv(t) = (1− α)dv(t− 1) + αa(t) (5.10)
Algorithm 3 summarizes the send procedure.
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Algorithm 3 send data(port number, dest id, payload)
1: Update M¯ vv using the spatio-temporal payload
2: M¯uv ← c1M¯ vv (ts1) + · · ·+ clM¯ vv (tsl)
3: Fv ←
∑
w∈Tv (m¯
u
w − m¯vw)2
4: pv ← min(1− Fv , 0)
5: if pv < dv then
6: qv ← pvdv , rv ← 1
7: else
8: qv ← 1, rv ← d log(1−pv)log(1−dv)e
9: end if
10: Transmit the data packet with probability qv
11: Retransmit unless acknowledged or reach rv times
12: If a(t) = 1, update tsi+1 ← tsi and M vv (ts1)←M vv
13: dv ← (1− α)dv + αa(t)
14: return control to the application layer
5.4 Cyber-physical Congestion Control
In addition to controlling reliability, another challenge in designing a multi-hop
data collection network is to eliminate congestion without significantly increas-
ing the global estimation error. Moreover, different applications may have differ-
ent accuracy requirements to be maintained. We provide weighted differentiation
among the applications based on user-defined accuracy weights. Our congestion
control achieves this ratio while minimizing the absolute error by summarizing
data adaptively both in space and time. Unlike before where the aggregates sent
out from each node contains all measurements, the output rate of a node is con-
trolled by summarizing the data to create smaller aggregates or averaging aggre-
gate values of different report periods. The main idea of our protocol is to start
with maintaining zero estimation error (due to summarization) at every node by
forwarding every sensor reading to the base station. When congestion is detected,
nodes in the congested area are allowed to cause some estimation error by re-
ducing their data transmission to eventually eliminate congestion [Ahmadi et al.,
2010a].
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In data collection networks, the main challenge in designing a cyber-physical
congestion control scheme (i.e., one where the coupling between the cyber and
physical domains is accounted for) is to eliminate congestion without significantly
increasing the global estimation error. This should be done with very little com-
munication overhead. Moreover, different applications may have different accu-
racy requirements to be maintained. We aim to provide weighted differentiation
among the applications based on user-defined accuracy weights. For example,
if accuracy of application A is twice as important as accuracy of application B,
then the estimation error weights of the two applications can be set 2:1. It defines
the statistically expected ratio of these errors to be maintained by our congestion
control scheme. Our congestion control achieves this ratio while minimizing the
absolute error by summarizing data adaptively both in space and time.
Our approach is based on aggregation at each intermediate node. Each node
sends an aggregate to its next hop periodically. The output rate of a node is con-
trolled by summarizing the data to create smaller aggregates or averaging aggre-
gate values of different report periods. The main idea of our protocol is to start
with maintaining zero estimation error (due to summarization) at every node by
forwarding every sensor reading to the base station. When congestion is detected,
nodes in the congested area are allowed to cause some estimation error by reduc-
ing their data transmission to eventually eliminate congestion. We are interested
in finding the minimal allowed error which is just sufficient to alleviate the con-
gestion. We first discuss the mechanism for congestion control and then describe
the details of our adaptive summarization method.
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Figure 5.4: Data and control packet send mechanisms.
5.4.1 Congestion Control Mechanism
The main objective of the congestion control mechanism is to minimize the es-
timation error incurred at the base station while ensuring a weighted allocation
of error among various applications running concurrently. A key idea here is to
control the error locally in a neighborhood so the global error is minimized. Let
ev denote the error between observations at a node and the values available to
its parent. In traditional rate control approaches, the output flow of a node is di-
rectly controlled by its transfer rate. However, in our scheme, the output flow is
indirectly controlled using ev. The reason we use induced estimation error as a
control mechanism rather than directly controlling the output flow is to manage
the ultimate error contribution resulting from congestion control. For presentation
simplicity, we first assume that all applications are equally important (i.e. have
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the same accuracy weight). Later in this section, we show how different weights
are supported.
Our scheme assigns a value to each node v called maximum tolerable error and
denoted by λv. The major principle of the protocol is to keep ev ≤ λv while mini-
mizing output data rate. Initially λv = 0 for all nodes. Upon detecting congestion,
our protocol increases λv until congestion is eliminated. There are three compo-
nents involved in this process (Figure 5.5): (i) The congestion detection compo-
nent, (ii) Error control component which adapts λv to observed congestion condi-
tions such that the congestion is eliminated, and (iii) The adaptive summarization
component which finds the smallest summary for which ev does not exceed λv,
for any given value of λv. We first discuss the congestion control components,
then present our summarization mechanism.
Congestion detection is widely studied in both wired and wireless networks. In
traditional wired networks, the congestion can be easily detected by checking the
output buffer size. The network is congested if the buffer is utilized more than a
threshold. Wireless networks may need more sophisticated mechanisms such as
identifying channel idle time (e.g. the mechanism proposed in CODA [Wan et
al., 2003]). We treat the congestion detection component as a black box so any
arbitrary mechanism can be used. At every call to the send data function, our
protocol first checks with the congestion detection component and determines the
transport status at that node to be congested, normal, or underutilized. The current
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implementation simply uses thresholds on output buffer size.
After obtaining the status, the protocol increases or decreases λv in case of
congestion or underutilization respectively. To find the appropriate estimation
error which is just large enough to alleviate the congestion, we use a multiplicative
(tolerance) increase, additive decrease method. When congestion is detected at
node v, λv is increased to 2λv. However, this increase does not always guarantee
a decrease in output rate. For example if λv = 0, the tolerance level would remain
at 0. To solve this problem, the protocol first examines what would be a reasonable
increase in λv to have an actual effect on the output rate. To do that, we consider
the aggregate value currently being sent using the old value of λv. The protocol
then computes the error introduced by adding one level of summarization. Let e∗
be that error. Now, we adjust tolerance level using
λv(t+ 1) = max{2λv(t), e∗} (5.11)
In the case of underutilization, λv is modified as follows:
1
λv(t+ 1)
=
1
λv(t)
+ ρ (5.12)
where ρ is a constant value protocol parameter and is greater than 1. Now, one
can claim that when the appropriate estimation error is found at the congested
node v, we can locally use more aggressive summarization without making any
changes in the protocol operation in other network parts. However, resources
(energy and bandwidth) are being consumed by nodes in Tv to deliver error-free
spatio-temporal data to v without knowing that this accuracy will be wasted. Al-
though nodes in Tv may not be congested, their excessive resource usage will
cause other nodes sharing the media or other applications running on those nodes
to suffer. Therefore, the protocol informs all nodes in Tv about the change in the
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amount of tolerable error at node v and allows them to tolerate the same amount
of error per sampling point. An special ADJUST ERROR message is sent to all
child nodes carrying λv. When receiving such a message, each node compares λv
with its own tolerance level and picks the maximum.
In order to provide a differentiated service to different applications, each appli-
cation i is given an accuracy weight αi. Let Eir be the estimation error at the base
station for the application i as defined in Definition 5. We design our protocol in
such a way that for any two applications i and j we have:
Eir
Ejr
=
αj
αi
This is simply achieved by modifying λv when running the congestion control
scheme. Instead of λv, each node uses λv/αi as the upper bound for ev and follows
the rest of the protocol as before. In Section 5.4.3, we show that this scheme
converges to the desired weighted error distribution among various applications.
Internally to the transport layer, every packet contains the the base station ad-
dress and port number (Figure 5.2) to identify each flow. The header also includes
the value of λv at the time of transmitting packet where v is the transmitter. uv is
called the upper bound on the estimation error of the payload and defined as:
uv = max
j∈Tv
{|m¯vj −mj|}
Finally, spatio-temporal payload is a summary of the array of estimated data
m¯vv.
5.4.2 Adaptive Summarization
In our scheme, adaptive summarization is the process of compressing the spatio-
temporal payload to a smaller size while satisfying the maximum tolerable error
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bound computed above. This process is done at every call to the send data.
Let us denote this summery by M¯uv as this would be the values that u estimates
for nodes in Tv. There are multiple degrees of summarization: a higher degree
summarization means smaller payload but larger estimation error. Specifically for
n = |M¯ vv | samples, we define log(n) summaries as follows: We take the average
of every consecutive pairs of values to obtain a set of n/2 samples. This creates
the first summarization of M¯ vv . Continuing this process yields k-th summariza-
tion with the size of n
2k
. Next, we find the smallest summary which satisfies the
following criteria:
(m¯uv −mv)2 +
k∑
i=1
∑
j∈Twi
[(m¯uj − m¯vj )2 + 2|m¯uj − m¯vj |uwi ]
≤ λv −
k∑
i=1
λwi (5.13)
To achieve this, we perform a binary search on log(n) different summaries. We
observe that, for λv = 0 only 0-th summarization satisfies the condition (5.13).
On the other hand, λv can be so large that even sending a single value does not
violate (5.13). In this case, where spatial summarization no longer reduces the
data rate, we start averaging values over time and sending one aggregate message
instead of two. In particular, the protocol defers sending any data packet to the
parent until the next call to send data function while keeping the last values
that u has received from v. When u does not receive any values from v, it uses the
current values of M¯uv .
Our scheme prefers spatial summarization over temporal summarization be-
cause unlike temporal summarization, the error introduced by spatial summariza-
tion can be calculated at the time of sampling. To perform bounded-error temporal
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aggregation, one needs to defer the summarization decision to after multiple sam-
pling intervals. Also, observe that while more complex summarization could be
used that introduces different degrees of temporal and spatial summarization to
different data values, such complex techniques would require appropriately com-
plex metadata to describe what summarization was performed. The advantage of
our scheme lies in the simplicity of needed metadata as described next.
After summarization, λv and uv are added to the packet header. In order to
calculate uv, v uses the uwi values reported in packet headers received from child
nodes. In particular, v uses to the following to calculate uv when composing each
data packet header:
uv = maxj∈Twi ,1≤i≤k{|m¯uj − m¯vj |+ uwi}
It can easily be verified that uv is greater than |m¯vj − mj| for any j ∈ Tu.
After the data packet is composed, it is sent to the output buffer and the control is
returned to the application.
5.4.3 Analysis of Protocol Properties
Our proposed cyber-physical congestion control scheme uses the local estima-
tion error at a subtree to control the data traffic. In this section, we first validate
that this local decision is sufficient to control the error globally. We analytically
show that our proposed scheme can indeed provide a controlled estimation error
at the base station. Next, we study the computational complexity involved in the
adaptive summarization process. We prove that the computational complexity is
O(log(log(n))), where n is the number of nodes. This allows the protocol to scale
as the network grows larger. Finally, we prove that our approach successfully
converges to a weighted error allocation, where each application i experiences an
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estimation error proportional to αi when the protocol stabilizes.
5.4.4 Validation
The congestion control component in our protocol works based the fact that the
estimation error at each node v is always less than or equal to λv. We first assume
the single application scenario and show that the proposed scheme for adjusting
summarization in a subtree respects the maximum tolerable error. Formally, we
prove the following theorem:
Theorem 3 The estimation error contributed from any node v to its parent u is
always less than or equal to λv.
Proof: We prove this theorem using induction on the height of the nodes. The
leaf nodes only store their own measurement mv. Thus, the error contributed to
their parents are always less than λv as enforced by the protocol and the theorem
is trivially true for the leaf nodes. Now, we assume that the data from child wi
introduces an error not exceeding λwi to v. In other words:
∑
j∈Twi
(m¯vj −mj)2 ≤ λwi (5.14)
On the other hand, the error at data points in wi sent to u can be expressed as
follows:
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∑
j∈Twi
(m¯uj −mj)2 ≤
∑
j∈Twi
(|m¯uj − m¯vj |+ |m¯vj −mj|)2
≤
∑
j∈Twi
(m¯uj − m¯vj )2 +
∑
j∈Twi
(m¯vj −mj)2+
2
∑
j∈Twi
|m¯uj − m¯vj ||m¯vj −mj|
Where the first inequality is based on |a− b| ≤ |a− c|+ |c− b|. By definition,
|m¯vj −mj| ≤ uwi . Using (5.14), we have:
∑
j∈Twi
(m¯uj −mj)2 ≤
∑
j∈Twi
(m¯uj − m¯vj )2 + λwi+
2
∑
j∈Twi
|m¯uj − m¯vj |uwj
According to adaptive summarization (5.13):
∑
j∈Tu
(m¯uj −mj)2 ≤ (m¯uv −mv)2+
k∑
i=1
[
∑
j∈Twi
(m¯uj − m¯vj )2 + λwi + 2
∑
j∈Twi
|m¯uj − m¯vj |uwj ] ≤
λv −
k∑
i=1
λwi +
k∑
i=1
λwi = λv (5.15)
This completes the proof. 
From the above theorem we immediately conclude that the estimation error
at the base station is bounded by λr. According to the proposed protocol, λr
equals the maximum tolerable error at the most congested node in the network.
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Therefore, minimizing λv locally at the congested node simply minimizes the total
estimation error bounded by λr.
We can generalize the argument to multiple applications with relative impor-
tance values of αi. Similar to Theorem 3, we can show that the estimation error
of application i contributed to node u by node v is bounded by λv/αi. This can
be proved just by replacing λv with λv/αi. Therefore, the total estimation error in
the multiple application case is bounded by λr/αi.
5.4.5 Computational Complexity
There are several steps involved in sending a data packet. Although the sampling
intervals of typical sensor networks are usually long enough to allow complex
processing, we need to make sure that the protocol can easily scale when the
network size increases. The following theorem describes the time complexity of
our protocol:
Theorem 4 At every call to send data function, our congestion control proto-
col performs O(log(log(|Tv|))) summarizations.
Proof: First, note that the size of the complete sample array is |Tv| at node
v. Therefore, given λv, there are log(|Tv|) different summarizations to choose
from. However, since the error of summaries are non-decreasing as the size de-
creases, we can use binary search to find the minimum size summary that satisfies
our error constraint. Using binary search, the total number of summarizations is
O(log(log(|Tv|))) 
We should note that the summarization itself is a linear operation on the data
packet. A same-order computation is performed in any transport protocol to send
and receive the data packet itself (O(|Tv|)). So our protocol increases the total
computational cost from O(|Tv|) to O(log(log(|Tv|))|Tv|) compared to previous
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approaches. Since the added term grows very slowly with n, we conclude that
the protocol can scale well with increase in network size. On the other hand, the
only parameter that affects the protocol convergence is ρ. Using a large value of ρ
results in non-optimal solution while a small value will slow down our protocol.
Ideally, ρ is inversely proportional to the number of applications.
5.4.6 Error Distribution
When running several applications on the same network, it is desirable to have
resources distributed among them based on their relative importance. Let λiv be
the maximum tolerable error computed by application i at node v. When using the
cyber-physical congestion control scheme, all the applications using the network
should incur estimation errors relative to their given αi value. Formally, for every
pair of applications i and j and any node v, with estimation errors of Ei and Ej ,
we should have:
Ei
Ej
=
αj
αi
(5.16)
We first show that the maximum tolerable error at each node converges to the
same value for all applications as time passes.
Theorem 5 For every pair of applications i and j and any node v, we have:
lim
t→∞
λiv
λjv
= 1
Proof:
According to the protocol we have:
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1λv(t+ 1)
=

1
λv(t)
+ ρ non-congested
1
2λv(t)
congested
(5.17)
When congestion occurs, we can write λ
i
v
λjv
as follows:
λiv(t+ 1)
λjv(t+ 1)
=
λiv(t)
λjv(t)
(5.18)
On the other hand in non-congested operation, we have:
λiv(t+ 1)
λjv(t+ 1)
=
1
λjv(t)
+ ρ
1
λiv(t)
+ ρ
=
1 + ρλjv(t)
1 + ρλiv(t)
λiv(t)
λjv(t)
(5.19)
Given (5.19) and for ρ > 1, we have λ
i
v(t+1)
λjv(t+1)
≥ λiv(t)
λjv(t)
if λ
i
v(t)
λjv(t)
≤ 1 and λiv(t+1)
λjv(t+1)
≤
λiv(t)
λjv(t)
otherwise. Thus, we conclude that λ
i
v
λjv
converges to 1 as time passes.

We conclude that for every pair of applications λir and λ
j
r converge to the same
value as the protocol stabilizes. Since the estimation error of applications i and j
converges to λir/αi and λ
j
r/αj respectively, we have:
Ei
Ej
→ λ
i
r/αi
λjr/αj
=
αj
αi
(5.20)
5.5 Experimental Testbed
We experimented with our protocol using a testbed of 20 MicaZ motes [MicaZ
Data Sheet, 2007] presented in Figure 5.6(a). We used the LiteOS [Lit, 2008]
operating system and implemented the protocol in C++. One of the motes is used
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 5.6: The LiteOS testbed: (a) Physical configuration , (b) Routing tree with
range r = 1, and (c) Routing tree with range r = 2.646.
as the base station. Each node in the testbed has a unique preset ID between 0 and
255. We used fixed tree topologies for our experiments where each topology is
obtained by considering different communication ranges. Nodes in Figure 5.6(a)
have roughly the same distance from their nearest neighbors. For simplicity of
presentation, we choose the unit of distance to be the distance between two neigh-
bor motes. Thus, communication range of 1 is the minimum range to keep the
network connected. We produce different topologies with communication ranges
between 1 and 4.6. Two examples are illustrated in Figures 5.6(b), 5.6(c).
Our transport layer is implemented as a C++ class with connect, listen, send,
send data, receive, and close functions. In our implementation, transport layer
buffer can hold up to 8 messages, 47 bytes each, considering extremely limited
memory available in MicaZ motes. We implement an application, where each
node independently and asynchronously reads the value of its light sensor at in-
tervals of R seconds (i.e. sampling intervals) and uses our new protocol to send
it. The observations are scalar values with the average of 700. We use l = 1 and
c1 = 1 for the physical model.
In order to compare our protocol against other reliable and unreliable transport
approaches, we implemented RMST [Stann and Heidemann, 2003] transport pro-
tocol based on the same framework as described above. The protocol uses the
same two threads to send and receive packets. Each packet is retransmitted based
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on NACK received from the parent node or until we reach the maximum num-
ber of retries. Similarly, an unreliable protocol is implemented by simply sending
each packet once to the parent; regardless of the delivery of the packet. We also
implemented ESRT [Sankarasubramaniam et al., 2003] by supplying the unreli-
able framework with variable data reporting frequency. This frequency is adapted
to maintain expected estimation error at base station.
In addition to bare transport protocols, we implement a simple data suppres-
sion scheme on top of RMST to study the performance of previous data suppres-
sion schemes. In this case, each node calculates the difference between its actual
measurement and the value estimated at the base station. The estimated value
is obtained by using the physical model and recently transmitted measurements.
The node transmits the sample if this difference is more than
√
. Since the work
by Santini et al. [Santini and Roemer, 2006] is too complex to be fully imple-
mented on motes, we use this implementation to roughly match the performance
of quality-based data reduction scheme in its steady state. Unless otherwise spec-
ified, we use the sampling interval, R, of 5 seconds,  = 100, and the average link
loss rate of 50% for our experiments. The default communication range is 2.646.
We run the experiment for 50 cycles and report the average value.
5.6 Evaluation
We evaluate our protocol reliability, bandwidth usage and latency and compare
those against different transport approaches. We use a simple data suppression
technique on top of a reliable transport protocol as described before to represent
the performance of data suppression techniques and specifically the work by San-
tini et al. [Santini and Roemer, 2006]. In this case, each node calculates the differ-
ence between its actual measurement and the value estimated at the base station.
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The estimated value is obtained by using the physical model and recently trans-
mitted measurements. The node transmits the sample if this difference is more
than
√
.We implemented RMST [Stann and Heidemann, 2003], RCRT [Paek
and Govindan, 2007], and ESRT [Sankarasubramaniam et al., 2003] in LiteOS
in order to perform comparison experiments. RCRT and ESRT protocols use rate
control for congestion management; however, they have different reliability se-
mantics.
The average estimation error is computed by comparing the set of samples
stored at the base station with the actual readings stored at each mote. An in-
tegrated mean square error is calculated and then divided by the number of motes
and time to obtain average estimation error per node and unit time. The number
of bytes each mote sends is also stored to calculate the used bandwidth, i.e. the
total number of bytes sent divided by the number of motes and time. Since trans-
mission is the only major energy consuming operation controlled by the transport
layer, we use average bandwidth used per node to represent both bandwidth and
energy consumption of protocols. Use of any sleep/wake mechanism concurrently
with the transport protocol gives our protocol an advantage on energy savings con-
sidering that the data is not forwarded at arbitrary time instances but at predefined
sampling intervals. To conduct a fair comparison, we do not use any sleep/wake
mechanism in experiments.
The latency is computed by comparing the actual time at which a sample is
taken and when the corresponding space-time sample is obtained at the base sta-
tion. First, we validate the performance of our protocol to show that it can indeed
provide the desired level of reliability. Next, we compare the protocols under
various system parameters.
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Figure 5.7: Impact of  on protocol performance: (a) Average estimation error, (b)
Used bandwidth, and (c) Average delay.
5.6.1 Reliability
We validate performance of our protocol against the two protocol parameters 
and R. In the first experiment, we study the impact of  on the average estimation
error observed by the base station. We change  between 50 and 500 and report
the average and standard deviation of estimation error. We plot the result in Fig-
ure 5.7(a). Our protocol guarantees that the average estimation error is always
less than or equal to . So, we expect the error curve to be below the y = x line.
On the other hand, our goal is to have the curve as close as possible to y = x,
to save as much energy as possible. The graph shows that our protocol is rather
close to the ideal case. Next, we collect the number of bytes transmitted and their
latencies in the same experiment and show it in Figures 5.7(b) and 5.7(c). We plot
the bandwidth usage of unreliable data transport as a reference. Considering the
average hop-count of 2 and uniform sampling times in this experiment, the aver-
age latency is expected to be close to the average delay at one intermediate node.
This delay is half of the sampling interval, i.e. 2.5 seconds. As we increase , both
bandwidth and latency drop as fewer transmissions are required to maintain the
error level.
In the next experiment, we change the cycle length of the protocol, R, be-
tween 2 and 10 seconds and report the average estimation error at sample points
in Figure 5.8. Increasing R increases the time interval between samples which
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Figure 5.9: Impact of R on bandwidth usage.
consequently increases integrated mean square of error over time and the average
estimation error. However, this implies fewer samples to be transmitted and there-
fore less bandwidth is used. We plot the average number of bytes transmitted per
node in Figure 5.9 and see that the used bandwidth increases super linearly with
decreasing R. The reason is that decreasing R means transmitting more packets
in a time unit, thus increased chance of collisions.
In the first comparison experiment, we study the performance of our protocol
in various channel conditions compared to RMST, ESRT, non-reliable transport,
and data suppression with hop-by-hop acknowledgment. We change the link de-
livery rate by dropping packets in the LiteOS radio interface API. We use values
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Figure 5.10: Protocol comparison for various channel qualities: (a) Average esti-
mation error, (b) Used bandwidth, and (c) Average delay.
between 12% to 100% for all links and present the results in Figure 5.10. We
observe the estimation error at the base station while we change the link delivery
rate. Since RMST always provides an estimation error of zero and the y-axis in
Figure 5.10(a) is plotted in log scale, we omit the RMST curve. Compared to
RMST, our protocol saves between 4 to 10 times on energy and bandwidth at the
cost of a small bounded estimation error (Figures 5.10(a) and 5.10(b)). On the
other hand, our protocol uses at most half of the bandwidth used by ESRT or the
data suppression protocol while simultaneosly reducing the estimation error by a
factor of 3. Note that the number of packets transmitted by a non-reliable proto-
col does not depend on link quality since it always sends one packet per sample.
The plot shows that the estimation error provided by our protocol is at least three
orders of magnitude less than an unreliable approach. Finally, the latency compar-
ison is presented in Figure 5.10(c). By increasing link loss ratio, a huge latency
is contributed to RMST because of the increasing number of retransmissions and
collisions.
In the next experiment, we compare the protocols as we change the noise on
sensor readings. To model white noise, each node generates a normal random
value with mean 0 and variance σ2 at the time of sampling and adds it to the ac-
tual light reading. We run the experiment for different values of σ2 and report the
average estimation error at the base station. The error is computed by subtracting
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Figure 5.11: Protocol comparison with different sensing noises: (a) Average esti-
mation error, (b) Used bandwidth, and (c) Average delay.
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Figure 5.12: Protocol comparison for various communication ranges: (a) Average
estimation error, (b) Used bandwidth, and (c) Average delay.
the base station values and real sensed values at nodes for each time instance and
plotted in Figure 5.11(a). Since adaptive and reliable transport protocols provide
error-free or low-error communication, the final estimation error is approximately
the same as noise. However, the unreliable transport protocol communication er-
ror dominates the noise and shows an almost constant error. We perform the same
experiment to study the used bandwidth and latency. We record the number of
packets sent by each node and find the average bandwidth used. Figures 5.11(b)
and 5.11(c) show that the sensing noise does not have any effect on the band-
width or latency as sensing noise is completely outside the scope of the transport
protocols.
In the last set of experiments, we compare the protocols for various communi-
cation ranges and tree topologies. We fix the position of the motes and change the
range they can directly communicate. In one extreme, any node can only commu-
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nicate with its nearest neighbor, while on the other extreme, the communication
range is large enough to make every node able to communicate directly with the
base station. For different values of communication range we use a fixed cor-
responding routing tree and run the experiment for different protocols. We first
plot the estimation error incurred at the base station in Figure 5.12(a). Again, the
y-axis is in log scale, so the the constant zero error of RMST is not shown. The
results verify that our transport protocol keeps the same error level as we aim to
guarantee, regardless of the depth of the routing tree.
Next, we plot the bandwidth usage of the protocols in Figure 5.12(b). In-
creasing transmission range increases the average bandwidth used in adaptive and
RMST transport protocols. The reason is that increasing transmission range would
increase the interference and degrade the link quality which eventually increases
the number of retransmissions. On the other hand, shorter paths do not help be-
cause data aggregation has already eliminated the forwarding overhead. Finally,
we illustrate the average latency as we change the communication range in Fig-
ure 5.12(c). Increasing communication range results in shorter paths and there-
fore, the average latency decreases for all protocols. All of the results suggest that
the adaptive transport protocol can provide a guaranteed error rate using much
less resources than the other protocols.
5.6.2 Congestion Control
We evaluate our congestion control scheme using experiments on an indoor Mi-
caZ mote [MicaZ Data Sheet, 2007] testbed. In particular, we study the estimation
error under various network conditions. Unlike traditional network applications
where the performance of a transport protocol is measured by throughput, es-
timation error is the major performance metric of a sensor network monitoring
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application.
First, in this section, we validate our protocols response to congestion. Next,
we study the distribution of the induced estimation error among several appli-
cations when they share the network. Finally, we compare the performance of
our protocol against two previous approaches to congestion control. We find
ESRT [Sankarasubramaniam et al., 2003] and RCRT [Paek and Govindan, 2007]
to be the best choice of protocols to compare against. The former is designed
for monitoring applications without having packet-level reliability requirements
while the latter is a flexible transport protocol with packet-level reliability and
applicable to any sensor network. In both protocols, receiver is responsible for
congestion control. We do not compare to our own prior work [Ahmadi and Ab-
delzaher, 2009], because that work does not use congestion control.
We implemented both RCRT [Paek and Govindan, 2007] and ESRT [Sankara-
subramaniam et al., 2003] in LiteOS in order to perform comparison experiments.
Both protocols use rate control for congestion management; however, they have
different reliability semantics. No spatial aggregation is used in these protocols.
The same application runs on top of each protocol to report light measurements.
Unless otherwise specified, in order to stress all protocols, we use an average non-
congestion-induced loss of 50% for all links to emulate an unreliable wireless
medium.
For each experiment, the protocols run on the testbed for 10 minutes. Each
experiment also runs 10 different times and the average is reported. Motes record
their own sensor readings to the flash memory. The values returned by the receive
function at the base-station are also recorded. Let ri(t) be the reading of mote i
at sampling interval t recorded to its flash memory. Also, let rˆi(t) be the value
received by the base-station similarly preserved in its flash memory. At each run,
the estimation error is obtained by computing the mean square error over time
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Figure 5.13: Fairness of the adaptive aggregation congestion control (αi = 1).
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Figure 5.14: Distribution of the estimation error among concurrent applications
where αi = i.
between recorded readings and the values from the base-station. This value is
then divided by the total time (120 intervals, 5 seconds each) and the number of
nodes (20) to calculate an average estimation error:
Estimation Error =
∑120
t=1
∑20
i=1(ri(t)− rˆi(t))2
20× 120
Note that we present the absolute value of estimation error. Hence, it should be
used as a relative measure for the purpose of comparison.
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5.6.3 Protocol Validation
In the first experiment, we study how increasing the number of applications affects
their performance, given a constant shared energy budget and equal weights (αi =
1) to all applications in Figure 5.13. In practice, different applications will focus
on different sensor modalities. We start with one application using an energy
budget of 20 bytes per second. In our system, it is more than enough for one
application to transfer all the data without loss. Therefore, the resulting estimation
error is zero.
As we increase the number of applications, k, a smaller share of the budget is
secured for each. This leads to more estimation error as depicted in Figure 5.13.
We observe that the estimation error is increased proportionally to the number of
applications. Furthermore, the results verify that an increase in the error is equally
shared among different applications as analytically predicted in Section 5.4.3.
Next, we evaluate how proportional differentiated service is provided using dif-
ferent weights. We repeat the previous experiment with αi = i and report the
results in Figure 5.14. Based on the values of αi we expect the first application to
have twice the estimation error of the second application, three times of the third,
and so on. Figure 5.14 shows that our protocol roughly maintains estimation er-
rors corresponding to the given weight values.
5.6.4 Performance Comparison
Next, we compare performance of our protocol to others. In our first comparison,
we plot the average estimation error when the wireless channel loss rate changes.
The link loss rate is changed by modifying the physical radio interface code to
deliberately drop packets. The rate varies between 0 and 87.5 percent and the
estimation error is plotted in log scale in Figure 5.15(a). Recall that the energy
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Figure 5.15: Comparing the estimation error of ESRT, RCRT, and Cyber-physical
congestion control for various: a) channel qualities, b) energy budgets, and c)
communication ranges.
budget for all nodes is 20 bytes per second. Considering this, none of the protocol
incur any error with zero loss (i.e., fully reliable channels). Note that, the curves in
Figure 5.15(a) do not include points with zero error since the y-axis is in log scale.
One can conclude from the figure that our protocol outperforms RCRT and ESRT
by 3 times when links become more lossy. In this experiment, the estimation error
induced when using ESRT is not only because of data-agnostic congestion control
but also because of the partial reliability it provides.
Next, we experiment with the effect of per node energy budget on the perfor-
mance of these protocols. As explained in the experimental setup earlier, energy
budget is represented by the number of bytes a node can transmit per second.
Since the energy budget and channel bandwidth have the same effect on protocol
performance and considering the fact that the energy budget can be easily con-
trolled, we use it to study how protocols react to more resource constrained situa-
tions. We change the energy budget between 1 and 50 bytes per second and plot
the average estimation error in Figure 5.15(b). The link loss rate is 50%. Again,
y-axis is in log scale and as before, our protocol outperforms others in the low
budget case. Observe that the estimation error remains constant when not apply-
ing any congestion control mechanism. This is because when links are very lossy,
the high channel loss rate dominates the smaller error introduced by congestion.
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In our final experiment, we evaluate the protocols against changes in communi-
cation range. Communication range is changed by changing the transmit power in
the sensors. The minimum power considered as the unit range. In Figure 5.12(a)
we show how increasing communication range affects the average estimation er-
ror. The communication range in this plot is normalized based on the unit range
and presented as communication range ratio. As communication range increases,
fewer hops are required to deliver a packet to its destination. This alleviates con-
gestion. On the other hand, the larger interference caused by increased range re-
duces the effective bandwidth. This two-fold change causes the protocols to have
different reactions. Our protocol, not suffering much from higher interference,
keeps a steady performance while others show significant increase in the error as
they encounter more collisions.
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CHAPTER 6
FUSIONSUITE IMPLEMENTATION
FusionSuite is a framework for developing wide-area sensing applications. It con-
sists of a set of libraries that are outcome of solving major challenges in cyber-
physical data distillation as described in this thesis. When developing the libraries,
the aim is to keep them application-independent such that they can be used by
many different types of wide-area sensing applications. A major challenge in de-
signing this architecture is to allow for configurable general purpose components
and interfaces to application-specific components. This section describes the de-
sign details and implementation of FusionSuite and GreenGPS. We first describe
the the architecture details and implementation. Next, the interfaces between com-
ponents are presented.
6.1 Architecture Details
As depicted in the beginning of this dissertation, the frontend consists of a data
collection component and a data sharing component (Figure 1.1). The former
efficiently collects spatio-temporal data and gather the data in the client to be
shared with the FusionSuite backend. The latter shares the collected data with the
backend through a variety of sharing channels. The sharing component may also
alter the data due to privacy concerns.
The backend is formed by a distillation manager, a set of data cleaning servers,
and a set of data modeling servers. Distillation manager finds, fetches, and stores
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the sensing data that are relevant to the application from the participants. The
data cleaning server removes the unreliable and noisy data shared by the users
and finally the data modeling server uses cleaned data to construct models and
provide them to the application server.
As data flows through the backend, it is stored in several intermediate stages.
This simplifies the interfaces between the components by allowing them to access
a data store to read the inputs and output to another data store. Also, it increases
the reliability since faults at each single stage can be recovered by rerunning the
process on the input data store. Three types of data are stored in the backend:
• Raw Data Stream: The raw time series data collected from all users that
are not processed. Examples include GPS trace of a users including the
timestamp, location, speed, direction, and other sample metadata.
• Cleaned Data Samples: The data stream in the same format as the raw data
stream but without any noisy or unreliable sample points.
• Segmented Data: The data tuples that are result of averaging the cleaned
data stream over time, location, or other stream attributes. For example, the
data tuples showing the average electricity usage of a household, the indoor
and outdoor temperature and appliance usage over a week.
The data fetched by the distillation manager is directly stored in the raw data
stream database. It is then passed to the cleaning servers and the results are stored
in the cleaned data stream database. Next, the cleaned database is segmented and
stored by the distillation manager. Finally, the segmented data database is used by
the modeling component as input. We discuss the details of each component next.
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Figure 6.1: Distillation manager design.
6.1.1 Distillation Manager
Data distillation process in the backend is executed by the distillation manager
component (Figure 6.1). The workflow includes several steps: First, the data
streams are fetched through various sharing channels and are stored into a raw
data stream database. The sharing channels are discussed later in this chapter.
The fetch module is an application-independent piece that can be configured to
work with different data types. A single data schema is used to define the sharing
channel data format and the database schema and is sufficient for the fetch module
to correctly parse the shared data from the channel and store them. The raw data
stream is stored in the corresponding database.
The manager periodically sends cleaning requests to the data cleaning servers
which populate the cleaned data stream database with the new data. The manager
then calls an application-specific segmentation module which segments the data
and stores it in a segmented database. Finally, update notifications are sent to
the modeling servers to update the internal model hierarchy which is used by the
application servers.
Note that the data distillation process is slightly different when neutral features
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Figure 6.2: Data modeling server design.
(described in Chapter 4) are shared instead of raw data traces. In that case, the
manager skips the cleaning and segmentation phases and all intermediate storage
phases and simply sends a special purpose update to the modeling server accom-
panied with the neutral features to be used for the update. The distillation manager
is implemented as a Java program.
6.1.2 Data Modeling Server
The data modeling module have access to the database of cleaned and segmented
data tuples and creates a set of regression models that are maintained internally
(see Figure 6.2). The model is updated either based on update notifications from
the distillation manager module or periodically at certain time intervals. The up-
dater module asks the sparse regression cubes (Chapter 2) to update the models in
the internal database accordingly. Our implementation of sparse regression cubes
supports dynamic updates of the cubes, simply by calculating the compressed rep-
resentation matrix for each individual data tuple that is added. The representation
matrix then can be added to all materialized data cells that are relevant to the tuple.
The application server queries the modeling server every time a prediction
needs to be made and the modeling server responds with the prediction. The
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query handler module is responsible to answer those using the stored regression
cube. The details of query handling process are described in Section 2.3. The data
modeling servers use C++ and Pyhton.
6.1.3 Data Cleaning Server
By including a data cleaning component in FusionSuite, the goal is to significantly
reduce the effort put on the application-specific error removal mechanisms. Fu-
sionSuite data cleaning servers are periodically asked by the distillation manager
to evaluate the newly submitted samples in terms of credibility. As discussed in
Chapter 3, data cleaning is done by assigning credibility values to the users and
the sample values they claim. A basic fact-finder can use the fact that correct
values should be claimed by many credible users and credible users often report
correct and accurate values.
To perform the fact-finding in a general way, data cleaning servers first need
to cluster the samples in such a way that similar samples grouped together in the
same cluster and are distinguished from other potentially noisy group of samples.
A clustering module does this in a flexible and general manner. A fact-finding
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module uses the output to identify clusters that are likely to be incorrect. The
data cleaning module then removes all samples that correspond to such clusters
and stores the remaining samples into the appropriate database. The process is
summarized in Figure 6.3. The data cleaning module is implemented in Java and
Python.
6.1.4 Data Sharing Component
The data sharing component is responsible for sharing different data streams with
the backed. Since each data stream may be used by multiple applications and each
application may use multiple streams, this component should support a general
sharing mechanism. In addition to scalability, efficiency and scalability are major
concerns with the data sharing component.
The data sharing component mainly consists of a privacy filter and a upload
module as shown in Figure 6.4. The raw data stream collected directly by at-
tached sensor drivers or our cyber-physical data collection protocol are supplied
to the sharing module. Depending on users privacy setting on the client, the shar-
ing module may or may not invoke the privacy filter. If invoked, the privacy filter
aggregates a set of data points. The minimum required number of data points for
the aggregation is another user-specified parameters that is thoroughly discussed
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in Section 4.3. The neutral features are then extracted and reported. The shar-
ing component asks the upload module to serialize either the raw streams or the
neutral features and upload them through one of the sharing channels. The data
sharing component is implemented in Java on Android.
6.1.5 Data Collection
Several sensing systems use pre-deployed sensors to monitor certain events or
physical phenomena that can be used as input to the FusionSuite modeling frame-
work. The sensing data streams collected from such networks are gathered in a
base station and shared using the data sharing component. Large scale sensor
networks usually use communication protocols tailored to resource constrained
multi-hop networks. Given the modeling goal of FusionSuite, data collection can
be optimized using our proposed cyber-physical data transport protocol presented
in Chapter 5. The data collection protocol is written in C++ for LiteOS operating
system. The receiving node (base station) in the transport protocol can be the user
client which shares the data. In this case, the data stream is simply written into a
local database or a text-file.
In systems where a few sensors are used by each user or autonomous system,
the data collection component is omitted. For example, a participatory sensing
system where users carry cellphones and use them to collect data, do not employ
this component. In such cases, the sensing module directly writes readings to the
local storage.
6.2 Data Sharing
FusionSuite is designed to be general in terms of different types of applications
and data streams that it can support. There are some points that need to be con-
146
sidered with regards to data types and data sharing:
• Sharing Channels: The communication channel used for sharing data needs
to be efficient yet flexible enough to support generic applications.
• Configurability: Since the tool is used to develop an arbitrary sensing
applications, appropriate mechanisms need to be devised to configure the
frontend and backend interfaces based on different data types. We ad-
dress this by proposing configurable application-independent modules and
application-specific plug-ins.
We address the configurability challenge by using configuration files at the
server and the client. The client program takes the data trace file and a config-
uration file as input. Each measurement attribute is a column in the trace file.
In this section, we first describe the sharing channel details, then describe how
FusionSuite is configured to be used with different sensing applications.
6.2.1 Sharing Channel
There are three main goals associated with designing the sharing channels. First,
the channel should be flexible meaning that it should support different data types
and applications. Second, it should be efficient in terms of throughput and latency.
Finally, it should be resilient to losses. The first goal is achieved by using data
schema files that enforces appropriate serialization for different data types. We
develop three different sharing mechanisms to be supported by FusionSuite:
• Direct TCP Upload: This TCP push mechanism directly uploads bulks of
collected samples to the fetching module in the distillation manager. The
TCP server in the fetch module constantly listens for TCP connections on a
pre-defined port reads the sample set in one of the supported formats.
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• CCNx Connection: The CCNx library [CCN, ; Jacobson et al., 2009] pro-
vides support for named-data networking paradigm over current IP-based
routing infrastructure. We use CCNx APIs to create content data streams
that are pulled by the fetch module from the participants
• Twitter: FusionSuite also supports data sharing through Twitter social net-
working service. In this case, samples are broken down to tweets and shared
with an appropriate hashtag that identifies the sample, the sequence, and the
application to which the tweet belongs to.
The frontend can be configured to use one or all of the three different channels
to share the data. Each channel has some unique advantages. The direct TCP
upload is simple and reliable hence it is suitable for a fallback mechanism. The
CCNx connection provides much higher efficiency and flexibility while the twitter
channel is very scalable.
6.2.2 Configurations
FusionSuite data flow is configured by a common data schema file that describes
the data types and database schema used in the application. In particular it con-
tains: i) A unique application id, ii) a database schema for the raw data stream,
and cleaned data samples, and iii) a database schema for segmented data. The first
database schema is used by the upload module in the data sharing component and
fetch module in the distillation manager to serialize and parse the data over the
sharing channel. It is also used by the data cleaning servers to read and write the
input and output.
In addition to the data flow configuration. each component also needs to be
individually configured with configuration files or application-specific plug-ins.
The following are the configuration requirements for different components:
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• Distillation Manager: The segmentation plug-in must be provided in the
source-code form and compiled with the rest of the manager code.
• Data Cleaning Server: A distance-metric plug-in is provided to the data
cleaning module as discussed before in Chapter 3.
• Data Modeling Server: The predictor functions that map S to X (gj) should
be provided.
• Data Sharing Component: Similar to the distillation manager, the segmen-
tation plug-in needs to be given. This is exactly the same Java code since
the interfaces to the plug-in are the same.
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CHAPTER 7
RELATED WORK
Previous work in a variety of areas are considered relevant to our work. We briefly
discuss the related work in the areas of: (i) regression modeling and learning, (ii)
online analytical processing, (iii) privacy, and (iv) data collection protocols.
7.1 Regression Analysis and Prediction
Modeling complex non-linear systems has been a challenge in a variety of dif-
ferent areas from control theory to data mining. Statistical estimators such as
Kalman filters, or Hidden Markov Models (HMMs) are frequently used to model
systems. Regression analysis through statistical learning is widely used for pre-
diction. Multi-variate regression analysis techniques are very mature and have
been studied for decades [R.O.Duda et al., 2001; Weisberg, 1980; S.M.Weiss
and C.A.Kulikowski, 1991; Kutner et al., 2005; R.A.Johnson and Wichern, 2002;
A.J.Dobson., 2001; Hastie et al., 2003]. In addition to least-squares minimiza-
tion estimators, several techniques such as Support Vector Regression [Cortes and
Vapnik, 1995] or Ridge regression [Hoerl and Kennard, 1970] provide robust pre-
dictors.
Many mechanisms enable choosing right set of regression predictors or re-
duce the dimensionality of the regression problem [Kononenko and Hong, 1997;
Shih, 1999; Breslow and Aha, 1997]. Attribute (feature) selection techniques
such as forward stepwise selection and backward elimination [Weisberg, 1980], or
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least-angle regression have been proposed to choose the right prediction attributes.
Principal component regression based on singular value decomposition [Hastie
et al., 2003] is another major technique to avoid inaccurate modeling in high-
dimensions or when using complex models.
Hierarchical regression techniques that construct several linear regression model
have been studied in various contexts. Regression trees [Breima et al., 1984] build
a hierarchy of regression models.
There is previous work on cost-sensitive classification and regression that comes
closer to our own. Past cost-sensitive classification literature, however, is focused
on predicting discrete class labels. It cannot be easily extended to regression
modeling of continuously varying functions on a continuous input space [Turney,
2000b; 2000a]. For cost-sensitive regression, Geoetschalckx proposed a parsi-
monious model to jointly minimize a weighted function of modeling error and
data collection cost as a single combined metric for a single linear regression
model [Goetschalckx et al., 2008]. In contrast, we study more complex predic-
tion problems in sensor networks where phenomena may behave differently under
different conditions, leading to a multitude of models under corresponding condi-
tions, and where both ordered and unordered predictors are used.
7.2 Online Analytical Processing
Data cubes are considered powerful tools to explore high dimensional spaces as
well as to perform predictive modeling [Raghu Ramakrishnan, 2007]. Prediction
Cubes [Chen et al., 2005] materialize various machine learning prediction tools
at different data abstraction levels. However, the problem of predictive linear
regression given sparse samples has not been studied. The Sampling Cube [Li et
al., 2008] focuses on how to generalize queries to compensate for sparse data cells
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but only primitive measures (e.g. mean) are discussed. In contrast, we address the
problem of constructing variable size models using sparse data.
Regression analysis has been used as an online analytical processing measure.
Regression Cubes [Chen et al., 2006] are OLAP data cubes which use compress-
ible regression models as measures. The measure compression and aggregation
scheme enables efficient materialization of regression cubes. Logistic Regression
Cubes [Xi et al., 2009] extend this idea to logistic regression models by contribut-
ing a compressible measure. Unlike ours, previous OLAP tools do not provision
reliability of modeling sparse samples.
Tremendous past research efforts focus on efficient data cube support for multi-
dimensional data analysis [Sarawagi et al., 1998; Harinarayan et al., 1996; Beyer
and Ramakrishnan, 1999; Sismanis et al., 2002; Wang et al., 2002]. Partial ma-
terialization is used widely to optimize the performance of data cubes. Previous
research [Harinarayan et al., 1996] employs general partial materialization goals
for common aggregates. Iceberg cubes [Beyer and Ramakrishnan, 1999] restrict
the computation of cuboids by employing a condition on the measure such as
minimum count. Techniques proposed to reduce the size of data cubes without
imposing decompression overhead [Wang et al., 2002]. Coalesced cubes [Sisma-
nis et al., 2002] use prefixes to compress the size of a data cube without incurring
any error. All of these methods only discuss the use of primitive and standard
OLAP aggregates.
7.3 Privacy
In recent years, a number of techniques have been proposed for modifying or
transforming data in such a way so as to preserve privacy. Such methods can be
classified into four main categories described below.
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First, randomization techniques that add noise to the original data points have
been used to hide the real value of sensitive data and other attributes (e.g., the
trend of the data over time) [Adam and Worthmann, 1989; Brand, 2002]. They tra-
ditionally distort data for methods such as surveys which have an evasive answer
bias because of privacy concerns [Warner, 1965; Liew et al., 1985]. Fuller [Fuller,
1993] and Kim and Winkler [Kim and Winkler, 1995] showed that some simple
statistical information (e.g., means and correlations) can be preserved by adding
random noise. In [Agrawal and Srikant, 2000; Agrawal and Aggarwal, 2001],
independent random noise (e.g., Gaussian) with high enough power is used to
perturb user data. Ganti et al. [Ganti et al., 2008] proposed that correlated noise,
which has the same distribution as real data, can be used to perturb time-series
data. Using randomization techniques in the context of privacy preserving regres-
sion, however, will introduce error in the regression model.
Another set of randomization techniques preserve differential privacy using
randomized aggregation functions [Dwork, 2008; Chen et al., 2009]. When an
aggregate value is derived by a trustworthy entity or the user client, differen-
tial privacy is preserved if adding or removing a data item does not significantly
change the output (aggregate) probability distribution. While traditionally these
approaches rely on a trusted server to compute the aggregate, some techniques
have been proposed to compute the output in a distributed manner to eliminate
the need for such servers [Dwork et al., 2006; Rastogi and Nath, 2010]. However,
like data point perturbation, all differential privacy methods rely on randomization
that introduces noise to the regression model.
Second, the k-anonymity model [L. Sweeney, 2002] was developed because of
the possibility of indirect identification of records from public databases. In the
k-anonymity method, the granularity of data is reduced using techniques such as
generalization and suppression. The l-diversity model [Machanavajjhala et al.,
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2007] was designed to handle some weaknesses in the k-anonymity model in-
cluding the the cases where there is homogeneity of the sensitive values within
a group. Many variants of the above methods exist in current literature [Ciriani
et al., 2007]. Although k-anonymity is widely used to hide user identity in large
database, it can not be applied into this problem because useful information for
regression will be lost during generalization and suppression.
Distributed privacy preservation [Yao, 1982b; Pinkas, 2002] is used to derive
aggregate results from private data sets which are partitioned across these enti-
ties. For this purpose, the data sets may either be horizontally partitioned or be
vertically partitioned. In horizontal partitioning [Clifton et al., 2002; Du and Atal-
lah, 2001; Lindell and Pinkas, 2000], the individual records are spread out across
multiple entities, each of which have the same set of attributes. In vertically par-
titioned data sets [Clifton et al., 2002; Vaidya and Clifton, 2002], the individual
entities have different attributes of the same set of records. There have been also
efforts in finding good privacy preserving regression methods [Sanil et al., 2004;
Du et al., 2004; Karr and others, 2004]. None of them, however, study the
achieved privacy.
Finally, secure multi-party computation [Yao, 1982a] and homomorphic en-
cryption [Gentry, 2009] techniques can be used as cryptographic solutions for
privacy-preserving modeling or aggregation of distributed data [Castelluccia et
al., 2005]. Some of these techniques, like our technique, do not perturb data and
hence enable exact computation of certain aggregate functions. However, such
encryptions are extremely expensive (up to 30× more expensive than regular en-
cryption) and only a small class of functions can be computed on such encrypted
data. Our solution is computationally cheaper and more general than these cryp-
tographic solutions.
Some previous work study how to provide different levels of privacy to different
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users. Xiao and Tao [Xiao and Tao, 2006] proposed the notion of personalized
privacy to allow each data owner to specify her own privacy level. However,
the technique works in a centralized setting and for string attributes organized in
a taxonomy tree. In contrast, our privacy-aware mechanism is targeted towards
numerical data in a distributed setting.
7.4 Fact Finding
Human-centric sensing and in particular participatory sensing has received signifi-
cant attention in the past years. Participatory sensing was introduced in [Burke and
others, 2006] and a broad overview of such applications is summarized in [Ab-
delzaher and others, 2007]. Some of the early participatory sensing applications
include CenWits [Huang et al., 2005a], a participatory sensor network to search
and rescue hikers, CarTel [Hull and others, 2006], a vehicular sensor network
for traffic monitoring, and BikeNet [Eisenman and others, 2007], a bikers sen-
sor network for monitoring popular bike routes. More recent applications include
CabSense [Sense Networks, 2010] to find taxi cabs in New York city and a coop-
erative transit tracking using GPS enabled smartphones [Thiagarajan et al., 2010].
Our service, Veritas, can be leveraged by the variety of participatory sensing ap-
plications to distill the sensor data collected and improve their accuracy.
A relevant body of work in the machine learning and data mining communities
performs trust analysis based on the source and claim information network. When
seeking to determine whether or not something should be believed, the simplest
approach is to take a vote, accepting the claim supported by the most information
sources in a set of mutually exclusive claims, or those claims supported by a num-
ber of sources exceeding a threshold. However, this implicitly assumes that all
information sources are equally trustworthy. Fact-finders, a class of iterative trust
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analysis algorithms, avoid this assumption by seeking both the believability of the
claims and the trustworthiness of the sources. In each iteration, the trustworthi-
ness of each source is calculated from the believability of the claims it makes,
and the believability of each claim is calculated from the trustworthiness of the
sources asserting it, repeating until convergence.
Hubs and Authorities [Kleinberg, 1999], for example, can be adapted as a sim-
ple fact-finder whether the belief in a claim c is B(c) =
∑
s∈Sc T (s) and the
trustworthiness of a source s is T (s) =
∑
c∈Cs B(c), where Sc and Cs are the
sources asserting a given claim and the claims asserted by a particular source,
respectively. Other straightforward instances of this model include TruthFinder
[Yin et al., 2008] and the Investment, PooledInvestment and Average·Log algo-
rithms [Pasternack and Roth, 2010]. Many fact-finders also enhance the basic
formula. 3-Estimates [Galland et al., 2010] rewards sources that correctly assert
highly disputed claims, while AccuVote [Dong et al., 2009a; 2009b] considers
“source dependence, where one source derives some of its information from one
or more other sources, effectively boosting the trustworthiness of independent
sources. The problem of detecting source dependency has also been discussed
and solustions have been proposed [Berti-Equille et al., 2009; Dong et al., 2010].
Blanco et al. [Blanco et al., 2010] analyze the source dependency with a focus on
copy detection using knowledge from multiple attributes.
Frameworks have been proposed to enhance fact-finding algorithms in general:
Pasternack et al. [Pasternack and Roth, 2010] incorporate prior knowledge con-
cerning the claims (in the form of first-order logic) into fact-finding to leverage
what the user already knows. A consequent piece of work [Pasternack and Roth,
2011] introduces a broad range of background knowledge into the process. Gupta
et al.[Gupta et al., 2011] account for a sources varying expertise across differ-
ent topics. Additionally, trust analysis has been done both on a homogeneous
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network of information providers [Balakrishnan, 2011] or claims [Yin and Tan,
2011] and a heterogeneous network consisting of multi-typed objects [Sun et al.,
2009]. Veritas borrows the idea of fact-finding from the basic iterative model.
In order to support as many different sensing applications as possible, we avoid
using methods that rely on source-dependence or prior knowledge.
7.5 Data Collection in Sensor Networks
Reliability and congestion control is widely studied in general multi-hop wire-
less networks and many protocols have been proposed for end-to-end data de-
livery [Kim et al., 2005; Sundaresan et al., 2005; Paek and Govindan, 2007;
Vedantham et al., 2005; Kim and others, 2007; Hui and Culler, 2004]. Re-
ceiver centric end-to-end retransmission (e.g., [Kim et al., 2005; 2004]), selective
NACKS (e.g.,[Kim and others, 2007]), explicit loss/congestion decoupling [Sun-
daresan et al., 2005], and error correction codes (e.g., [Kim et al., 2004]) are
common mechanisms. Such protocols cannot efficiently be applied to data collec-
tion in cyber-physical systems with many-to-one traffic.
Previous work also discuss many-to-one transport protocols [Stann and Hei-
demann, 2003; Wan et al., 2002; Vedantham et al., 2005], many of them em-
ploy directed diffusion and use hop-by-hop NACKs to guarantee reliability (e.g.,
[Stann and Heidemann, 2003; Wan et al., 2002]). More closely to our work, some
work addresses many-to-one communication paradigms with new reliability se-
mantics specific to wireless sensor networks [Sankarasubramaniam et al., 2003;
Zhou et al., 2005]. ESRT [Sankarasubramaniam et al., 2003], for example, as-
sumes that the base station needs a minimum number of reports from sensors to
reliably identify the event. Similarly, PORT [Zhou et al., 2005] defines reliabil-
ity based on a function of the packet rate received from each node. Gungor et
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al. [Gungor et al., 2008] propose a real-time and reliable transport protocol focus-
ing on characteristics of different applications such as number of packets being
received from the event and the delay constraint of decision interval. All of the
proposed protocols have a very limited knowledge about the real importance of a
data packet from the application perspective. Unlike those, we introduce a proto-
col designed efficiently for spatio-temporal data collection.
Several efforts specifically address congestion control in wireless sensor net-
works [Wan et al., 2003; Sankarasubramaniam et al., 2003; Ee and Bajcsy, 2004;
Hull et al., 2004; Iyer, 2005; Vedantham et al., 2005; Rangwala et al., 2006;
Bian et al., 2007; Paek and Govindan, 2007; Kim and others, 2007]. Such proto-
cols can be divided into three classes: i) protocols designed for node-to-node data
transfer (e.g. [Iyer, 2005; Kim and others, 2007]), ii) centralized rate control for
many-to-one data collection (e.g. [Ee and Bajcsy, 2004; Vedantham et al., 2005;
Sankarasubramaniam et al., 2003; Bian et al., 2007; Paek and Govindan, 2007]),
and iii) distributed rate control for many-to-one data collection (e.g. [Wan et al.,
2003; Rangwala et al., 2006; Hull et al., 2004]). To the best of our knowledge,
there is no congestion control scheme that considers importance of data packets
in terms of estimation accuracy and provides an efficient yet simple protocol that
can be implemented on motes.
Data aggregation is one of the main characteristics of wireless sensor net-
works and has been widely addressed [Intanagonwiwat et al., 2000; Madden et
al., 2002]. Directed Diffusion [Intanagonwiwat et al., 2000] is a data-centric dis-
semination approach at which data can be directed toward the sink on several
different paths and intermediate nodes can merge two or more samples that have
been received and report a single aggregate value. TAG [Madden et al., 2002] is an
aggregation service for sensor networks using a query system. Authors in [Chen
and Sha, 2004] formulate the many-to-one data transport problem given specific
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channel constraints and message utility functions. Using this formulation, they
provide a framework for studying the optimal flow assignment to maximize the
total utility of the network. Comparing to our work, these do not address the
issues of reliability or congestion control.
Estimation theory and predictive modeling have been used widely in monitor-
ing applications to reduce the sampling load and data transfer rate in a sensor
network [Chu et al., 2002; Nowak et al., 2004; Santini and Roemer, 2006]. Chu
et al. [Chu et al., 2002] propose a mechanism to decide when new data pack-
ets should be sent based on the local variation in the measurements. Using this
scheme, only nodes with high difference in recent observations would transmit
their readings and therefore energy is saved. Nowak et al. [Nowak et al., 2004]
propose another energy saving method for field estimation where sampling in
slow-changing areas is performed with a lower resolution.
Authors in [Huang and Rubin, 2007], discuss the problem of selecting a small
subset of sensors to achieve the lowest estimation error given the energy con-
straint on the network. Santini et al. [Santini and Roemer, 2006] propose a data
reduction protocol using an adaptive physical model to save on transmitting the
predictable data. Similarly, autoregressive models are used [Tulone and Madden,
2006] to predict sensor readings given a query at the sink. In comparison to our
scheme, all these approaches are aimed toward reducing bandwidth usage in a re-
liable medium. BaySail [Silberstein et al., 2007] is an out-of-network Bayesian
inference engine for unreliable networks which employ data suppression. This
engine provides a better estimation by distinguishing between suppression and
channel failures using the knowledge of the transmission redundancy and the sup-
pression scheme. None of the previous data reduction research has designed to
provide controlled error in an unreliable environment which our protocol achieves
through probabilistic retransmissions.
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In real-time computing, several protocols have been proposed for sensor net-
work communication [Caccamo et al., 2002; Koubaˆa et al., 2008; Felemban et
al., 2006], but they restrict themselves to different mechanisms for deadline or pri-
ority enforcement. Some application semantics, such as estimation error, do not
lend themselves well to urgency-based prioritization. New schemes are needed
to decide which packets to forward or how packet content is combined based on
physical-world state.
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSIONS
We conclude the thesis by first presenting a summary of what have been done.
Next, the limitations and weaknesses are discussed and finally we present oppor-
tunities to continue this work and extend it.
8.1 Thesis Summary
This thesis studied the problem of data distillation in the next-generation of sens-
ing applications and developed an architecture and library called FusionSuite to
facilitate the development of such applications. Wide-area sensing applications
and services are motivated by the proliferation of common use sensors for exam-
ple the ones that are embedded in cellphones, cars, and homes. Data modeling is
a common requirement in many instances and requires a tremendous application
development effort. To this end, four major challenges have been identified and
addressed: i) reliable and cost-sensitive modeling of non-linear cyber-physical
system using sparse and high dimensional data, ii) removing incorrect, irrelevant,
and unreliable data collected by the users, iii) user privacy when sharing data
traces, and iv) efficient data collection in multi-hop environments that optimizes
the modeling performance.
To address the first challenge, we proposed Sparse Regression Cubes a model-
ing tool that is able to reliably build hierarchical models of a complex non-linear
system even when trained with sparse data. This interdisciplinary effort com-
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bines techniques from data mining and estimation theory to achieve this. The data
cleaning challenge is tackled by burrowing techniques called fact-finders from
data mining and machine learning communities and building appropriate repre-
sentation of sensing data. This way, we are able to provide general means of
removing noise and unreliable data traces without requiring application-specific
knowledge or much effort from the developer.
Privacy concerns of the users sharing data are alleviated by a scheme proposed
to alter the data that are being shared. In our scheme, user clients share features of
the collected data instead of raw data traces. These features can then be used by
the modeling backend and in particular sparse regression cubes to construct mod-
els that are exactly the same as the case where all private data traces have been
shared. The fourth and final challenge is studied in the context of a data transport
protocol for multi-hop data collection networks that constantly measure a phe-
nomenon. Our approach exploits the importance of each measurement in terms of
the contribution to the physical model to minimize the resource consumption and
maximize the modeling accuracy.
We have built a green navigation service called GreenGPS that uses wide-area
sensing to understand the fuel-consumption behavior of vehicles and provide users
with the fuel-efficient route between different locations. GreenGPS uses Fusion-
Suite to overcome different challenges and showcases the advantages of having a
general purpose wide-area sensing framework.
8.2 Limitations and Weaknesses
The presented work is a first step towards building frameworks and architec-
tures that support easy and simple development of wide-area sensing applications.
Defining and understanding what constitute a wide-area sensing applications and
162
what are the characteristics requires significant amount of work and is a key in
success of such framework. Participatory sensing and monitoring applications
that are currently developed are just a small fraction of what can be done with the
vast amount of sensing data that are currently available. From that small fraction,
our framework is only applied to one application, GreenGPS. Resolving each of
the data distillation challenges that were presented in this thesis is indeed hard
but much easier compared to the problem of understanding and formulating chal-
lenges in a way that the resulting framework is actually usable by application
developers. One reason is that current sensing applications are very much entan-
gled with the specific sensors, data types and processes and therefore can be very
diverse in terms of the design and requirements.
Given any particular application such as GreenGPS, using flexibility and sim-
plicity of FusionSuite can come with a small price in terms of efficiency. Al-
though each component is tuned to scale well and work with the highest effi-
ciency, FusionSuite as a whole needs find-tuning to achieve a perfect balance in
the efficiency-flexibility trade-off. Data sharing channels are examples of places
where supporting arbitrary data types can hurt the performance and thus special
considerations must be made. Again, our experience suggests that applying Fu-
sionSuite to more deployed applications would immensely help fine-tuning the
design and implementation of FusionSuite.
The diversity of requirements also calls for more components and more cus-
tomization in FusionSuite. For example, GreenGPS data can be modeled well
with a hierarchy of regression models while another application may call for a
different method with different requirements. One may need an expectation maxi-
mization procedure while the other need an efficient way of storing statistics such
as mean and variance. The privacy-aware data sharing also would differ based
on the modeling requirement. For example, a perturbation-based scheme is re-
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quired when simple statistics are calculated over smaller data segments instead of
generalized models. Finally, each component has several limitations that can be
addressed to make them more useful for more applications. The details of how to
improve are presented next.
8.3 Future Directions
There are several directions that can be considered as future work to this thesis.
Based on the limitations that we identified, we present three general directions.
First and te most important direction is to use FusionSuite to develop other par-
ticipatory or wide area sensing applications. This would refine the APIs and in-
terfaces to match better with different application requirements and also may call
for building new components.
Another direction is to extend the current framework. Some instances that need
improvement are: i) extend the modeling framework by exploiting the linkages
between different variables in order to improve the accuracy. ii) extend the data
cleaning component to consider ambiguous data attributes or malicious user be-
havior as well as considering social information for more accurate inference. iii)
extend the user privacy analysis by providing analytical bounds on the privacy as
defined. iv) extend the data collection mechanism to support long-term linkages
between sources.
In the third direction, extensive work on the security is needed. Firstly, backend
security can be improved to make sure that the correct models are given to the
application. Also, prediction queries made to the framework should be ensured
not to be bogus. Secondly, the data sharing channels are secure from any hijacking
or data sniffing. Finally, the server processes and data stores should be isolated
and secure against attacks.
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FusionSuite demonstrates how data distillation challenges can be solved in an
application-independent manner and why it is important to build a framework for
future wide-area sensing applications. There is much left to be done to identify
and fine-tune core components and to make the framework completely robust, effi-
cient and flexible. We hope that future research leads to industry-level frameworks
for wide-area sensing applications where FusionSuite is the underlying architec-
ture.
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